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Abstract
The thesis consists of five chapters: the first functions as an overture; the second,
third and fourth deal with Plato, Cicero and Montaigne respectively; and the fifth
raises some questions.
The overture explores the ways in which Odysseus, Lucretius and Seneca approached
death, and in the process introduces some obvious distinctions - between death
viewed as the act of dying and death viewed as the state of being dead, between the
death which comes to everyone and the death which comes to me, between our own
death and the death of others - and anticipates certain recurring themes.
The second chapter, on Plato, is concerned chiefly with the Phaedo and the question
of what is involved in "the practice of death". This entails an examination of related
concepts and terminology in the Gorgias and the Republic, and of the whole subject
of Platonic myth.
The third chapter discusses Cicero's views on death and immortality - both the
considered reflections of the philosopher and the spontaneous reactions of the
bereaved father - principally as these emerge from the Tusculan Disputations and the
letters to Atticus.
The fourth chapter approaches Montaigne - his own experiences of death, the
relationship between his earlier and later approaches, the tension between his
professed Catholicism and his pagan inclinations, the difficulty and perhaps
undesirability of extracting a 'message' from the Essais on this or any other subject.
The conclusion asks to what extent these various approaches succeed in what they set
out to do, and whether any generalised, objective approach to death can ever
successfully address the individual predicament, either in relation to one's own death
or in facing bereavement.
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I. Overture
The title "Approaching Death in the Classical Tradition" requires some explanation.
"Approaching Death" is highly ambiguous. First it may indicate the fact that death is
approaching all of us, or, as Seneca was fond of saying, that as soon as we are born
we begin to approach it. Second, it may refer to the way in which I approach my own
death, how I face the thought of it now, how I will face the reality then. Third, it may
describe how we react to the death of others, how we deal with bereavement. Fourth,
"death" may mean either the fact of death, of having to die; or the state of death, what
is involved in being dead. Fifth, "approaching" may suggest not a finished stance
over against death but an emerging, developing, even self-contradictory process. And
sixth, there may be overtones of "Towards an understanding of . . .", with the
implication that there is something tentative about the thesis itself, that it does not aim
to be exhaustive and definitive. In fact all these ambiguities are both conscious and
intentional, the first five because they reflect what is actually the case in the material
selected, the sixth because it reflects what will be the case in the treatment of that
material.
But something must also be said about the second part of the title, because while "the
Classical Tradition" is (conventionally at least) less ambiguous it seems to be in
collision with the table of contents - Plato and Cicero being obviously under-
representative and Montaigne non-representative. And, equally obviously, if the
intention were to produce a catalogue of attitudes to death in the classical world, then
limiting the evidence to any three names would be absurd. That, however, is not the
intention. Nor is it to describe, on the basis of archaeological, artistic and literary
2evidence, how the ordinary person in the classical world viewed death.1 Rather it is to
examine the ways in which a selection of canonical figures, on the basis of their own
ideas and emotions and experience, suggested that other people should view death.
But the exercise is not simply descriptive: it will involve a consideration of whether
the advice given is sound advice, whether it is logically coherent and philosophically
satisfying, whether it should inform our own approach to death. And within the
confines of a thesis it would be unrealistic to deal in any depth with more than three
such figures along these lines.2 The question then is, why these three: why Plato,
Cicero and Montaigne?
As far as Plato is concerned, it would be necessary only to defend his exclusion: that
is to say, in terms of range, of imagination, and of influence, his inclusion is
inevitable. And if there is to be a balancing Roman, Cicero is the obvious candidate,
not only in terms of range and of influence, but because we know so much about his
private life and his real thoughts. But a second, equally representative, wide-ranging
and influential Greek or Roman would have been hard to find. About Homer's
personality, for example, we know nothing, and the state of death for his characters
means only a murky half-existence. Of Lucretius' life we know next to nothing,3 and
1 As, for example, Rohde and Cumont and more recently Vermeule and Garland do in their various
ways. Cf. most recently Edwards, whose aim is rather to capture, on the basis of literary texts, the
distinctively Roman attitudes to death: because of the nature of the evidence, this means essentially
elite rather than ordinary Romans.
2 The force of the objection that only three, whoever they are, cannot possibly be representative, may
be diminished by citing Vermeule's self-deprecating uneasiness about her own field, "where it has
always been customary to serve up a Homeric tag, a passage of Euripides, a red-figured vase, a
quotation from one of the sacred laws of the Greek cities and a passage of Plutarch, a skeleton, a
loutrophoros, a lethykos, and some lines of Cicero and Demosthenes, and to call the mixture 'what the
Greeks thought about death'. After four years of reading I still do not know what the Greeks thought
about death, or what Americans think either, or what I think myself." (p.x)
3 As Boyancé puts it (1964, p.1): "Il a pratiqué rigoureusement, trop rigoureusement au gré de notre
curiosité, le 'Cache ta vie' recommandé par son maître." To Santayana (p.20) this is no loss: "Our
ignorance of the life of Lucretius is not, I think, much to be regretted. His work preserves that part of
him which he himself would have wished to preserve. Perfect conviction ignores itself, proclaiming
the public truth. To reach this no doubt requires a peculiar genius which is called intelligence; for
3after death he sees no alternative to non-existence. About Seneca we know a great
deal, but of his thoughts only those which were intended for public consumption,4 and
while he does allow for the possibility of a blissful afterlife, he is much more
preoccupied with dying than with death.
Montaigne as the third man is a more intriguing counterweight than any of these, and
his presence produces a better mixture. Of course this apparently involves moving
out of the classical world altogether into 16th century France, but Montaigne is
scarcely to be defined as a 16th century Frenchman. Latin was his first language and
he was steeped in the literature of the ancients. Although ostensibly a Catholic, his
approach to death is much more pagan than Christian, and given his debt to Lucretius
and Seneca, the extent to which he quotes Cicero, and the fact that Socrates is his
hero, he might be thought to offer a synthesis of attitudes to death in the classical
world - were it not for the entirely distinctive nature of his own attitude and the very
modern way in which this is presented to us in the Essais.5
But if one way of reading Montaigne is to see his starting-point as Lucretius and
Seneca and his final position as in some sense Socratic, so Cicero the philosopher can
be understood6 as a Roman Academic in dialogue with Epicureanism and Stoicism;
intelligence is quickness in seeing things as they are. But where intelligence is attained, the rest of a
man, like the scaffolding to a finished building, becomes irrelevant. We do not wish it to intercept our
view of the solid structure, which alone was intended by the artist." While this may be true of
Lucretius it is not true in every case, certainly not in that of Montaigne whose scaffolding is as
interesting as the building - or whose scaffolding is the building.
4 M.T. Griffin (pp.4 f.) speaks of "the reader's general impression that he is not really being brought
close to the author, that he is being told only what Seneca regards as philosophically interesting and no
more...[Seneca] is more concerned to offer the public examples of the moral preacher, the pedagogue,
the struggling student, the zealous convert, than to portray his real relationship with his addressee
Lucilius, or record his own moods."
5 Cf. Leeman (p.322), who describes him both as the first modern intellectual and as a bridge between
Seneca and us.
6 Or misunderstood. Cf. Long, p.289: "We should distinguish in Cicero between the genus
philosophandi that he favours - that is, the sceptical Academic methodology - and theses that he finds
4and Homer's influence on Plato though complex is immense. It may therefore help to
set the scene if the approaches of that hypothetical alternative trio - Seneca, Lucretius
and Homer (or more precisely Odysseus) - are given a brief airing at this point.7 It
will also serve the purpose of heralding some of the recurring themes and leitmotifs.
The three will be dealt with in that order, partly because Seneca's approach, being the
most wide-ranging, suggests principles of classification against which to compare and
evaluate the others; and partly because the question of the status of myth or poetry or
fiction in the Odyssey, coming at the end of the overture, leads naturally into the
chapter on Plato.
Death is always hovering in Seneca.8 The Consolationes of course - those addressed
to Marcia, to Helvia, to Polybius, to Marullus,9 and to Lucilius10 - deal with it
expressly, but there are few of the Epistulae Morales in which its presence cannot be
sensed. He follows convention in cramming every conceivable stratagem into each
consolatio, even to the point of self-contradiction, and the Epistulae are haphazard by
their nature, so that the treatment is far from systematic.11 But nowhere is it his
'plausible' (probabilia), which could be drawn in theory from any other school."
7 It should be emphasised that just as in the body of the work there will be no question of broadening
the field to include "Greek and Roman attitudes to death", so here the intention is not to identify and
discuss "orthodox" Epicurean or Stoic approaches to death, but rather to ask how Lucretius and Seneca
confronted it. Colish (p.2) draws attention to the dangers involved in "the sort of Ideengeschichte
which divorces thought from the human beings who produce it, ignoring their lives, their historical
circumstances, their professional identities, their intellectual proclivities, their education and
associations, the genre in which they wrote, their personal concerns and conviction..." It is precisely
those human beings who will be the focus of attention here.
8 As Schönegg (p.15) puts it: "Der Tod ist Ausgangspunkt und Ziel seines Philosophierens."
9 Ep.Mor. XCIX.
10 Ep.Mor. LXIII.
11 See Grimal p.40: "Aussi, quand il abandonne le dialogue, il a recours à la lettre, qui n'est qu'un
dialogue à distance. Mais, dans le dialogue comme dans la lettre, l'exposé est dominé par la
considération des cas particuliers, des appels à l'expérience, qui rendent assez malaisé pour nous de
rétablir, dans tous ses chaînons, une doctrine cohérente." Cf. Leeman, p.324: "Einerseits gehören die
einzelnen Aussagen in den Gedankengang oder die Gedankenreihe des einzelnen Briefes und können
daraus nicht gelöst werden, ohne denaturiert und zuweilen sogar zu einer Art billiger Kalendersprüche
5intention to give a theoretical account of the nature of death and its consequences: it
is rather to offer practical advice on the subject of approaching death.12 And this
advice falls into two distinct categories: how to approach our own death, and how to
approach the death of another.
Within the former category, there is a further distinction between preparing to die and
preparing for the state of death, a distinction reflected in the ambivalence of the
recurring verb meditari, meaning either “to think on, ponder, contemplate,” or “to
practise, study, exercise oneself in.”13 So, for example, with the first meaning, Seneca
tells Lucilius that he should think every day about the transience of human life, so that
he may be able to leave it with a calm mind.14 Or with the second meaning,
paraphrasing the Phaedo: "Inde est quod Plato clamat: sapientis animum totum in
mortem prominere, hoc velle, hoc meditari."15
Meditari in the first sense enables us to face dying. It amounts in fact to a kind of ars
moriendi, but one which applies not just to the deathbed: it should be begun
immediately, since its purpose is to combat that fear of dying which destroys the
zu werden. Anderseits hat Senecas Denken über den Tod als solches nichts Systematisches,
Folgerichtiges. Es ist lebendiges Gedankengut, der jeweiligen Lebenslage und Stimmung
entsprechend."
12 See Kassel, p.28: "Senecas umfängliche konsolatorische Schriftstellerei gehört durchaus in den
Rahmen dieser umfassenden, ganz aufs Praktische gerichteten und mit unermüdlicher Bemühung ins
Werk gesetzten Seelentherapie..."
13 The same ambivalence in the Greek meleta/n allows Seneca to use the same word in reproducing
both Epicurus and Plato. But although he quotes Epicurus with approval he does not follow him.
Seneca envisages a continual meditation on death in order to be ready when the time comes (see e.g.
the reference in the following note). Epicurus (Ep.Men. 122-123) recommends that we meditate
(meleta/n) on what brings happiness, which involves principally (Ep.Men. 124) accustoming ourselves
to the thought that death is nothing to us (sune,qize de. evn tw/| nomi,zein mhde.n pro.j h`ma/j ei=nai to.n
qa,naton); but once we have succeeded in convincing ourselves of this we will no longer meditate on
death, since to continue to have to do so would be to admit its power over us. For Seneca, life is a
constant battle against the fear of death (De Brev.Vit. VII.3:"tota vita discendum est mori"); for
Epicurus, what one has ceased to fear one ceases to think about.
14 Ep.Mor. IV.5: "Hoc cotidie meditare, ut possis aequo animo vitam relinquere..." Cf. Nat. Quaest.
VI.32.12: "Omnibus omissis, hoc unum, Lucili, meditare, ne mortis nomen reformides."
6quality of life.16 And there are various techniques. One is to think each day that this
might be our last.17 Another is to consider that death is never a sudden thing: it is a
process which began when we were born.18 A third is to remember that everyone is in
the same boat, and that it is absurd to complain about a necessary condition of life.19
A fourth is to assure ourselves that there will be no suffering after death. The
underworld is merely something dreamt up by the poets.20 Death means non-
existence - "mors est non esse"21 - and what does not exist does not suffer. The dead
are no worse off than they were before they were born, just as a lamp is no worse off
when it is extinguished than before it was lit.22 There is no more reason to weep at
the thought of our non-existence a thousand years hence than at the thought of our
non-existence a thousand years ago.23 All this should result in the contempt for
death24 which is characteristic of great men, men like Socrates and Cato, and that is a
fifth technique: to dwell on their example25 and so avoid the unmanliness of fear.26
15 Ad Marciam XXIII.2.
16 See Ep.Mor. XXVI.10: "'Meditare mortem'; qui hoc dicit [Epicurus] meditari libertatem iubet.
Qui mori didicit servire dedidicit." Cf. Nat. Quaest. VI.32.9: "Quantum potes itaque ipse te cohortare,
Lucili, contra metum mortis. Hic est qui nos humiles facit; hic est qui vitam ipsam cui parcit inquietat
ac perdit."
17 E.g. Ep.Mor. XXVI.7: "Incertum est quo loco te mors expectet; itaque tu illam omni loco expecta."
Or Ep.Mor. XXIV.15: "quidquid fieri potest quasi futurum cogitemus." (Cf. De Tr. An. XI (quoting
Publilius): "cuivis potest accidere quod cuiquam potest.") Or Ep.Mor IV.8: "Cogita posse et latronem
et hostem admovere iugulo tuo gladium."
18 E.g. Ep.Mor. IV.9: "Ita dico: ex quo natus es, duceris." Or Ep.Mor. XXIV.20: "Cotidie morimur;
and 21 (quoting Lucilius): "mors non una venit, sed quae rapit ultima mors est." Or Ad Marciam
XXI.6: "Ex illo quo primum lucem vidit, iter mortis ingressus est accessitque fato propior et illi ipsi
qui adiciebantur adulescentiae anni vitae detrahebantur." Or Ep.Mor. CXX.18: "Erramus autem qui
ultimum timemus diem, cum tantumdem in mortem singuli conferant. Non ille gradus lassitudinem
facit, in quo deficimus, sed ille profitetur; ad mortem dies extremus pervenit, accedit omnis; carpit
nos ille, non corripit." Cf. Ep.Mor. LVIII.23: "vis tu non timere ne semel fiat quod cotidie fit!"
19 E.g. Ep.Mor. XXX.11: "Mors necessitatem habet aequam et invictam: quis queri potest in ea
condicione se esse in qua nemo non est?" Cf. Nat. Quaest. VI.32.12: "Mors naturae lex est."
20 E.g. Ad Marciam XIX.4: "luserunt ista poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus." Cf. Ep.Mor.
LXXXII.16.
21 Ep.Mor.LIV.4.
22 Ep.Mor. LIV.5.
23 "Haec paria sunt: non eris nec fuisti." Ep.Mor. LXXVII.11. (The so-called symmetry argument,
discussed below in connection with Lucretius.)
24 E.g. Ep.Mor. XXXVI.8 (giving advice to a friend of Lucilius who has just retired): "Quid ergo huic
meditandum est? quod adversus omnis tela, quod adversus omne hostium genus bene facit, mortem
contemnere..." Cf. Ep.Mor. LXXXII.16.
25 And not just the example of great men: Seneca frequently appeals to the courage of the gladiator in
7Cato indeed exemplifies not just the courage to face death but the freedom to choose
it.27
And once the fear of death is contained, we are not only enabled to die well, we are
free to live well.28 Seneca's ars moriendi accordingly prepares the ground for an ars
vivendi, but the specific content of that ars vivendi, the actual practice of virtue, may
involve29 a different orientation to death, which is evident in the second meaning of
the face of death. See e.g. Ep. Mor. XXX.8; XXXVII,2; XCIII.12; De Tranq. An. XI.5-6. In De
Prov.II the two are combined: Cato's death is presented as a spectaculum at which the gods form the
audience.
26 See e.g. Ep.Mor. XIII.13-15.
27 De Prov. II.10: "Cato qua exeat habet; una manu latam libertati viam faciet."
But Seneca's attitude to suicide is ambivalent. Sometimes he thinks it wrong (Ep Mor. XXIV.24,
where he criticises the "libido moriendi"; sometimes he thinks it justified as soon as circumstances
preclude peace of mind (Ep.Mor. LXX.5); sometimes he thinks it the philosopher's trump-card in the
pursuit of freedom (Ep.Mor. XXIV.7, De Prov. II.10 - both relating to Cato's death - and Ep. Mor.
LXX.14); sometimes he thinks it the only conceivable course (De Ira III.14-15); sometimes he is
indifferent: Ep.Mor. LXX.15: "Placet? vive. Non placet? licet eo reverti unde venisti." Cf. Ep.Mor.
LXVII.5.
Tadic-Gilloteaux (p.551) denies that there is any incoherence or contradiction in all this: "En
déterminant les mobiles valables du suicide, Sénèque les a tellement réduits - ni la crainte, ni la
souffrance, ni le dégout de la vie, ni la passion ne sont des mobiles suffisants - que, finalement, seul le
sage a le droit de se donner la mort. Et même dans les cas où il aurait de bons motifs de se suicider, il
devrait encore se poser la question: 'Ne puis-je plus être utile aux autres ni à moi-même'?"
And see the extended discussion in M.T. Griffin, pp.367-388, comparing the deaths of Seneca and
Socrates. Griffin argues that Seneca's views on suicide conformed to Stoic doctrine, which was itself a
"slight amplification " (p.374) of the position in the Phaedo; "necessity" in the latter being more
widely interpreted, but always provided that "one must not be moved by a sudden impulse, or driven by
one of the passions, i.e. by fear of misfortune or of death itself; by love of death or angry contempt of
life." (p.382) But Griffin herself quotes Ep.Mor. CIV.21 where Seneca contrasts the deaths of Socrates
and Zeno (who killed himself after breaking a finger): "alter te docebit mori si necesse erit, alter
antequam necesse erit."
Cf. also Edwards (pp.98-112), who thinks that Seneca's views on suicide "need to be seen as a key part
of his project to overcome the fear of death." (p.102.) But she also draws attention to the tension
between Seneca's frequent use of military imagery in the summons to face death, and his insistence that
suicide is always available as an escape route (De. Prov. VI.7: "si pugnare non vultis, licet fugere") -
which is really tantamount to desertion in the face of the enemy.
Cf. also Colish, pp.49f.
28 E.g. Ep.Mor. LXXXII,17: "Quae [mens] numquam ad virtutem exsurget si mortem malum esse
crediderit: exsurget si putabit indifferens esse." Cf. Ep.Mor. LXI.4: "Ante ad mortem quam ad vitam
praeparandi sumus." Cf. De Tr. An. XI:4: "Male vivet quisquis nesciet bene mori" and 6: "qui
mortem timebit nihil umquam pro homine vivo faciet." De Brev.Vit. VII.3 expresses the converse idea:
"Vivere tota vita discendum est et, quod magis fortasse miraberis, tota vita discendum est mori.."
29 Although some passages indicate that the ars vivendi following on a proper contempt for death is
simply a corresponding contempt for life, which results in an impregnable tranquillity. (See e.g. Nat.
Quaest. VI.32.4-5.) Indeed the implication is that the process is reciprocal. If we despise death we are
able to laugh in the face of fortune, and if we despise life the terrors of death evaporate. Or putting it
the other way round, it is the fear of death which produces the illusion that life is worth preserving, and
it is the desire to preserve life at all costs which makes us fear death. The answer (VI.32.6) is to live
8meditari. Here it is no longer a question of learning how to die (h` mele,th tou/
fusikou/ qana,tou), but of anticipating, practising in advance, the state of being dead.
And here of course the state of death can no longer be seen as annihilation, non-
existence: the practice or study of death, in the sense of a rehearsal of the state of
death, presupposes some kind of afterlife.
Yet Seneca is somewhat equivocal on the subject of an afterlife.30 At the lowest level
there is that bald statement that "mors est non esse."31 In other words, there is no
afterlife at all. Then there is the reflection that nothing in this world is ever
completely annihilated: it may disappear from sight, but it does not perish.32 In other
and die in accordance with nature: "rerum natura te, quae genuit, expectat et locus melior ac tutior."
("Ein Trost," remarks Waiblinger, p.81, "der neben dem schwermütigen Gedanken von der
Vergänglichkeit aller Seienden [VI.32.8] freilich nur wenig zur Geltung kommt.")
30 See Motto, p.188: "On the question of the soul after death Seneca is neither in harmony with the
Stoic masters nor consistent with himself." Hoven (pp.109-126) distinguishes four currents in
Seneca's writings: "Les textes relevés dans le premier groupe (A) indiquent que Sénèque connaît bien,
et approuve en principe, la doctrine stoïcienne de l'au-delà. Mais il ne paraît guère pouvoir s'en tenir à
cette 'voie moyenne' et il penche tantôt d'un côté tantôt de l'autre: certains passages dénotent une
attitude dubative (B) ou même une tendance à la négation épicurienne (C); d'autre part, dans le cas
d'une réponse positive, la doctrine stoïcienne est assez fréquemment remplacée ou submergée par un
'courant mystique' (D)." (p.125.)
Cf. Leeman, p.326: "Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele ist nur eine schöne Möglichkeit von der Seneca und
Cicero sich zuweilen hinreissen lassen und der sie mit echt-römischen Pathos Ausdruck verleihen, die
aber in der philosophischen Todesproblematik keinen wirklichen Halt bietet." This judgement is
perhaps more true of Seneca than of Cicero.
31 Ep.Mor. LIV.4. Cf. Troades 407-408: "Quaeris quo iaceas post obitum loco? / Quo non nata
iacent." Friedländer, after quoting those lines, says (1987, p.147): "An dieser unbedingten Leugnung
der Festdauer hat Seneca freilich wohl nicht lange festgehalten; doch zu einem festen, alle Zweifel
ausschliessenden Unsterblichkeitsglauben ist er trotz ernstlicher Bemühungen niemals gelangt." The
second part of that statement may well be true: cf. Hoven, p.115: "...dans Épitre CII nous avons
affaire, semble-t-il, à une véritable incertitude, à une profonde hésitation de Sénèque." The first half,
however, is rather misleading, since there is no good reason to suppose that Seneca ever held fast to a
view of death expressed by the chorus in one of his plays. After all, the same chorus in the same play
envisages Priam wandering free and happy in the Elysian Fields (156-162). And as Hoven says
(pp.124f.), "Quant aux nombreux passages qui dans les tragédies parlent des enfers souterrains...leur
présence s'explique par des raisons littéraires évidentes et n'engage nullement, croyons-nous, la pensée
même de Sénèque."
On Seneca's treatment of death and the afterlife in the tragedies, see the two articles by Cattin.
Essentially Cattin finds there the same range and contradictions as in the philosophical works, but on
the whole he thinks that Seneca inclined to the negative view. In Troades 401 ("post mortem nihil est,
ipsaque mors nihil") he says "on sent une conviction" (p.364), whereas in relation to immortality
"quand il s'enchante de cette possibilité [e.g. Ep.Mor. 102] il ne fait qu'ânonner Platon." (p.550.)
32 Ep.Mor. XXXVI.10: "cogita nihil eorum quae ab oculis abeunt et in rerum naturam, ex qua
prodierunt ac mox processura sunt, reconduntur consumi: desinunt ista, non pereunt, et mors, quam
pertimescemus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit."
9words, we too will be recycled. Then there is the offer of two alternatives: either we
are destined to dwell with the gods, or to be mingled again with nature.33 In other
words, either paradise or recycling. And at the highest level there is the confident
statement that the soul at death does indeed leave the body and join the gods:34 the
day of death which we fear as the end of everything is in fact the birthday of
eternity.35 Although of course this eternity may be subject to the Stoic qualification
that the next conflagration will change even the souls of the blest into their former
elements.36 In other words, paradise and recycling.
At any rate, the one thing that Seneca does not make room for37 is any possibility of
suffering, and therefore of punishment, after death.38 But there is a kind of negative
punishment envisaged, in the sense that by practising death, by anticipating the
release of the soul from the body, the virtuous wise man ensures that after death his
soul will make the journey to the gods.39 The philosopher is granted a sort of trailer
of the beatific vision:40 in the closing words of the Consolatio ad Helviam Seneca
33 Ep.Mor. LXXI.16: "Magnus animus deo pareat et quidquid lex universi iubet sine cunctatione
patiatur: aut in meliorem emittitur vitam lucidius tranquilliusque inter divina mansurus aut certe sine
ullo futurus incommodo, si naturae remiscebitur et revertetur in totum."
34 See e.g. Ep.Mor. CII.21-22; Ad Marciam XXIV.5 - XXVI.7; Ad Helviam XI.6-7; and Ad Pol. IX.7-
8 (on all of which Hoven remarks (p.122): "À notre avis, aucun Stoïcien 'orthodoxe' n'aurait pu 'signer'
de tels textes.") Friedländer remarks (1987, p.148) on Ep.Mor. CII: "Vergleicht man diesen Schluss
mit dem Anfang des Briefes, so kann man sich der Vermutung nicht erwehren, dass die Zuverzicht, mit
der er hier spricht, eine künstlich eingeredete war." Cf. Hoven, p.122: "quant à la fin de l'Épitre CII,
représente-t-elle plus que le bellum somnium dont it est question au début de la lettre?"
35 Ep.Mor. CII.26: "Dies iste quem tamquam extremum reformidas aeterni natalis est."
36 See Ad Marciam XXVI.6-7. But whether "aeternus" should be taken as similarly qualified in Ad
Helviam. XI.7 and Ad Pol. IX.7 is open to question - see Hoven p.120.
37 In the philosophical works, that is: the tragedies are a different matter.
38 In this at least he is "orthodox". See e.g. Hoven, p.84: "...aux yeux de la morale stoïcienne, il n'est
nul besoin d'une sorte de justice compensatoire dans l'au-delà; car la vraie justice est pleinement
réalisée dans la vie terrestre: la vertu suffit au bonheur, seul le sage est heureux, il n'y a de mal que ce
qui est honteux. C'est donc dans la vie terrestre que sont appliquées les sanctions morales du
Stoïcisme."
39 E.g. Ep.Mor. CXX.14: "quod numquam magis divinum est [pectus mortale] quam ubi mortalitatem
suam cogitat et scit in hoc natum hominem, ut vita defungeretur, nec domum esse hoc corpus sed
hospitium, et quidem breve hospitium, quod relinquendum est ubi te gravem esse hospiti videas." Cf.
Ad Marciam XXIII.1-2.
40 Cf. Hoven, p.119: "Il [Seneca] prône la vie contemplative comme une préparation et un avant-goût
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assures his mother that exile is no hardship to him because his mind has leisure to
employ itself in contemplation, and, conscious of the fact that it is immortal, to
penetrate to things divine.41 And this, he says in the Consolatio ad Marciam, is why
and how the wise man practises death in the Platonic sense.42
The consolatio, obviously, is the form which contains advice on approaching
another's death. But the title should not be understood as entirely synonymous with
the notion of consolation in our sense, of comfort, of something which brings solace.
Often it smacks much more of a schoolmasterish lecture on keeping a stiff upper lip -
in other words, more exhortatio than consolatio.43 For example, where Seneca refers
to a letter he has written to one Marullus on the death of his little son, he says that he
considered Marullus to be deserving of criticism rather than comfort, because of his
womanish behaviour.44 And to Marcia he declares his intention of being just as
brutal, since her grief is long past the stage of warranting gentle treatment - her son
had died three years before.45 Marullus' little boy was only just dead, but Marullus
was a man: women were allowed to be womanish for a time,46 men not at all.47
de la vie dans au-delà."
41 Ad Helviam XX.2: "Tum peragratis humilioribus ad summa perrumpit et pulcherrimo divinorum
spectaculo fruitur, aeternitatis suae memor in omne quod fuit futurumque est vadit omnibus saeculis."
42 Ad Marciam XXIII.2.
43 On the contrast between ancient and modern approaches, see Kassel, pp.3f. He quotes Harder:
"Teilnahme unter Menschen berüht auf jener Nähe, die den andern gelten lässt, wie er ist, ohne zu
fragen, wie er sein sollte oder was er hätte tun müssen - ohne ihn also an der Norm zu messen, vor
welcher sein Leidenszustand sich als ein pathologischer darstellt. Gegen dieses Hinnehmen des
Menschen in seiner zufälligen, normwidrigen Schwäche sträubt sich die greichische Anlage."
44 Ep.Mor. XCIX.1: "Epistolam quam scripsi Marullo cum filium parvulum amisisset et diceretur
molliter ferre misi tibi, in qua non sum solitum morem secutus nec putavi leniter illum debere tractari,
cum obiurgatione esset quam solacio dignior." The letter began (XCIX.2): "Solacia expectas?
convicia accipe." Cf. Ad Pol. VI.2: "Quid autem tam humile ac muliebre est quam consumendum se
dolori committere?"
45 Ad Marciam I.8: "Non possum nunc per obsequium nec molliter adsequi tam durum dolorem;
frangendus est."
46 Seneca refers more than once to the ancient laws restricting their mourning to a year at most: Ep.
Mor. LXIII.13; Ad Helviam XVI.1.
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Accordingly Seneca's aim in the consolationes is to cure men of any indulgence in
grief, and women of too prolonged an indulgence. They are, again, a form of therapy.
The ars moriendi involved in the first sense of meditari is intended to enable us to
approach our approaching death by ridding us of fear. The ars vivendi involved in the
second sense of meditari is intended to prepare our souls for a better state hereafter by
ridding us of the distractions of the body.48 The consolatio is intended to help us49
face the death of another by ridding us of our grief.
Again there are techniques, and it became the convention, instead of choosing only
those which might be especially suited to the recipient, to include everything, since
these were documents written not just for the person to whom they were addressed but
for publication50 - which may explain, for example, why both Socratic alternatives51
can be presented with equal conviction in the same Consolatio.52 But what is perhaps
surprising to us in Seneca's consolationes is that the obvious comfort represented by
the Socratic alternatives seems to be subordinated to other considerations. Among
these there are of course some which are also found in connection with our own
47 Ep.Mor. LXIII.13: "viris nullum legitimum tempus est, quia nullum honestum."
48 See e.g. Ep.Mor. CII.28: "Huic nunc quoque tu quantum potes sub <duc te> voluptatique nisi quae
*** necessariisque cohaerebit alienus iam hinc altius aliquid sublimiusque meditare."
49 Or rather primarily to help the philosopher to help others: as Kassel puts it (p.24), the early
consolationes were "keine Rezepte für Patienten, sondern Anweisungen für den Arzt." On the
limitations of the "therapy analogy" to the consolatio, see Wilson, who also points out (p.49) that
Seneca sees himself as both doctor and patient.
50 See e.g. Kassel's description (p.98) of Ps.-Plutarch's Consolatio ad Apollonium as an endless
treatise, "in dem der ganz schattenhaft bleibende Adressat auf weite Strecken vergessen scheint..."
Kassel's analysis of this document (pp.48-98) lists many of the topoi which were to be found in every
consolatio; he quotes Pohlenz: "Wer etwa die Trostschriften...miteinander vergleicht, wird bald sehen,
dass nicht bloss die einzelnen Argumente, sondern auch ganze Gedankenverbindungen und die
Disposition von Gedankenreihen ganz fest geworden sind..."
51 See Plato, Ap. 40 C. (Succinctly summarised by Seneca in De Prov. VI.6: "Contemnite mortem;
quae vos aut finit aut transfert.")
52 See Ad Marciam XIX.5: "Mors nec bonum nec malum est; id enim potest aut bonum aut malum
esse, quod aliquid est; quod vero ipsum nihil est et omnia in nihilum redigit, nulli nos fortunae tradit;
mala enim bonaque circa aliquam versantur materiam. Non potest id fortuna tenere, quod natura
dimisit, nec potest miser esse qui nullus est." And XXIV.5: "Imago dumtaxat fili tui perit et effigies
non simillima; ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi
relictus." As Hoven says (p.122), some of Seneca's arguments may be included for literary rather than
12
approaching death: that it is the human lot to die,53 that we should always expect
death round the corner,54 that the process of dying begins as soon as we are born.55
But of those which are peculiar to the consolatio the most important for Seneca
appears to be the requirement that grief should be moderate, both in intensity and in
duration. Lucilius should not have more sorrow than is fitting,56 and he should stop
grieving as soon as possible,57 because nothing becomes offensive so quickly as grief:
protracted, it is either assumed or asinine.58 People like Marullus should learn that
tears can be overdone,59 or conversely that there should be dignity even in grief.60
The question Marcia should ask herself is whether grief ought to be acute or chronic.61
But Seneca is not so inhuman, he says, as to forbid grief altogether.62 The best course
is a middle course.63
In other words, the principal aim of the consolatio for Seneca seems to be to ensure,
not that the bereaved are consoled, but that they keep up appearances.64 And the
reason for avoiding excessive or prolonged manifestations of grief is a horror of
philosophical reasons, as part of "l'arsenal habituel des auteurs de Consolations."
53 E.g. Ad Marciam XVII.1: "Sed humanum est;" XIX.3: "semper enim scisti moriturum." Cf. Ad
Pol. I.4, XI.2.
54 E.g. Ep.Mor. LXIII.14, XCIX.32, Ad Marciam IX.1-5.
55 E.g. Ad Marciam X.6, XXI.5: "Si mortuum tibi filium doles, eius temporis quo natus est crimen est;
mors enim illi denuntiata nascenti est."
56 Ep.Mor. LXIII.1.
57 Ep.Mor. LXIII.12.
58 Ep.Mor. LXIII.13: "aut enim simulatus aut stultus est."
59 Ep.Mor. XCIX.2: "discant quasdam etiam lacrimarum ineptias esse."
60 Ep.Mor. XCIX.21: "Est aliquis et dolendi decor."
61 Ad Marciam IV.1: "utrum magnus dolor esse debeat an perpetuus."
62 Ad Marciam IV.1; Ad Pol. XVIII.5; De Const. Sap. X: "Haec non nego sentire sapientem; nec
enim lapidis illi duritiam ferrive adserimus. Nulla virtus est quae non sentias perpeti. Quid ergo est?
quosdam ictus recipit, sed receptos evincit et sanat et comprimit." And he admits to his own
susceptibility - Ep.Mor. LXIII.14: "Haec tibi scribo, is qui Annaeum Serenum carissimum mihi tam
inmodice flevi ut, quod minime velim, inter exempla sim eorum quos dolor vicit."
63 Ad Helviam XVI.1 "et sentire desiderium et opprimere." Ad Pol. XVII.2: "Nam et non sentire
mala sua non est hominis et non ferre non est viri."
64 Cf. Wilson, p.62: "Seneca employs the medical analogy in a way which reveals that it is, in the long
run, inadequate. Healing is secondary to the preservation of modesty (verecundia)...The means of
quelling passion are more important than the end." And p.60: "Ostensibly preoccupied with grief,
consolatory writings carry underneath a strong ideological imperative concerned with self-definition
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pretence, of playing to the gallery, of lamenting because lamentation is thought to be
expected.65 There is of course another contradiction here, because what Seneca is
advocating is just as much a pretence: rather than display grief in order to conform to
other people's expectations, we are to conceal our grief in order to impress other
people with our fortitude.66 The other people may be different in each case, and there
may be a difference in the kind of the pretence involved, but in both cases our
behaviour is dictated by convention and in both cases the problem of grief itself is
sidestepped.67
Or relegated: because the Consolationes do offer in addition what to the modern
mind would be understood by consolation. The bereaved are certainly expected to
control and even overcome their grief, but they will find that easier to do if they bear
certain things in mind. There is the futility of grief.68 There is the fact that they are
not alone.69 There is the thought that it is better to have lost than never to have known
and the fortification of identity. Marullus should behave like a man, not a woman."
65 See e.g. Ep.Mor. LXIII.2: "Quaeris unde sint lamentationes, unde inmodici fletus? per lacrimas
argumenta desiderii quaerimus et dolorem non sequimur sed ostendimus...est aliqua et doloris
ambitio." Cf. also Ad Marciam VII.1-2, Ep.Mor. XCIX.17, De Tr. An. XV.6.
66 Cf. Ad Pol. VI.1: "Circumstat te omnis ista consolantium frequentia et in animum tuum inquirit ac
perspicit quantum roboris ille adversus dolorem habeat et utrumne tu tantum rebus secundis uti
dextere scias, an et adversas possis viriliter ferre."
The "orthodox" Stoic position is not that we should conceal our grief but that it should be removed
altogether. But here, as elsewhere, Seneca seems almost more anxious to prolong the fight (and so
extract more virtue from it) than to win it outright. Cf. Wilson, pp.61f.: "...to the extent that the Stoics
advocate extirpation of the destructive passions, Seneca is more interested in the act of extirpation than
in the ideal state of serenity to which it should lead. Seneca locates value in the heroism of the battle,
not in enjoying the rewards of victory." And cf. Edwards, pp.96f.
67 There is a further irony involved here: in relation to the death of the other, Seneca seems to be
recommending a kind of privatization of grief in contrast to the public display of emotion; whereas in
relation to one's own death - and his own death, as reported by Tacitus, will prove to be a classic
example - the audience and its reaction are always very much in mind.
68 Ep.Mor. XCIX.6: "supervacuum est dolere si nihil dolendo proficias." Ad Marciam VI.2: "Sed si
nullis planctibus defuncta revocantur, si sors immota et in aeternum fixa nulla miseria mutatur et mors
tenuit quicquid abstulit, desinat dolor qui perit." Cf. Ad Pol. II.1.
69 E.g. Ad Marciam XII.4: "Circumfer per omnem notorum, ignotorum frequentiam oculos, occurrent
tibi passi ubique maiora." Cf. Ad Pol. XII.2: "Est autem hoc ipsum solacii loco, inter multos dolorem
suum dividere; qui quia dispensatur inter plures, exigua debet apud te parte subsidere." Cf. also
Ep.Mor. XCIX.22.
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the beloved.70 There is the example of famous men and women who have borne with
unflinching courage the loss of spouses or children.71 Or friends, because (and this is
not easy for the modern mind to understand) the loss of a friend is in Seneca's book
much more affecting than the loss of a child. He rebukes Marullus for reacting like a
woman to his little boy's death: what would he do if he lost a close friend?72
But the consolatio almost by definition has its Sitz im Leben in the context of
premature death, and one of the recurring themes accordingly deals with the imagined
cri de coeur of the bereaved: "sed puer decessit"73 or "nimis tamen cito perit et
immaturus"74 or "at inopinanti ereptus est."75 Seneca has several answers. In the first
place, there is no advantage in reaching an advanced age, since we spend most of our
time sleeping, or worrying, or in useless endeavour - we only actually live a small part
of our lives.76 Second, compared with eternity, even the longest life is incalculably
short, and the difference between the incalculably short and the even shorter is
scarcely worth troubling about.77 Third, the one who has died in the prime of life,
beautiful, virtuous, full of promise, if he had lived longer might have turned ugly and
vicious,78 or have had to endure illness, exile, imprisonment, suicide.79 Indeed not
only is it not a misfortune to die young, it is a positive blessing: if the best thing is
70 E.g. Ad Pol. X.3-6; Ad Marciam XII.1-2.
71 E.g. Ad Marciam III and XII.6 - XV.4; Ad Helviam XVI.6-7; Ep.Mor. XCIX.6; Ad Pol. XIV.4-
XVI.3.
72 Ep.Mor. XCIX.2: "Tam molliter tu fers mortem filii? quid faceres si amicum perdidisses?"
(Wilson suggests - p.66, note 31 - that Marullus may have had Epicurean leanings, and if so this
comparison "with the loss of a friend is deliberately provocative as alluding to the pre-eminent value
placed by Epicureans on friendship."
73 Ep.Mor. XCIX.9.
74 Ad Marciam XXI.1.
75 Ad. Pol. XI.1.
76 Ep.Mor. XCIX.10-11. Cf. De Brev. Vit. III:3: even the centenarian dies "immaturus".
77 E.g. Ad Marciam XXI.1-2; Ep.Mor. XCIX.31.
78 Ep.Mor. XCIX.12.
79 Ad Marciam XXII.1-4. Cf. Ad Pol. IX.4: "Si bene computes, plus illi remissum quam ereptum est."
15
never to have been born, the next best thing is to depart early.80 Fourth, it is in any
case impossible for a man to die an untimely death, since the length of his life is
predetermined.81
Now it must be doubtful whether any of this would have consoled anyone. For
example, it might be thought cold comfort to point out that someone who has died at
an early age of one kind of illness might have died of another kind of illness if he had
lived longer. And Marcia could be forgiven for inferring that she should in fact be
grieving not for her dead son but for his surviving siblings. And Solon's retort, when
he was reminded in his bereavement of the futility of tears, is equally apposite to the
argument that there is no such thing as dying before one's time because one's time has
been decreed by fate: it is precisely this which causes us to weep.82
But perhaps more striking than the inadequacy of what is included in the Consolatio is
the omission of any real recognition that the principal cause of grief is likely to be not
the dictates of convention, nor fear of what happens after death, nor resentment
against fate, but the simple fact that the dead person is no longer present. There is
only one occasion when Seneca does mention this, and he does so only to brush it
aside as clearly bearable: the remedy is simply to deceive ourselves that the parting is
only temporary.83
And this raises a more fundamental question, that of the status of the consolatio, or
80 Ad Marciam XXII.3.
81 Ad Marciam XXI. 4-5: "Nemo nimis cito moritur, quia victurus diutius quam vixit non fuit. Fixus
est cuique terminus." Cf. Ep Mor. LXIX.6: "nemo moritur nisi sua morte" and see Mann for a recent
discussion of this theme in Seneca.
82 Diogenes Laertius I.63.
83 Ad Marciam XIX.1.
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the status of the philosopher who offers the consolatio. Or putting it another way, one
wonders how the bereaved reacted to this kind of unsolicited (and publicly
disseminated) advice on how to manage their grief better - advice which was
sometimes offensive, sometimes self-contradictory, sometimes logically ridiculous,
sometimes psychologically unrealistic or even dangerous.84 Did the recipients of
these consolationes ever feel gratitude to the author, or were they rather confirmed in
the opinion that genuine grief is ultimately a private matter which can only be faced
privately and is not susceptible to objective analysis and advice?85
But that same question must be asked in relation to our own approaching death as
well: has the philosopher, or indeed anyone else, either the locus or the capacity to
influence the way in which we approach our death? Seneca's moral writings expose
the great paradox which lies at the heart of the matter: death is the one thing that
every human being must face, it is in one sense the most objective fact of our
existence, it is what above all expresses our solidarity, and the cumulative experience
of mankind has resulted in boundless advice on how to face it; but at the same time
my death is something only I can face, its reality is the most subjective fact of my
existence,86 it is what above all expresses my individuality, and however much advice
I receive I have no idea how I will face it when the time comes because I can have no
84 Cf. Wilson, p.60: "Marullus' reaction, on reading Seneca's denunciation of his failure to constrain
his grief, can only be guessed at. Indignation? Anger? Shame? Certainly not peace of mind. Given
that the epistle has evidently been devised with a view to inciting rather than soothing his feelings,
what, it might be asked, of the Stoic ideal of apatheia?"
85 Something which the writer of Ox.Pap.I.115 understands only too well. Having lost a child herself,
she makes no attempt to console the bereaved mother she is writing to: kai. pa,nta o[sa h=n kaqh,konta
evpoi,hsa kai. pa,ntej oi` evmoi,( avll v o[mwj ouvde.n du,natai, tij pro.j ta. toiau/ta) As Kassel says (p.4):
"Von so rührender Hilflosigkeit sind die Verfasser literarischen consolationes weit entfernt. Sie
glauben sehr wohl etwas ausrichten zu können 'pro.j ta. toiau/ta)'"
86 "...mourir, qui est la plus grande besoigne que nous ayons à faire." (Montaigne II.6: 350/416.) Or as
Nagel says (1986, pp.223f.): "The desire to go on living, which is one of our strongest, is essentially
first-personal...and therefore it collides with objective indifference about the survival of anyone in
particular. Your relation to your own death is unique, and here if anywhere the subjective standpoint
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experience of it in advance.87 It is the difference between Donne's two poles: "Never
send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee", and "She, she is dead; she's
dead; and when thou know'st this / Thou know'st how dry a cinder this world is":
between the common fate of mankind and that element of delectus personae which
makes the common fate of mankind irrelevant.88
This paradox is less obvious in Lucretius, because he is concerned solely with the
common fate of mankind. Indeed the element of delectus personae is only to be
found in the celebrated passage about the cow searching for its dead calf,89 while the
dead man's family who foresee everlasting sorrow for themselves are sarcastically
dismissed: if there is no everlasting life, how can there be everlasting grief?90 Like
the animal rights extremist Lucretius chooses to be humane to brutes and brutal to
humans.
But of the three categories distinguishable in Seneca, it is not only the consolatio
which is missing from De Rerum Natura.91 The second meaning of Seneca's
meditari, involving the Platonic practice of death, is also entirely absent, for the good
and sufficient reason that it assumes an afterlife, and Lucretius is very sure that there
holds a dominant position."
87 Cf. Montaigne again (ibid.):"...mais, quant à la mort, nous ne la pouvons essayer qu'une fois; nous y
somme tous apprentifs quand nous y venons."
88 Seneca himself is aware of the paradox. The example of Sabinus, who made himself ridiculous by
delegating to slaves the burden of memorising the classics, applies to dying a good death as much as to
acquiring a good mind: no one else can do it for us. (Ep.Mor. XXVII.4-8.) And cf. Ep.Mor. XXVI.5ff
on the gulf between word and deed in relation to dying, between bravado now and bravery then. In
Seneca's own case, of course, there was apparently no such gulf. "Die meditatio mortis, von Seneca in
den Schriften als Propädeutik des Sterbens praktiziert, wird zur actio mortis." (Schönegg, p.19.) But
even if Tacitus' account (Ann. XV.60-64) is taken at its face value rather than as a literary construction
(see Chapter 5 below), this does nothing to lessen the paradox.
89 De Rerum Natura II. 352-366.
90 III. 904-911.
91 At least in the more restricted sense of dealing with bereavement: the word is sometimes used of
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is no such thing. There is no question here of Socratic alternatives: animus, anima
and corpus are all equally mortal,92 and what follows death is extinction.93 Only
death itself is immortal.94 Yet this is not, apparently, a simple matter of
temperamental preference; it is not, apparently, mere assertion; it is not, apparently,
just an atheistic hunch. No fewer than twenty-nine proofs,95 or at least arguments,96
are advanced in support of the mortality of the animus-anima-corpus,97 but more
important than these is the chain of presuppositions lying behind them.
First of all, the gods. Although he begins the poem by invoking Venus,98 he goes on
to make it clear that the gods cannot be invoked:99 they are inaccessible and
unconcerned,100 and they have neither original nor continuing responsibility for the
world and its inhabitants101 - indeed they could have had neither the will nor the
capacity for any such involvement, which would in any case have been against their
own interests.102 Their function, or rather their aim since they have no function, is
simply to enjoy a life of blissful ease.103 The world, far from owing its existence to
the gods, is a random combination of atoms.104 And so are we. But we have
misunderstood the nature of the gods and, through religion, we have forged an
illusory though pernicious relationship with them. Religio, which to Lucretius is
Lucretius' intentions in Book III: see, e.g., Kenney, pp.31ff.
92 DRN III. 417-424.
93 III. 830ff.
94 III. 869: "mortalem vitam mors cum inmortalis ademit"
95 Or perhaps one fewer: see Boyancé, 1963, p.161.
96 Cf. Santayana, p.49: "All that Lucretius urges about the divisibility of the soul, its diffused bodily
seat, and the perils it would meet outside fails to remove the ominous possibility that troubles him" -
i.e. that there is an afterlife.
97 III. 417-829.
98 I. 1-49.
99 V. 165-167.
100 I. 44-49 = II.646-651; VI. 68-79.
101 II. 167-181; cf. V.195-199.
102 V. 156-173; II. 1093-1104.
103 III. 18-24; cf. VI. 68-79.
104 II. 1058-63.
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always a pejorative term, equivalent to superstition, originates in fear,105 generates
fear,106 and feeds on fear:107 fear, that is, both of what the gods may do to us now, by
means of hurricanes, earthquakes or thunderbolts,108 and fear of what they may do to
us after death.109
That second kind of fear, of everlasting punishment after death, is whipped up by the
vates, the priests and poets of traditional religion,110 but Epicurus and now
Lucretius111 have precisely the opposite function: to unmask the true nature of
religio, to trample it underfoot.112 Because not only does it render us abject, it
actually produces impiety - the classic example of this being Iphigenia's pathetic
fate.113 The purpose of De Rerum Natura, then, is to dispel fear - fear of the gods,
fear of death, fear of everlasting punishment. And because fear is based on ignorance,
the remedy lies in knowledge of the facts - de rerum natura.114
Accordingly, Lucretius proceeds to the analysis of the physical world, of the animus-
anima, and of death. The world, randomly composed of atoms, is and always has
105 V. 73f; I. 151-154.
106 III.31-93.
107 I.102-111.
108 V.1218ff.
109 I.102-111.
110 "nam si certam finem esse viderent / aerumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent / religionibus
atque minis obsistere vatum. / nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas, / aeternas quoniam poenas
in morte timendum." (I. 107-111.)
111 Cf. Bailey, p.13: "Lucretius then is first and foremost a missionary, whose purpose is to deliver
men's minds from the tyranny of religious fears, and in particular from the fear of the intervention of
divine powers in the events and affairs of the world, and the fear of death and the punishment of the
soul hereafter for its misdeeds in life."
112 "quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim / obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo." (I. 78f.)
113 "saepius illa / religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta" (I.82f); "tantum religio potuit suadere
malorum." (I.101.)
114 I. 127-135. Cf. Epicurus K.D. XI: eiv mhqe.n h`ma/j ai` tw/n metew,rwn u`poyi,ai hvnw,cloun kai. ai`
peri. qana,tou( mh, pote pro.j h`ma/j h|= ti( e;ti te to. mh. katanoei/n tou.j o[rouj tw/n avlghdo,nwn kai. tw/n
evpiqumiw/n( ouvk a'n prosedeo,meqa fusiologi,aj)
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been entirely independent of the gods, and will eventually come to an end.115 The
same must apply to everything in the world, and therefore to human beings and their
constituent parts: the mens = animus, the anima, and the corpus.116 There is no
underworld - the underworld of the poets he demythologises and locates in this
present life117 - and no blissful eternity in the company of the gods. Death is simply
absence of sensation, non-existence, and since existence is a prerequisite of suffering
there is no suffering after death and nothing to be feared.118
The proper approach to death, therefore, is not to approach it at all, but to ignore it
and forget about it:119 it means nothing, it is irrelevant.120 There is no reason to be
distressed at the prospect of annihilation since we will know nothing about it - just as
we felt no distress from wars which took place long before we were born.121 The
person who resents imminent non-existence is simply not taking the concept of non-
existence seriously.122 In any case, death is a condition of life, each generation
passing the baton to the next.123 Nature personified sums it all up: if you have
enjoyed life, you should depart from it as you would at the end of a banquet, replete
and aequo animo; if you have not enjoyed it, why do you want to prolong it?124 And
what would be the point? The longest life is no different from the shortest, since it
115 II. 1170; V. 64-66, 91-109, 235-246.
116 III. 94: "primum animum dico, mentem quam saepe vocamus..." Cf. III.136-139.
117 III.978-1023.
118 III. 866f.: "scire licet nobis nil esse in morte timendum, / nec miserum fieri qui non est posse..."
119 See Schrijvers, p.291: "La mort est inhérente à la vie et possède une existence objective qui est
indéniable. Cependent, grâce à la faculté de l'esprit de refouler les choses désagréables, l'homme est
capable de tuer la mort, c'est-à-dire de lui refuser une existence subjective. De cette façon, l'homme
peut se croire immortel. Il ne faut pas penser à la mort, il faut l'oublier. Voilà le remède qu'Epicure
nous conseille contre la peur de la mort."
120 III.830: "Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum,/ quandoquidem natura animi mortalis
habetur;"
121 III. 832ff., cf. III.972-5 - the so-called symmetry argument. On the different nuances of the two
passages, see Warren, 2004, pp.57ff.
122 III. 870ff.
123 II. 78-79: "inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum / et quasi cursores vitai lampada
tradunt."
21
subtracts nothing from the duration of death.125
Once we are liberated in this way126 from the fear of death, we are able to lead our
lives as we were meant to, in carefree enjoyment.127 That is true piety: not making
sacrifices to the gods and lying prostrate before their shrines, but having a tranquil
mind.128 In fact it is more than piety, it amounts to a life like that of the gods
themselves:129 when religio is overthrown we are simultaneously raised to heaven.130
And the source of our liberation, Epicurus, who was the first to take a stand against
religio and the fables about the gods131 and to tear away the mask and reveal the true
nature of reality,132 can be addressed not just as a father whose words are worthy of
eternal life,133 but as himself a god.134
Lucretius and Seneca therefore have this in common, that they both want to rid us of
the fear of death so that we may live life properly, they both dismiss the myth of
punishment in an underworld, and they both argue that extinction precludes suffering.
But Lucretius differs in excluding not only any alternative to extinction after death,135
and therefore any notion of practising for death, but also any notion of a life-long
preparation for dying in the first sense of Seneca's meditari - according to Lucretius
we are to remove the sting of death not by inuring ourselves to the idea but by
124 III. 931-939.
125 III. 1086-1089.
126 V. 18: "at bene non poterat sine puro pectore vivi."
127 II. 16-19; cf. Epicurus Ep.Men.124.
128 V. 1198-1203.
129 III. 322.
130 I. 78f.
131 I.62-79.
132 V. 54: "atque omnem rerum naturam pandere dictis." Cf. III. 58.
133 III. 9-13.
134 V. 8, 19, 50f.
135 He does mention the theoretical possibility of reincarnation, but dismisses it as irrelevant because it
would be effectively equivalent to extinction. III. 674-676: "nam si tanto operest animi mutata
potestas, / omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum, / non, ut opinor, id ab leto iam longiter errat."
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unmasking it and then ignoring it. And he is just as unconcerned with the death of the
other, with consoling the bereaved. In all this he is tidier and apparently more logical
than Seneca. He claims that the knowledge of death is deducible from the knowledge
of life, of the nature of things. As a result he offers no self-contradictory alternatives:
he ridicules not only the underworld of the poets but the heaven of the philosophers as
well, so that reward and punishment are equally excluded - whereas Seneca, having
no grounds for denying the possibility of punishment, simply ignores it.
But that word "apparently" has been used now several times. Does Lucretius'
understanding of death in fact amount to more than mere assertion based on an
atheistic hunch, and is he in fact as logically consistent as he thinks he is? Take the
gods. If Occam's razor ever applied to anything it applies to Lucretius' gods. Or
putting it another way, if they did not exist it would certainly not be necessary to
invent them. Indeed Lucretius himself comes very close to stating that we did invent
them, in a kind of anthropomorphising self-projection.136 Clearly their existence,
whatever bliss it may entail for themselves, adds nothing, subtracts nothing, explains
nothing.137 It does, however, give rise to at least one logical problem. If they do live
such an unconcerned and self-contained existence, sealed off from us, having no
contact with us or influence over us and being entirely uninfluenced by us, how is it
Cf. III.760-768.
136 V. 1161-1193.
137 Unless they are understood simply as symbolising the happiness which will be ours once we have
ceased to fear them. Epicurus' relationship with the gods may have been more positive - see the
discussion in Rist, 1972, pp.140-163. Rist remarks (p.163): "When we read the poem of Lucretius,
we can easily be misled into supposing that Epicurean thought about the gods is almost entirely
negative. It is true...that there are sections of his work in which Lucretius speaks about the blessed life
of the gods in the intermundia, but more frequently we are learning of the evils and tragedies which
false beliefs can produce and from which the enlightened philosophy of Epicurus can release us." On
the other hand, Epicurus himself may have seen the gods simply as "thought-constructs". Long and
Sedley (pp.144-149) conclude that "the only philosophically satisfying interpretation" of Epicurus'
theology is that the gods are "a projection of man's own ethical ideal", and that Epicurus "can be
compared to many nineteenth-century advocates of religion (e.g. Feuerbach, George Eliot, Matthew
Arnold) whose professed theism proves on closer inspection to be an essentially moral theory, which
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that we know anything about the remote life of the gods, even that it is remote? How
do we know that they exist at all?138
Of course the fact that Lucretius' gods are irrelevant in every way means that any
illogicalities contained in his ideas about them are also irrelevant; except that these
illogicalities do put a question-mark against the self-proclaimed rigour of his
intellect.139 And there are other difficulties. The brevity of even the longest human
life compared with the eternity of non-existence is only one way of looking at it: it is
equally arguable that even the briefest life is precious compared with the eternity of
non-existence.140 And when Nature bids us depart from life as we would at the end
of an enjoyable banquet, she rather begs the question: what happens if we are
summoned away during the first course?141 Again, if it is true that even the longest
either evades or positively excludes any question of an objective superhuman deity."
138 At V.1161-8 Lucretius gives two reasons for the origin of belief in the gods, although according to
Bailey (p.67) "he does not, as he should have done, explain that one of the reasons is true and the other
false." The second reason is astronomical and meteorological phenomena. The first is visions, whether
waking or sleeping, caused by the simulacra (VI.76) of the gods. But if it is true that Lucretius does
regard the latter as reliable evidence of the gods' existence, why does he dismiss (at IV.31-41) the
visions, whether waking or sleeping, of the simulacra of the dead as certainly not reliable evidence of
their continued existence in the underworld? (At IV.757ff. he accounts for the visions of the dead in
terms which might seem to apply equally to visions of the gods.) And it may be significant that at
I.127-135 celestial and natural phenomena and waking or sleeping visions of the dead are lumped
together as both requiring explanation by "ratione sagaci".
139 Cf. IV. 1-9. Feuerbach's remarks (p.74) on the inconsistencies of some more modern philosopher-
theologians apply also to Lucretius: "Wo sich daher einmal das Bewusstsein des Menschen
bemächtigt, dass die religiosen Prädikate nur Anthropomorphismen, d.h. menschliche Vorstellungen
sind, da hat sich schon der Zweifel, der Unglaube des Glaubens bemächtigt. Und es ist nur die
Inkonsequenz der Herzensfeigheit und der Verstandesschwäche, die von diesem Bewusstsein aus nicht
bis zur förmlichen Verneinung der Prädikate und von dieser bis zur Verneinung des zu Grunde
liegenden Subjekts fortgeht. Bezweifelst du die gegenständliche Wahrheit der Prädikate, so musst du
auch die gegenständliche Wahrheit des Subjekts dieser Prädikate in Zweifel ziehen. Sind deine
Prädikate Anthropomorphismen, so ist auch das Subjekt derselben ein Anthropomorphismus."
140 Cf. Boyancé, 1963, p.177: "'Un instant parfait vaut toute une vie,' semble dire Épicure. Mais
Lucrèce, lui: 'Une vie ne vaut pas plus qu'un instant.' C'est peut-être la même chose pour un logicien,
mais non pour un psychologue, car il y a une différence d'accent."
141 Nussbaum (1989, p.321) has more of the gourmet's approach: "If one dies prematurely - for
example, before reaching the main course - this will be the worst sort of death; for it will make
fruitless those 'courses' in the meal whose primary function was to prepare appetite and palate for the
main course. (One would have eaten differently had one known the main course was not going to
arrive.)"
Warren points out (2004, pp.155ff), that the Epicureans find themselves with an apparently insoluble
difficulty in relation to the problem of premature death: their only antidote to the fear of premature
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life subtracts nothing from the eternity of death,142 is mass-suicide not the obvious
solution?143 Attaining tranquillity of mind during this allegedly infinitesimal lifespan
(not to speak of composing seven-and-a-half thousand lines of Latin verse on the
subject) seems hardly worth the effort.
More serious, however, is the paradox involved in the underlying theme of the poem,
or at least of Book III, that by removing the prospect of any life after death, the
present life is made more tolerable - in other words, that hopelessness produces
happiness. Again Solon's retort is apposite: it is precisely the fact that there is no
hope which causes us to weep.144
There are problems too in connection with the symmetry argument - that just as we
did not fear the advancing Carthaginians because we did not yet exist, so there will be
nothing to fear when we no longer exist. The argument (perhaps originating with
Lucretius, and repeated by Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne) has recently been the
death is ataraxia, but ataraxia can only be attained if one no longer fears premature death.
142 III. 1087-1094.
143 Cf. Warren, 2004, p.202: "In short, arguments which try to remove the anxiety of dying
prematurely by arguing that one is not benefited by living longer undermine reasons for continuing to
live at all." And he remarks on DRN V.177-80: "So great is their [the Epicureans'] emphasis on
removing any sense in which death might be an evil, they have left themselves with precious few
resources to explain why continued life is worth pursuing."
144 Kenny (pp.32f.) quotes Cornford, who makes the same point in relation to Epicurus: "Epicurus, it
is true, abolished the terrors of hell; but he also abolished the joys of heaven...I do not know how
common the horror of death may be among normal people; but, where it exists, is it not often the
prospect of extinction that horrifies them? If so, the fear of death, which Epicurus claimed to have
banished, is actually increased by the denial of immortality." But Plutarch had pointed this out long
ago in Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum: to. ga.r "avnaisqhtei/n to. dialuqe.n kai. mhde.n ei=nai
pro.j h`ma/j to. avnaisqhtou/n" ouvk avnairei/ to. tou/ qana,tou de,oj avll v w[sper avpo,deixin auvtou/
prosti,qhsin) auvto. ga.r tou/to, evstin o] de,doiken h` fu,sij)))th.n eivj to. mh. fronou/n mhde. aivsqano,menon
dia,lusin th/j yuch/j) (27.1105.)
Santayana (pp.52f.) demonstrates not so much that Lucretius' argument is misdirected as that any
argument on the subject is pointless: "The radical fear of death...is the love of life...Nothing could be
more futile, therefore, than to marshal arguments against that fear of death which is merely another
name for the energy of life, or the tendency to self-preservation...For what is most dreaded is not the
agony of dying, nor yet the strange impossibility that when we do not exist we should suffer for not
existing. What is dreaded is the defeat of a present will directed upon life and its various
undertakings."
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subject of extensive discussion by professional philosophers, sometimes in a faintly
surreal way.145 For example, it has been objected146 that the two periods are not in
fact symmetrical: death deprives us of whatever continuing existence we would have
had if it had not occurred, whereas it cannot be said that by being born when we were
we have been deprived of whatever life we would have had if we had been born
earlier - since if we had been born earlier we would have been different people.
There is, however, a more straightforward reason why not-yet-existing is not the
equivalent of no-longer-existing from the standpoint of the presently-existing subject.
Lucretius' argument is that the attacking Carthaginians caused me no concern because
I wasn't there. But who wasn't there? At the time of the Punic Wars there was no
subject, no "I", whose presence there could be asserted or denied: whereas the subject
whose continuing existence after my death is prospectively denied is certainly "I".
Now Lucretius may insist that I need not fear being dead because I will not exist, but
he cannot do so on the basis of the symmetry argument since there is no symmetry.
The difference is between absence of identity (not-yet) and cancellation of identity
(no-longer).147
145 Indeed there is something Pythonesque about the whole spectacle of philosophers devoting their
lives to establishing that death is a bad thing after all. If death were to cut short their efforts, would that
be proof or disproof?
146 By Nagel, 1979, pp.7ff. In his second book Nagel is more radical (1986, p.229): "It is a fact
perhaps too deep for explanation that the cutting off of future possibilities, both their nonactualization
and their obliteration even as possibilities, evokes in us a very different reaction from any parallel
nonrealization or nonexistence of possibilities in the past."
147 As Warren puts it (2004, p.77): "The time of birth is a necessary condition of personal identity,
whereas the time of death is merely contingent (i.e. I could not have been born earlier than I was, but
could die later than I will." Cf. C.J.F. Williams p.218: "If 'living' means 'existing' and 'dead' 'no longer
existing' it might appear that there is a tertium quid, 'not yet existing'. But is this really a third
possibility? If I ask whether your car is black or white you may answer 'Neither; it's blue.' But if I
ask...whether your father is alive or dead, I can think of no way of attaching sense to the words 'My
father does not yet exist.'" In other words, as soon as the symmetry argument is applied to an actual
rather than a hypothetical human being, the symmetry breaks down; and since the purpose of the
argument is to remove the fear of death from actual rather than hypothetical human beings, it fails.
Leeman (p.327) quotes Schopenhauer: "Wenn, was uns den Tod so schrecklich erscheinen lässt, der
Gedanke des Nicht-seins wäre, so müssten wir mit gleichem Schauder der Zeit gedenken, da wir noch
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But most serious of all is that Lucretius not only brushes aside the problem of how I
approach the death of another, he also fails to engage with the problem of how I
approach my own death. He is concerned only with Death, and with Mankind.148
Indeed in asserting that death is nothing to us, he trivialises it. Chesterton said that to
the pacifist's way of thinking "St George did not conquer the dragon: he tied a pink
ribbon round its neck and gave it a saucer of milk."149 Death to Lucretius is rather
like the pacifist's dragon.150 But my own death is not so easily domesticated.151
In this connection Lucretius has a good deal in common with Feuerbach. They both
identified religion with superstition; they both saw the origin of religion in self-
projection and the application of human predicates to a divine subject; and they both
saw it as their mission to bring the gods down to earth and simultaneously to raise
mankind to heaven. But they also shared this weakness, that they operated with a
generalised, and ultimately abstract conception of man which loses sight of, indeed
obliterates the individual, real man. Buber's criticism of Feuerbach, that he was guilty
of a "Reduktion auf den unproblematischen Menschen,"152 applies also to
Lucretius.153 Feuerbach, having unmasked religion and reduced it to anthropology,
nicht waren. Zwischen uns und dem Tod steht das Sterben, - nicht das Nichts, sondern die
Vernichtung."
148 Cf. Edwards, p.84: "...in his treatment of death throughout the poem, Lucretius seems not to view it
as part of an individual's life-story. Bad deaths are certainly shown in terrifying detail in Lucretius'
plague narrative but they are hardly particularised."
But contrast Long (p.219) who sees Lucretius' "tendency to vivify pain and suffering...as a test and
protreptic for the Epicurean novice, especially in the horrific treatment of the Athenian plague at the
end of book 6 - a test to balance the optimism of Epicurean objectivity against the irrevocable
predicaments of human existence, and to remain convinced that the optimism is still justified."
149 Chesterton, pp.154f.
150 In fact the real dragon in Lucretius' view is not death but religio.
151 Cf. Seneca, Ep.Mor.LXXXII.23: "Magnis telis magna portenta feriuntur."
152 See Küng p.249.
153 Karl Barth's judgement (Vol.II. p.462) on Feuerbach is similar: "Der wirkliche Mensch dürfte doch
wohl, wenn ganz existentiell gedacht werden soll, der einzelne Mensch sein. Feuerbach hat mit der
Theologie seiner Zeit mit dem Menschen im Allgemeinen operiert, und indem er diesem Gottheit
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proceeded to make anthropology into a religion and in doing so fell into his own
trap.154 Lucretius, having with Nature’s aid toppled religio and trampled on it,
proceeded to put Nature on the pedestal instead and in doing so fell into a similar
trap.155
Nature personified speaks only at III. 933-962. Yet in a sense almost the whole of De
Rerum Natura is uttered by Nature - Lucretius is her mouthpiece.156 The terrors of
religio are to be dispelled by the law of nature;157 nature wants us simply to have
carefree minds,158 which is the definition of true piety;159 and this inner tranquillity is
only possible if we learn to accept that death is natural.160 But the fallacy lies in
believing that the personification of nature is anything more than a rhetorical
mannerism. Lucretius himself warns against the divinization of Mother Earth, which
he characterizes as a reintroduction of religio. Yet he seems unable to see that Mother
Nature is no more privileged. And the fallacy is instantly exposed whenever the death
zuschreib, über den wirklichen Menschen faktisch nichts gesagt. Und wenn er nun diese beiden doch
weithin verwechselt und also vom einzelnen Menschen so redet, als wäre er jener Mensch im
Allgemeinen, und also es wagt, dem einzelnen Menschen Gottheit zuzuschreiben, so hing das doch
wohl damit zusammen, dass er weder um die Bosheit des Einzelnen, noch darum, dass dieser Einzelne
sterben muss, ernstlich und wirklich gewusst zu haben scheint."
154 See Küng pp.239f: "Ist das 'allgemeine Menschenwesen' nicht eine Abstraktion? Projiziert hier
Feuerbach nicht selber etwas aus sich heraus, was es in Wirklichkeit nicht gibt? Ist somit nicht gerade
dieser Mensch im allgemeinen, ist nicht dieses allgemeine Menschenwesen eine reine Projektion, von
Feuerbach vergegenständlicht and verselbständigt? Kann die Projektion eines solchen gespenstischen
Menschenwesens den Humanismus garantieren, auf den es Feuerbach zu Recht so sehr ankommt?"
155 Cf. Nussbaum (1989) on the tension within Epicurean thought "between the perspective of nature
and the perspective of the god" (p.324.) "This shift over to a godlike life and a godlike self requires
enormous revision in human patterns of desire and of value. We are asked not to alter reactions that we
have and regard neutrally, but to alter evaluative judgements that we endorse on reflection as giving us
a correct account of what constitutes mortal good life. We were told that this shift is commended by
nature, that it is a shift away from a religious view of life towards a life lived within the limits of a
finite being. But on deeper inspection it appears that the goal of the shift is, in fact, quite different: to
rise above mortality altogether, and to make ourselves into gods. But isn't this the religious view of life
once again, in a slightly different form, furnished with a new conception of the divine and a new
Hercules (cf. V.22ff.), but still feeding the same old longing for transcendence?" (327.)
156 Cf. Santayana (p.34): "There remains the genius of the poet himself. The greatest thing about this
genius is its power of losing itself in its object, its impersonality. We seem to be reading not the poetry
of a poet about things, but the poetry of things themselves."
157 I. 146-148.
158 II. 16-19.
159 V. 1198-1203.
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of an individual, a real person - der wirkliche Mensch - knocks Nature off the
pedestal: "She, she is dead; she's dead; and when thou know'st this / Thou know'st
how dry a cinder this world is."
The cast of the Odyssey are neither allgemeine nor wirkliche Menschen: they are not
philosophical abstractions nor are they characters from "real life". Partly because of
the intrinsic nature of the work, and partly because of its normative status,161 they
have a universal quality, so that they are more real than flesh and blood. Odysseus is
Everyman. This does not mean of course that the oddities of the Odyssey in relation
to approaching death are themselves to be universalised and the underworld re-
mythologised. But it does have two implications. First, that the experience of
Odysseus is available to us as part of our own experience, and second, that the forms
of poetry or fiction or myth or fable are potentially as legitimate a key to the mystery
of death as philosophical speculation or ethical exhortation. And both these
implications are evident in the Nekuia, where Odysseus is presented as experiencing
what no ordinary man has ever experienced - direct contact with the dead.
That direct experience of the underworld controls (and reflects) the whole approach to
death in the Odyssey. There are no "Socratic alternatives" here. Everyone162 is
160 III. 964-977.
161 See Halliwell (2000, p.99) on the normative status of Homer in the classical period, where the
implication is "that the poet's voice is expected to be instructive and authoritative, a source of insight or
guidance with established, pre-eminent credentials in the cultural tradition."
162 Except for a handful like Menelaus (iv.561-568) and Herakles (xi.601-604). Cf. Od. v.206-10,
v.333-5, ix.299-304, xv.250f. And as Clarke (2004, p.78, note 17) points out, "In the Odyssey
Menelaus is bound for Elysium not as a favourable afterlife but as an alternative to death; and he is
given this gift because he is Zeus's son-in-law, with no suggestion that other men might have the same
prospect."
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destined for Hades. And the house of Hades is essentially a place of darkness.163
Even the last inhabited country before Hades, the land of the Cimmerians, is itself
unvisited by the sun.164 The characteristic epithets of Hades are all related to
darkness;165 Teiresias asks Odysseus why he has left the light of the sun,166 Anticleia
urges him to return to it as soon as possible,167 Helios threatens to shine in Hades
among the dead.168 And "existence" in this pitch-black underworld is correspondingly
bleak. It is a joyless place,169 its inhabitants are pitiable,170 even the most wretched
status in the land of the living is preferable.171 Above all, the dead seem to be
speechless.172
Yet within this uniformly wretched atmosphere there is differentiation: Agamemnon
is still a leader of men, still accompanied by his entourage;173 Anticleia is still defined
by her sorrow over her son and her pity for her husband;174 Achilles is still consumed
by anxiety over his son and his father.175 In other words, even in the shadowy world
of the strengthless dead the individual personality continues: I may lead a shadowy
existence, but it is my shade.
163 See Heath p.391, note 8, on recent discussions.
164 xi.13-19.
165 E.g. xi.15: hve,ri kai. nefe,lh| kekalumme,noi; xi.19: nu.x ovloh,; xi.57: pw/j h=lqej u`po. zo,fon
hvero,enta; and xi.37 u`pe.x vEre,beuj (which Clarke (1999, p.201, note 85) argues should be taken "not as a
proper name but as an ordinary word for darkness in general and the darkness of death in particular.")
166 xi.93.
167 xi.223.
168 xii.382-386.
169 xi.94: o;fra i;dh| ne,kuaj kai. avterpe,a cw/ron;
170 See e.g. xi.55, 87, 387f, 541f.
171 xi.488-491.
172 By implication, since it is only the blood of the sacrifices which unlocks their tongues and their
memories – xi.139-149 and cf. xi.475f. At least this applies to communication with the living. See
Heath: "The issues are complex and the picture is often a bit fuzzy, but we can conclude that under
normal circumstances the buried dead cannot use articulate speech. They must be re-animated with
blood before they can converse with the living." (p396) "In later Greek, and often in Latin, the
underworld was known as the 'silent regions' and the dead as 'the silent ones', or, as the Hesiodic
Scutum refers to death itself, the place 'forgetful of speech' (laqifqo,ggoio, 131). This silence,
however, is the absence of articulate speech." (p.398)
173 xi.387-389.
174 xi.187-203.
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All this of course gives rise to obvious problems on a literal level, which in turn give
rise to the urge either to demythologise and dismiss the "fables of the poets", or to
rationalise by distinguishing different historical or symbolic layers.176 If it is di,kh
that the souls of the dead depart to Hades leaving flesh, sinews and bones behind,177
why are they frightened of swords? How can they drink blood? How are young girls
among them to be distinguished from the old men?178 How are they recognisably who
they were in life? How can they speak to Odysseus, or hear him, with what do they
recognise him? Why does Anticleia know exactly what her daughter-in-law is doing
and thinking,179 whereas Agamemnon and Achilles know nothing about their
respective sons?180 How does Ajax remember and nurse his wrath without drinking
the blood?181 What conceivable litigation is it that Minos presides over?182
In other words, on that level it is all naive, childish, absurd. But on another level we,
like the Phaeacians, are spellbound,183 because we want to hear what the state of death
is like. We know perfectly well that we cannot know this, and that the Nekuia in its
details is full of glaring contradictions, but we are willing to suspend our disbelief in
the details because details are irrelevant. Or perhaps the point is that the story, when
175 xi.492-503.
176 For example, Lucretius demythologises and Seneca dismisses, while Sourvinou-Inwood and Clarke
(1999) rationalise, the former on the basis of historical development, the latter on the basis of
competing or complementary imagery.
177 xi.212-222.
178 xi.38f.
179 xi.181-183.
180 xi.457-461 and xi.492f.
181 xi.543-567.
182 xi.568-571. The judicial role assigned to the Minos of the Odyssey in Gorgias 526 C-D is obviously
anachronistic. See Dodds, p.384: "Plato blandly overlooks the fact that Homer's Minos does not judge
the earthly lives of the dead, but judges disputes between them."
183 xi.333f.
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it is authentically told,184 has the power to charm us out of our disbelief.185 It is not
the physical impossibilities which concern us, it is the psychical possibilities: personal
immortality, however tenuous; communication between dead and living; communion
among the dead; the continuing force of pity.186
Accordingly, the description in the Nekuia of the state of death, of being dead,
dominates and controls the approach in the rest of the Odyssey to the fact of death, of
having to die. The epithets for death - for the act of dying - correspond to those for
the house of Hades. All deaths are wretched.187 So qa,natoj rarely appears alone: it is
qualified by me,laj188 or kako,j189 or tanhlegh,j,190 or it is coupled with or replaced by
kh,r191 or moi/ra192 or po,tmoj193 or oi=toj.194 Or else some circumlocution is used195 -
but never euphemisms. No attempt is ever made to domesticate death, to lessen its
184 For example, w[j te, pou h' auvto.j parew.n h' a;llou avkou,saj (viii. 491). See in this context de Jong,
p.215: "The word 'truth' does not imply historical accuracy, but rather vivid evocation...: the task of
professional singers was to preserve people's memory of the great deeds of men and gods. They did
this by bringing alive the past (e.g. by frequently allowing the heroes themselves to speak) and
transporting their audiences back to the past (by narrating events so graphically that they felt as if they
were almost eyewitnesses themselves.) This evocative conception of epic poetry, in combination with
its entertainment function, leaves the door open for amplification and invention."
185 xi.367f.: soi. d v e;pi me.n morfh. evpe,wn( e;ni de. fre,nej evsqlai,( / mu/qon d v w`j o[t v avoido.j
evpistame,nwj kate,lexaj...
186 Because that is another characteristic feature of the Nekuia. Odysseus has nothing but pity for the
dead, from his first encounter with them (xi.38f). His immediate reaction when sees Elpenor and
Anticlea and Agamemnon is to shed tears (xi.55= 87= 395: to.n / th.n me.n evgw. da,krusa ivdw.n evle,hsa,
te qumw||/.) Even more striking is the pity felt by the dead, both for themselves - xi.59 (Elpenor), xi.391f
(Agamemnon), xi.488ff (Achilles) – and for the living – xi.187ff (Anticlea for Laertes), xi.494ff
(Achilles for his father.)
187 xii.341: pa,ntej me.n stugeroi. qa,natoi deiloi/si brotoi/si)
188 E.g. xii.92: plei/oi me,lanoj qana,toio. Cf. xvii.326.
189 E.g. xxii.14: oi- teu,xein qa,nato,vn te kako,n)
190 E.g. xi.398: ti,j nu, se kh.r evda,masse tanhlege,oj qana,toio. Cf. iii.238.
191 E.g. ii.283: ouvde, ti i;sasin qa,naton kai. kh/ra me,lainan. (Cf. ii.352, v.387, xii.157, xvi.169,
xix.558.) And xviii.155: avll v ouvd v w-j fu,ge kh/ra)
192 E.g. xvii.326: :Argon d v au= kata. moi/r v e;laben me,lanoj qana,toio. (Cf. xvi.421, xix.145.) And
xxiv.28f : h= t va;ra kai. soi. prwi> parasth,sesqai e;melle / moi/r v ovloh,)
193 E.g. iv.562: qane,ein kai. po,tmon evpispei/n) (Cf. xxiv.31.) And xxii.416: tw/| kai. avtasqali,h|sin
aveike,a po,tmon evpe,spon) (Cf. xi.197.)
194 E.g. iii.134: tw/ sfewn pole,ej kako.n oi=ton evpe,spon)
195 E.g. xiv.89: oi[de de, toi i;sasi( qeou/ de, tin v e;kluon auvdh,n( / kei,nou lugro.n o;leqron) (Cf. xv.268,
xxiv.96.) Or xxii.67: avlla, tin v ouv feu,xesqai voi<omai aivpu.n o;leqron) Or ix.17: evgw. d va'n e;peita
fugw.n u[po nhlee.j h=mar. Or x.175: pri.n mo,rsimon h=mar evpe,lqh|. Or xvi.280 : dh. ga,r sfi
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awfulness.196 Certainly there are degrees of awfulness: all deaths are wretched, but
some are more wretched than others.197 Yet even the gentlest death is still wretched
because it condemns us to darkness and silence.
But all this is in the lap of the gods, or more precisely it has already been spun by the
gods198 - a consideration which is reinforced by all those "fateful" synonyms: kh,r(
moi/ra( po,tmoj( oi=toj.199 And that conviction results in an approach to death200 quite
unlike the neurotic terror from which Seneca and Lucretius want to emancipate us.
There is no abject fear of ever-looming death in the Odyssey. Fear of death is
mentioned only at moments of crisis, when death seems to be imminent.201 The
difference is particularly clear when Phemius and Medon, reprieved by Odysseus but
still unable to believe it, sit down by the altar of Zeus pa,ntose paptai,nonte, fo,non
potidegme,nw aivei,.202 That constant - but temporary - expectation of death by the
sword is very far from the kind of permanent existential dread which Seneca seeks to
dispel by the pen.
pari,statai ai;simon h=mar)
196 Except perhaps on the two occasions when it is likened to sleep: xiii.79f: kai. tw/| nh,dumoj u[pnoj
evpi. blefa,roisin e;pispe( / nh,gretoj h[distoj( qana,tw| a;gkista evoikw,j, and xviii.201-205.
197 Best of all (or least awful) is to be overtaken in sleek old age – the gentle death prophesied for
Odysseus himself: qa,natoj de, toi evx a`lo.j auvtw/| / avblhcro.j ma,la toi/oj evleu,setai( o[j ke, se pe,fnh| /
gh,ra| u[po liparw/| avrhme,non. (xi.134-137. Cf. i.217f, iv.207-211, xv.407-411, xix.365-368.) Next
comes dying in the arms of one’s comrades, having wound up the skein of war, with proper funeral
rites and posthumous fame (e.g. i.236-240, iv.490, iv.583f, xix.365-370, xxiv.30-34.) Then a “clean
death” (xxii.462: mh. me.n dh. kaqarw/| qana,tw| avpo. qumo.n e`loi,mhn / ta,wn), as opposed to the “piteous
death” of the maidservants (xxii.472: o[pwj oi;ktista qa,noien; and cf. xii.340f., where Eurylochus
characterises death from hunger as oi;ktiston) or Cassandra (xi.421f) or Agamemnon (xxiv.34). Worst
of all is a shameful death, like that of the suitors (xxiv.186-190) or Aegisthos (iii.258-261) without the
ge,raj due to the dead.
198 E.g. xi.139.
199 Cf. Clarke, 1999, p.251: "In particular moi/ra and kh,r (along with po,tmoj( ai=sa and oi=toj) differ
from qa,natoj in that they are responsible not only for death but also for the planning of man's fate at
his birth and its execution throughout his life."
200 But perhaps "approach to death" is misleading. As Clarke puts it (1999, p.244): "The essence is
that a man does not go to meet death, but rather it is death that comes to meet him."
201 E.g. x.130, xvi.445-7, xxii.42f.
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So the consciousness of death, of its inevitability, in no way undermines or diminishes
the value of life: on the contrary, it enhances it. Life is always "honey-sweet", even
the sorrowful existence of which Anticleia is deprived by death.203 Odysseus may
sometimes wish he were dead (for example, ironically, when he is told that he must
visit the realm of the dead),204 and so does Penelope,205 but neither, whatever the
circumstances, seriously contemplates suicide,206 nor do any of the other characters.207
Life is precious and death, even though it is entirely negative, is fated and therefore to
be accepted with resignation - both the inevitability and the actuality.
In other words, the characters in the Odyssey, in accepting death as inevitable and not
allowing the fear of death to affect the quality of life, seem to approach the matter
instinctively - or naturally - in a way which Lucretius thinks impossible for anyone
who accepts the fables of the poets about the underworld and for whom the gods are
actively engaged in human affairs and open to propitiation. But while Odysseus
would think Lucretius' exhortations superfluous, he would find Seneca's consolationes
incomprehensible. Because the death of others in the Odyssey is met with anything
but calm resignation by either sex. In fact the tears of men are even more copious
than those of women, and the reaction of men and women to the death - or even the
supposed death - of a spouse or child is a grief which is both inconsolable and
uncomplicated: there is never a hint of embarrassment, or shame, or guilt, or any
suggestion that the ge,raj due to the dead might be a matter of ritual posturing.
202 xxii.378-380.
203 xi.202f: avlla, me so,j te po,qoj sa, te mh,dea( fai,dim v VOdusseu/( / sh, t v avganofrosu,nh melihde,a
qumo.n avphu,ra)
204 x.496-498.
205 xx.61-65.
206 x.49-52 is more hyperbole than the reflection of a real dilemma - cf. x.53: vall v e;tlhn. For
polu,tlaj di/oj vOdusseu,j not to endure would be inconceivable.
207 The only suicide referred to directly in the Odyssey is that of Epicaste (xi.277-280). Rohde (p.3)
goes too far in saying "to turn aside from life altogether never enters the head of anyone in Homer":
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Of the minor characters, Aegyptius is always weeping for his son Antiphas, even
though he has three others still with him,208 and the sorrow Eupeithes feels for his
worthless son Antinous is "comfortless".209 But the most striking examples are
Anticleia who dies of grief,210 Laertes whom grief has turned into a pathetic shadow
of his former kingly self,211 and of course Penelope, the model of the perpetually
grieving wife, whose signature tune as it were is: ovizurai. de. oi` aivei. / fqi,nousin
nu,ktej te kai. h;mata da,kru ceou,sh|.212 Penelope's tears are never considered a matter
for reproach: on the contrary, they are the indispensable proof that she still loves her
husband.213 Although at one point the nurse Eurynome tells her mistress that
unceasing sorrow is not good, what she means is that it is not conducive to health and
beauty, not that it is wrong.214 And the disguised Odysseus tells Penelope that it is
both natural and right to weep for a lost husband (even after twenty years): the only
reason why she should now cease is that his return is imminent.215
Absent then from the approach to death in the Odyssey is any form of consolatio on
bereavement, as well as any idea of meditari in either of its senses. The characters are
resigned to the inevitability of their own death but inconsolable over the death of
others, in ironic contrast to Seneca's ideal sage, who obsessively practises for his own
death and accepts that of his spouse or child with fortitude or indifference. And they
seem to live life more naturally than the Lucretian ideal, in that they do so without
the suicide of Ajax must be inferred from xi.549.
208 ii.15-24.
209 xxiv.423: paido.j ga,r oi` a;laston evni. fresi. pe,nqoj e;keito)
210 xi.197-203, xv.358f.
211 xi.187-196, xv.353-357, xvi.142-145, xxiv.315-317.
212 xi.182f = xiii.337f = xvi.38f.
213 xi.182f, xiii.336-338. Cf. the extended simile of the distraught widow at viii.523-530.
214 xviii.173f. When at xix.120 Odysseus says evpei. ka,kion penqh,menai a;kriton aivei,( he is talking not
about bereavement but about self-pity in adversity.
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reference to nature - there is, after all, something unnatural about being consciously
natural.
Of course, if we have lost the art of living naturally, and if striving to be natural is
itself unnatural, we seem to be in difficulties. But this is perhaps where poetry (or
myth, or fiction) is able to effect something which is beyond the power of philosophy.
Chesterton, in analysing the curious split in Tolstoy's literary personality, argues that
"The real distinction between the ethics of high art and the ethics of manufactured and
didactic art lies in the simple fact that the bad fable has a moral, while the good fable
is a moral."216 Seneca and Lucretius have a moral. The Odyssey is a moral: instead
of telling us what to do, it shows us - through characters who are universal, who
represent us, who either articulate our experience of life or make new ways of
experiencing life available to us.217 Penelope is the archetypal bereaved wife. She
does not argue the case for inconsolable grief: she simply, by virtue of her role in the
story, sanctifies the concept of inconsolable grief and makes it legitimate for us. We
do not appeal to nature in order to legitimise our continuing sorrow: we appeal to the
story of someone who behaved naturally. Or putting it another way: that her
behaviour was natural is not something to be established by rational argument, it is
something which we perceive instinctively (or naturally) in reading the story. In this
way, we are again enabled to live naturally ourselves.
And in this way the gulf between Donne's two poles - "It tolls for thee" and "She, she
is dead" - is almost bridged. The pathos of real life, of individual personal loss, is no
215 xix.262-272.
216 Chesterton, pp.147f.
217 Cf. Finley, p.v: "[Homer's] preconceptual age and tradition gave his characters the double role at
once of living their lives and showing the nature of the world."
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longer swallowed up (and thereby dismissed) in a generalising abstraction: instead it
finds expression in a representative figure, a figure who succeeds in being both
individual and universal. (So that we actually find Penelope's inconsolability more
consoling than Seneca's consolationes.) It is in this sense that Odysseus himself, far
from being No Man, is Everyman.
Seneca at one point wishes that someone could come back from the dead to tell us
what to expect.218 Odysseus is that man: disqanh,j, as Circe calls him, while other
mortals die only once.219 He has, it might be said, rehearsed his own death, taking the
second sense of Seneca's meditari literally. And in doing so his experience becomes
authoritative. This is the other difference, especially in relation to death, between
philosophy and certain kinds of poetry: philosophy is necessarily tentative,
exploratory, hypothetical; epic poetry, poetic myth claim to be authoritative, self-
authenticating.
In other words the Nekuia is both the assertion and the proof of the validity of this
approach to death. It asserts that this man Odysseus has visited the realm of the dead
- has died - and lived to tell the tale. And it presents his experience of the realm of the
dead as the basis on which he approaches death. And as a result Odysseus becomes
representative or illustrative, in the sense that his experience of the realm of the dead
is presented as evidence for what we ourselves are to expect, and the basis on which
we are to approach death. The rational mind of course is irritated by this
extraordinary self-confidence shown by poetic myth and wants to interrogate it,220 if
218 Ep.Mor. XXX. 9-10.
219 xii.21f. Circe actually uses the plural, of Odysseus and his comrades, but of course by the time
Odysseus tells the tale he is the only survivor.
220 Cf. Halliwell (2000, p.104) on the attitude to the poets portrayed in the Republic: "The logos of
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not dismiss it out of hand. But - again - it is not the details that matter. It is the power
of the story to suggest possibilities. And after all, is the confidence with which the
Nekuia asserts the reality of the underworld any less justified than the confidence with
which Lucretius and Seneca deny it?
poetry...is discourse for which the poet's authorial voice, a voice that is granted cultural authority to
'speak' on the most important matters of life, must be held responsible and subject to the ethical
interrogation of philosophical enquiry." Where this leaves Plato's own poetry, his mu/qoi, will have to
be considered in the following chapter.
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II. Plato and the Practice of Death
Platon me semble avoir aymé cette forme de philosopher par dialogues, à escient,
pour loger plus decemment en diverses bouches la diversité et variation de ses
propres fantasies. Diversement traicter les matieres est aussi bien les traicter que
conformément, et mieux: à sçavoir plus copieusement et utillement.
Montaigne, Essais, II.12
And so the stage is set and the curtain rises on Plato. Except that Plato himself is not
to be seen. Pla,twn de. oi=mai hvsqe,nei:1 his absence from the Phaedo is unusual
merely in that it is expressly noted. Not only do we know little about his life (very
little if the Seventh Letter is spurious), we know very little about his thinking, that is
to say about what he himself thought. The Socratic problem is one thing - the
question whether and to what extent the Platonic Socrates reflects the historical
Socrates, whether we can ever assert with any confidence, "Socrates thought that . . ."
The Platonic problem is another: whether and to what extent the Platonic Socrates
reflects Plato's own ideas, whether we can ever assert with any confidence, "Plato
thought that . . ." The "solution" which simply takes everything on its face value, and
sees no distinction between "Plato says that" and "Plato thinks that", which treats the
dialogues as simply philosophy dressed up,2 and which tries to work everything up
into a system with all the wrinkles ironed out, is equivalent to the approach of the
fundamentalist Christian who simply appeals to "what the Bible says", and who
accordingly incurs the impossible and unnecessary task of reconciling the
irreconcilable.3
1 Phaedo 59B.
2 As for example in the case of Pascal or Hume who, in Schaerer's words (pp.12 f.), "conçoivent la
forme dialoguée comme un artifice destiné à communiquer plus de vie aux idées exprimées - celles-ci
demeurant toujours le but et la raison d'être de l'oeuvre et la discussion obéissant constamment, dans sa
marche, aux intentions didactiques de l'auteur, lequel ne fait que mettre sous une forme dramatique un
discours suivi..."
3 The two approaches are sometimes labelled "dogmatic" and "sceptical". See e.g. Press, p.310:
"...during most of its history, interpretation of Plato has oscillated between two poles. For the most
part, it has been what may be called dogmatic or doctrinal; that is, it has been assumed that Plato's
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Yet there is another biblical analogy which might suggest a less than total agnosticism
in relation to what Plato thought - the canonical gospels. The three synoptic gospels
are probably closer than the fourth gospel is to the historical Jesus, just as Plato's
Socrates probably has a greater range than the historical Socrates. But the position is
more complicated than that, because the synoptic gospels are certainly not
straightforward eyewitness accounts - the historical Jesus still has to be disentangled
from the distortions and accretions of the tradition and the interpretations of the
evangelists. And to some extent a picture of the historical Jesus - or at least a picture
of someone closer to the historical Jesus than the Jesus of the gospels - can be built up
by comparing the evangelists with each other. (Perhaps here Plato could be classed
with the fourth evangelist and Xenophon with the synoptists.)4 But in the process
something else emerges as well: redaction criticism, the technique of isolating the
peculiar contribution of each evangelist, not only helps to clarify the picture of the
historical Jesus, it also produces a picture of each evangelist, of his "theology"
(although virtually nothing is known about any of the evangelists except what is
contained in the gospels). And applying this to Plato means that to argue that we can
thought consists of a more or less systematic body of doctrines which it is the primary function of the
dialogues to communicate along with the arguments that Plato believes to show the truth of these
doctrines...The other pole, the skeptical, emphasises the inconclusive endings of many dialogues,
Socrates' perpetual questioning, and the wealth of inconsistencies, ambiguities, and apparently weak or
invalid arguments, and claims that Plato does not have any settled doctrines, but always remains in
doubt or open to further inquiry and argument."
A slightly different perspective contrasts the analytic and the dramatic, see Dorter, p.ix: "One is the
analytic approach, which isolates individual arguments and evaluates their logical success or failure
(usually the latter); the other may be called the dramatic approach, which prefers to view the dialogue
as a dramatic unity rather than an aggregate of arguments."
On the dialogues as dramatic unities, and with a corresponding emphasis on literary rather than
philosophical considerations, see Rutherford. (But Rutherford does not deal with the Phaedo at any
length.) On Plato's reasons for choosing the dialogue form - i.e. on the inseparable relationship
between philosophical and literary considerations - see M. Frede. And for a recent defence of the
"dogmatic" approach, see Beversluis.
4 At least in the sense that, while "both Plato and Xenophon make Socrates in their own image"
(Rutherford, p.22), Plato carries the process much further because his image is much more complex.
40
know nothing at all about what he thought may be too pessimistic.5 We may never be
in a position to assert (in the way we can about Lucretius or Seneca) that Plato
thought such and such about approaching death, but we may very well be able to
assert that he thought approaching death the most important thing in life, that his
approach had room for the mystical and the mythical, and that he approached the
mythical in ways which were influenced by but distinct from those of Homer. In
other words, although Plato may not be there on the stage as one of the players or
singers, his presence is there to be felt - not only as the composer and librettist, but as
the conductor in the orchestral pit.
1. The Fear of Death
The argument that the dialogues are to be seen as open-ended,6 as a stimulus to
thought and discussion rather than as dogmatic statements of the truth, means that the
approach of the systematic critic - the critic who treats Plato like Lucretius or Seneca,
who adopts a systematic approach to "what Plato thought" and in the process is
always on the lookout for logical inconsistencies - is misconceived. For example, on
the basis of what the dialogues say about the fear of death the systematic critic might
infer that Plato does not attach a great deal of importance to it, that far from finding it
necessary to inure himself and others to the thought of death, as Seneca was to do, or
embarking like Lucretius on a mission to rid mankind of the fear of death, he is
contemptuously dismissive. There are several passages which might suggest this.
5 See Rutherford, p.26, on the shortcomings of the "panaporetic" interpretation of Plato.
6 See e.g. Griswold, p.239: "It seems that if Plato had written one more or one less dialogue, the unity
of the corpus would suffer little, precisely because its unity derives from a common goal, not the
systematization of the means."
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First, in the Apology7 Socrates argues that when people fear death they pretend to
knowledge (that death is the greatest evil)8 which they do not have, whereas here if
anywhere he is wiser than others since he does not know very much about it and he
admits it.9 (The systematic critic might think this somewhat at odds with the positive
assertion a little later on that death is duoi/n qa,teron10 – it is either highly agreeable11
or the greatest good.12 In other words, he would deduce that for Plato it is apparently
all right to entertain the hope13 that death is the greatest good and therefore to
welcome it, but not to think that it is the greatest evil and therefore to fear it. And he
would ask why the first should be designated wise agnosticism, and the second
deplorable ignorance14 masquerading as wisdom.15 And he might find a further
paradox in the fact that according to the Phaedo16 non-philosophers who face death
bravely are said to do so out of fear of greater evils: they are brave through
cowardice, which is a;logon) He might argue that this produces the curious result that
to fear death is ignorant, and to brave death is irrational.)17
Second, Socrates appears to think there is something ridiculous18 about the inability to
face death. Those, for example, who in order to avoid the death sentence parade their
wives and children in court are criticized as womanish and as making Athens a
7 Apol. 29A: to. ga,r toi qa,naton dedie,nai( w= a;ndrej( ouvde.n a;llo evsti.n h' dokei/n sofo.n ei=nai mh.
o;nta)
8 Ibid.: o[ti me,giston tw/n kakw/n evsti)
9 Ibid.. 29B: ouvk eivdw.j i`kanw/j peri. tw/n evn [Aidou ou[tw kai. oi;omai ouvk eivde,nai)
10 Ibid. 40C.
11 If it is like a dreamless sleep: indeed more than highly agreeable – it would be qauma,sion ke,rdoj)
12 If it involves a journey to another place: ti, mei/zon avgaqo.n tou,tou ei;h a;n;
13 Apol . 41C: avlla. kai. u`ma/j crh,)))euve,lpidaj ei=nai pro.j to.n qa,naton)
14 Ibid. 29B: kai. tou/to pw/j ouvk avmaqi,a evstin au[th h` evponei,distoj)
15 Ibid. 29A: dokei/n ga.r eivde,nai evsti.n a] ouvk oi=den)
16 Phaedo 68D: kai,toi a;logo,n ge de,ei tina. kai. deili,a| avndrei/on ei=nai)
17 For a discussion of the "dubious slide" in the Phaedo passage "from 'brave through fear' to the full-
blown paradox 'brave through cowardice'" see Gallop, pp.99ff.
18 katage,laston – Apol. 35B.
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laughing-stock in the eyes of foreigners. And it is considered particularly
inappropriate or jarring for an old man to get worked up about imminent death.19
Third, Socrates claims that the fear of death ought to pale into insignificance beside
the fear of doing wrong. The most elegant formulation of this principle is in the
Crito:20 ouv to. zh/n peri. plei,stou poihte,on( avlla. to. eu= zh/n, where eu= is then defined
as dikai,wj. But it appears also in the Apology at 28C where Socrates adduces
Achilles as an example of someone fearing a cowardly life more than an honourable
death, and at 32D where he adduces himself as an example of the same thing: rather
than concur in what he considered an injustice he chose to risk death by disobeying
the Thirty.
(The systematic critic might argue that the choice between the alternatives, fear death
or fear wrong-doing, may not always be clear-cut. Nor are they always mutually
exclusive, though Cephalus, in Book I of the Republic, seems to think that they are.
Cephalus says that people who are approaching death begin to take seriously the tales
of the underworld21 and if they are conscious of having done wrong they suffer from
nightmares about what might be in store for them; if, on the other hand, like Cephalus
himself - assisted by his wealth - they have done no wrong, their old age is sweetened
by hope.22 But the systematic critic might object that it not impossible to conceive of
someone who is unconscious of doing wrong yet who nevertheless fears death. For
Plato, however, such a fear seems to be met by the first two arguments: it is simply
19 Crito 43B: kai. ga.r a;n( w= Kri,twn( plhmmele.j ei;h avganaktei/n thlikou/ton o;nta eiv dei/ h;dh
teleuta/n. And cf. Phaedo 117A: ouvde.n ga.r oi=mai kerdanei/n ovli,gon u[steron piw.n a;llo ge h' ge,lwta
ovflh,sein par v evmautw/|( glico,menoj tou/ zh/n)))
20 Crito 48B; cf. 54B.
21 Rep. 330D: oi[ te ga,r lego,menoi mu/qoi peri. tw/n evn [Aidou)
22 Rep. 331A: h`dei/a evlpi,j)
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irrational or unmanly.23 As he puts it towards the end of the Gorgias,24 in a sentence
which combines all three arguments: auvto. me.n ga.r to. avpoqnh|,skein ouvdei.j fobei/tai,(
o[stij mh. panta,pasin avlo,gisto,j te kai. avnandro,j evsti( to. de. avdikei/n fobei/tai.)
Fourth, according to Book III of the Republic it is actually the tales about the
underworld and its horrors which create the fear of death: no one who believes such
things can be expected to prefer death in battle to defeat and slavery.25 All negative
descriptions of what follows death must therefore be forbidden in the ideal state. In
other words, fear of death is the result of an uncontrolled imagination: control the
imagination by proper censorship, and the problem is solved. (The trouble is, the
systematic critic might say, that not only does this nullify Cephalus’ h`dei/a evlpi,j,
which consisted in the hope that having done no wrong he would escape the horrors
of the underworld, but it collides dramatically with the harrowing description of the
punishment of the wicked in Book X of the Republic26 – rather more terrifying and
certainly intended as more generally applicable than the examples in Book XI of the
Odyssey.27)
Fifth, while the first four arguments should apply to everyone, for the true philosopher
there is a more profound consideration: to one who is accustomed to contemplate
everything sub specie aeternitatis, this life cannot be of any great concern.28 Of
course that is merely the negative way of putting it. And if it were the only way of
23 Or childish, like the fear of ta. mormolu,keia – Phaedo 77E.
24 Gorgias 522E.
25 Rep. 386A-387C.
26 Ibid. 614E-616A. Colotes the Epicurean had already noted the collision in the 3rd century B.C. (See
Halliwell, 1993, on Rep. 615D4 and p.27, note 35.)
27 Cf. Annas, 1981, p.351: "The stress is not on the useful improving power of punishment but on
vindictive retribution; the very wicked are eternally tortured although they will never improve (615c-
616b) and Plato's underworld is a sadistic hell, not a purgatory."
28 Rep. 486A.
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putting it, then even Socrates - in spite of having all his life striven to be a true
philosopher29 - admits that he would be right to feel angry at having to die30 (an
admission perhaps rather out of tune with the first two arguments). In fact, however,
the true philosopher, far from being angry31 or fearful32 at the thought of death,
approaches it confidently because of his conviction33 that he will share in the greatest
blessings after death.34 (Obviously, the systematic critic will say, this reinforces the
question-mark against the first argument, that those who fear death simply fail to
acknowledge our ignorance of what it entails: the true philosopher, in stating that he
does not fear death because he is confident that he will share in the greatest blessings
after death, is failing to acknowledge his ignorance of what it entails. And
conversely, as Cebes points out in the Phaedo, in the absence of proof that the soul is
immortal, confidence in the face of death is merely foolish.35)
Now when it is pointed out to him that this approach is misconceived, that Plato is not
being dogmatic, that the dialogues are philosophical dramas which demand the
participation of the reader, that the intention is not to provide an exhaustive treatment
of any subject by combining everything that is said about it in all the dialogues, when
29 Phaedo 69D.
30 Ibid. 63B: evgw. ga,r)))eiv me.n mh. w|;mhn h[xein)))para. Qeou.j a;llouj sofou,j te kai. avgaqou,j)))hvdi,koun
av.n ouvk avganaktw/n tw|/ qana,tw|)
31 avganaktei/n is perhaps not quite as strong as Dylan Thomas’s “raging”, but it is certainly stronger
than the Loeb translator’s “being troubled” at Phaedo 62D, 62E, 64A, 67E. The picture conjured up is
of angry, resentful resistance to death, whereas the true philosopher dies r`a|di,wj (Phaedo 62C, 81A.)
The same opposition between avganaktei/n and r`a|di,wj appears at Gorgias 522D and Crito 43B-C
(where r`a|di,wj is accompanied by pra|,wj).
32 Phaedo 67E: to. teqna,nai h[kista auvtoi/j avnqrw,pwn fobero,n)
33 eu;elpij (Phaedo 63C, 64A) must imply more than good hope or strongly held hope. Everyone
presumably hopes that there is a happy afterlife – and Socrates (Phaedo 68A) gives the example of the
many men who have willingly died in the hope of seeing their dead loved ones again: the argument
there is that a fortiori the philosopher (who is in love with wisdom and greatly - sfo,dra - hopes to find
it after death) will be willing to die. But if the first is merely a case of wishful thinking, the second is
merely a more extreme case of wishful thinking, unless the hope amounts to a conviction. Cf. Rowe,
1993, p.146 on 68A-B: "evlpi,j embraces 'expectation' as well as 'hope'." (And cf. The Epistle to the
Hebrews xi.1, where Christian faith is described as pi,stij evlpizome,nwn u`po,stasij.)
34 Phaedo 64A: kai. eu;elpij ei=nai evkei/ me,gista oi;sesqai avgaqa. evpeida.n teleuth,sh|)
35 Phaedo 88B: avnoh,twj)
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this is pointed out to him the systematic critic might respond with some irritation that
what it amounts to is to put Plato beyond criticism: it will be impossible ever to
detect Plato in a fallacy or an inconsistency or a contradiction, since he can always
take refuge behind the dramatist's mask. If what Plato's characters say can never be
attributed to Plato himself, it can never be permissible to claim that Plato was
mistaken in saying X. If it can never be said that Plato thought Y, it can never be
said that Plato was mistaken in thinking Y.
But the response to that response might be that of the Punch reviewer who said that to
criticize a novel by P.G. Wodehouse was to take a spade to a soufflé. In other words,
the systematic critic is simply wielding the wrong tool: what the reader is invited to
do is not to engage in logic-chopping in relation to self-contained propositions, but to
continue an imaginative exploration into the unknown.36 It is the difference between
the te,cnh evn gra,mmasi and the dialektikh. te,cnh of the Phaedrus,37 to the extent that
Plato's dialogue form succeeds in overcoming the limitations of the former and
representing the latter.38
Needless to say, nothing in this should deter us from criticizing each argument
separately on its merits, and if we can convince ourselves that Plato failed to see the
fallacies in the arguments he puts in the mouths of others, we will permit ourselves to
36 Cf. Griswold, p.238: "...Plato's dialogues contain no assertions by Plato, only depictions of people
becoming and failing to become philosophers...Plato presents us with dramatic imitations of the
practice of philosophising. Indeed, by withholding his own answers from his texts Plato seduces the
reader into finding an answer for himself."
37 Phaedrus 275C and 276E.
38 Cf. Griswold (p.238f.) on "Socrates' criticisms of writing presented at the end of the Phaedrus":
"Plato wrote the criticisms, a fact that shows...that he both rejects the criticisms (since, unlike Socrates,
he wrote) and that he accepts them (since he wrote dialogues). Plato accepts Socrates' arguments in
favor of dialectical discourse, but he thinks that he has found a form of writing that blunts Socrates'
criticisms of writing." Friedländer put it more succinctly when he said (1954, Vol.1, p.177) that the
dialogue is "die einzige Form des Buches, die das Buch selber aufzuheben scheint."
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say that in that respect he was mistaken. (And we will remember that Plato himself
would not find this in the least disconcerting, always assuming that he endorsed what
he has Socrates say in the Gorgias,39 that it is more blessed to be refuted than to
refute.) Nor, naturally, are we precluded from comparing passages on the same
subject in different dialogues and seeking clarification from such a comparison. What
is illegitimate is the use of such comparison to control our interpretation, as if what
Plato means by what is said in one dialogue must be compatible with what is said in
another.
2. The Death of Others
There is, however, one contribution which the systematic critic can make, and that is
negative: a subject about which Plato says little or nothing may reasonably be
inferred to be one in which he has little or no interest. There are only two passages -
both in the Republic - which deal directly with bereavement. The principle
enunciated in Book III is that tears and lamentations are inappropriate for future
guardians,40 and this for two reasons. First, the man who is evpieikh,j will not consider
the death of a friend (who is presumed also to be evpieikh,j) to be terrible for the
friend:41 therefore he will not weep for him. Second, since being evpieikh,j he is self-
sufficient,42 the death of a son or a brother will affect him less than other men, indeed
he will bear such misfortunes with great calmness.43 Exhibitions of grief are to be
expected from the weaker sort of women and the baser sort of men, but the future
39 458A.
40 Rep. 387D: kai. tou.j ovdurmou.j a;ra evxairh,somen kai. tou.j oi;ktouj tou.j tw/n evllogi,mwn avndrw/n)
41 Ibid: fame.n de. dh. o[ti o` evpieikh.j avnh.r tw|/ evpieikei/( ou-per kai. e`tai/ro,j evstin( to. teqna,nai ouv
deino.n h`gh,setai)
42 Ibid. w`j o` toiou/toj ma,lista auvto.j au`tw/| auvta,rkhj pro.j to. eu= zh/n)))
43 Rep. 387E: fe,rein de. w`j prao,tata)
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guardians must not be exposed to the emotional outbursts of Achilles over Patroclus,
or Priam over Hector.
When the question of poetry arises again in Book X, the subject of grief is reopened.
It is now admitted that o` evpieikh.j avnh,r will feel some pain at the loss of a son, but
he will restrain his grief in the presence of others, while allowing himself to express in
private feelings which he would be ashamed to display in public.44 What controls his
public behaviour is lo,goj kai. no,moj, whereas in private he is at the mercy of auvto. to.
pa,qoj. And in a pregnant sentence45 o` no,moj is said to enjoin calmness and restraint
in this kind of misfortune, for four reasons. First, because it is not clear whether it is
in fact misfortune, second because there is no point in taking it to heart, third because
nothing in this life matters very much anyway, and fourth because grief stands in the
way of recovery.
The first – ou;te dh,lou o;ntoj tou/ avgaqou/ te kai. kakou/ tw/n toiou,twn – recalls the
recommended agnosticism in the Apology,46 but it appears to conflict with the earlier
passage in Book III of the Republic where it is positively affirmed that to the avnh.r
evpieikh,j the death of his friend is not deino,n. In other words there is the same
oscillation here between detached agnosticism and privileged knowledge which the
systematic critic found in relation to the fear of death. The second, that there is no
profit in grief, is true if it means that grief will not restore the dead to life, but if it
means that the expression of grief will achieve nothing by way of therapy, that
44 Ibid. 604A.
45 Ibid. 604B: Le,gei pou o` no,moj o[ti ka,lliston( o[ti ma,lista h`suci,an a;gein evn tai/j sumforai/j kai.
mh. avganaktei/n( w`j ou;te dh,lou o;ntoj tou/ avgaqou/ te kai. kakou/ tw/n toiou,twn( ou;te eivj to. pro,sqen
ouvde.n probai/non tw|/ calepw/j fe,ronti( ou;te ti tw/n avnqrwpi,nwn a;xion o'n mega,lhj spoudh/j( o[ te dei/
evn auvtoi/j o[ti ta,cista paragi,gnesqai h`min( tou,tw|| evmpodw.n gigno,menon to. lupei/sqai)
46 Apol. 29A.
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presumably is an empirical judgement which is rebuttable by experience. The third,
taken on its face value (ou;te ti tw/n avnqrwpi,nwn a;xion o'n mega,lhj spoudh/j), puts
something of a question-mark against every human endeavour, including the previous
nine books of the Republic. The fourth, that grieving hinders the cure, is in effect a
restatement of the second, but in such a way that the alleged cure is presented as
infallible. Instead of behaving like hurt children, crying and clutching the sore bit, we
should get into the habit47 of accepting whatever happens like the fall of dice: if we
do not weep we will be cured.48 But of course it could equally well be claimed that
weeping is the cure, and that the suppression of grief 49 is not only unnatural but
unreasonable.
The point is that all four reasons are reasons of expediency, so that if it can be shown
that they do not work then in practice they collapse. We don’t know whether death is
good or bad – but what if that uncertainty is itself the cause of distress? Grief
achieves nothing – but what if it does? Life is not important – but what if it is (and it
must be if it is important to be evpieikh,j)? Grief hinders the cure – but what if the
proposed cure is no cure at all?
At any rate, in the Republic indulgence in grief is presented as rooted in ignorance, as
womanish and childish, and as inappropriate in the guardians. And we have a glimpse
into what is appropriate, not just in the blueprint for the ideal state,50 but in Plato’s
47 Rep. 604C: evqi,zein th.n yuch,n)
48 Ibid. 604D: ivatrikh/| qrhnw|di,an avfani,zonta)
49 To the point of refusing to allow ourselves to remember the reason for our suffering, on the ground
that this is tantamount to cowardice – 604D.
50 See Kassel (p.33) on what he regards as the illegitimate use of this passage from the Republic in the
Konsolationsliteratur, e.g. Ps.-Plutarch 112 e-f: "Der Gedankengang, bei Platon in weitreichendem
Zusammenhang auf den Aufbau des Idealstaates durch die innere Ausbildung seiner berufenen Träger,
die dem entnervenden Einfluss der bisher erziehungsmächtigen Poesie entzogen werden sollen,
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description of a “real life” situation. Because in the Phaedo we are shown both how
the philosopher meets death, and how o` evpieikh.j avnh,r should face the death of a
friend; and we also see that there is a connection between the two. In the
introduction Phaedo describes his emotions to Echecrates. Since Socrates appeared to
be happy and to be approaching death nobly and without fear, it was impossible to
feel what might be expected in such a situation. Instead of pity, a strange mixture of
pleasure and pain came over Phaedo and his friends: sometimes they laughed,
sometimes they wept.51 But at the end, when Socrates cheerfully downs the cup of
poison,52 the tears take over. Apollodorus wails aloud, Phaedo covers his face in his
cloak and weeps, not for his friend but for himself in losing such a friend – until
Socrates recalls them to their senses by telling them how womanish and jarring their
behaviour is: it was precisely to avoid such an exhibition that he sent the women
away.53 And at that Phaedo and his friends are ashamed and dry their tears.
An inspiring scene, and yet in that little phrase of Phaedo’s, that he wept not for his
friend but for himself, Plato seems to remind us of another dimension to all this: that
grief at the death of others may have much less to do with anxiety about their future
state54 than with sorrow over our own present state. Our grief in fact is a measure of
our loss.
gerichtet, wird jetzt ganz der Beschwichtigung privaten Leids dienstbar gemacht, worum es Platon
durchaus nicht zu tun war."
51 Phaedo 58E-59A.
52 Ibid. 117C.
53 Ibid. 117D: evgw. me,ntoi ouvc h[kista tou,tou e[neka ta.j gunai/kaj avpe,pemya( i[na mh. toiau/ta
plhmmeloi/en) (Cf. Crito 43B: kai. ga.r a;n)))plhmmele.j ei;h avganaktei/n thlikou/ton o;nta eiv dei/ h;dh
teleuta/n.)
54 Cf. Rep. 387D: ouvk a;ra u`pe,r g v evkei,nou w`j deino,n ti peponqo,toj ovdu,roit v a;n)
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3. The Practice of Death
By contrast, one subject which the systematic critic would consider central to Plato's
thinking is the afterlife and its relationship with our present existence. That there is
such a relationship is evident even in the Apology, although the straightforward
statement of the logical alternatives in the duoi/n qa,teron at 40C seems to exclude it:
death is either wonderful, like a dreamless sleep, or it is the greatest good. But of
course there is nothing logical about these alternatives. In the first place, a dreamless
sleep is not wonderful except in its effects, and ex hypothesi there will be no effects.55
In the second place, there is no logical reason why there should not be an infinite
number of other possibilities ranging from extinction to ineffable bliss, and including
every shade of misery. In fact what Socrates is putting forward in his duoi/n qa,teron
is not a logical proposition but a personal credo. He is after all exclusively addressing
those who have voted for his acquittal,56 and this is reinforced at 41C by the addition
of avndri. avgaqw|/.57 In other words, it is only the good man who has reason to regard
death hopefully.58
But this ethical connection between life and afterlife is most succinctly expressed in
the Phaedo: oi` ovrqw/j filosofou/ntej avpoqnh|,skein meletw/si.59 That succinctness,
55 "Miss Seward: 'There is one mode of the fear of death, which is certainly absurd; and that is the
dread of annihilation, which is only a pleasing sleep without a dream.' Johnson: 'It is neither pleasing,
nor sleep; it is nothing. Now mere existence is so much better than nothing, that one would rather
exist even in pain, than not exist.'” (Boswell, Vol. II, pp.435f.)
56 Apol. 39E-40A: toi/j de. avpoyhfisame,noij h`de,wj a'n dialecqei,hn)))u`mi/n ga.r w`j fi,loij ou=sin
evpidei/xai evqe,lw to. nuni, moi sumbebhko.j ti, pote noei/.
57 vAlla. kai. u`ma/j crh,( w= a;ndrej dikastai,( euve,lpidaj ei=nai pro.j to.n qa,naton( kai. e[n ti tou/to
dianoei/sqai avlhqe,j( o[ti ouvk e;stin avndri. avgaqw/| kako.n ouvde.n ou;te zw/nti ou;te teleuth,santi( ouvde.
avmelei/tai u`po. Qew/n ta. tou,tou pra,gmata.
58 So that the position stated in the Apology is not unlike that in the Phaedo at 63C: avll v eu;elpi,j eivmi
ei=nai, ti toi/j teteleuthko,si kai,( w[sper ge kai. pa,lai le,getai( polu. a;meinon toi/j avgaqoi/j h' toi/j
kakoi/j) The only difference is that in the Apology Socrates does not expressly refer to the kakoi,)
59 Phaedo 67E.
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however, may be misleading. It led Cleombrotus to short-circuit the process by
committing suicide.60 Friedländer, on the other hand, maintains that “vor allem lehrt
[der Phaidon] ...dass Leben ein Sterbenlernen ist. Das heisst nicht erlösungssüchtig
sich dem Tode hingeben, vielmehr leben im Angesichte der Idee und so, dass das
Wissen um den Tod dem Leben sein Gesetz gibt..."61 Somewhere in between, Sorabji
assumes that what is involved is solely preparation for a new mode of existence: the
Platonic Socrates supposes that “what he will principally be doing after death is
thinking, and also enjoying his thoughts, and that philosophy can prepare you now for
this very different sort of existence by occupying you with thinking, not with the
seeing and feeling that is so dependent on a body... It is . . . no accident that Plato
called philosophy a preparation for death.”62 Which if any of these readings is
correct?
The first step in answering that question is to recognize that the formula in the Phaedo
is not some kind of oracular pronouncement which is then left to the audience or the
reader to interpret. It represents the conclusion from the following propositions or
assumptions:
 that human beings consist of body and soul;
 that death entails the final separation of body and soul (64C, 67D);
 that the soul survives death (64C, 70B, 80D);
 that only after death can the soul have full access to wisdom / truth / pure
knowledge (65A-B, 66D-E, 68A-B);
60 See Cicero, T.D. I.84.
61 Friedländer, 1954, Vol.1, p.94.
62 Sorabji, pp.313f.
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 that it is nevertheless possible for the soul to have limited access to wisdom
etc. during this life (65E-66A);
 that such access is hindered by the demands of the body (65A-B, 66);
 that the person who desires wisdom etc. – the philosopher – should therefore
curtail the demands of the body by separating the soul from the body as much
as possible during this life (65C, 66);
 that this preliminary separation of soul from body, which amounts to a kind of
purification, is the mele,thma of the true philosopher (65E, 67D, 80E-81A);
 that this mele,thma is a necessary anticipation of the final separation of body
and soul on death, because after death only the purified soul will have full
access to wisdom etc. (82B);
 that this mele,thma can therefore be characterized as mele,th qana,tou (81A).
There are, however, two major problems. One concerns the vocabulary, which is both
varied and ambiguous, although both the variety and the ambiguity tend to be
concealed by those who appeal to the text. (For example, Cicero simply has
commentatio, Seneca simply has “meditari”, Friedländer simply “learning”, and
Sorabji simply “preparation”.) The usual English translation of meleta/n is “practice”,
but the English “practice” is itself ambiguous: it can describe what is done habitually
(“it is my practice to ignore insults”); it can refer to the activity of a professional
practitioner (e.g. a medical practice); it can refer to the constant training or study
involved in mastering some technique (“practice makes perfect”); and it can be used
of the rehearsal for a performance (“I must practise my speech one last time”).
Mele,thma / mele,th / meleta/n have all these meanings, together with the original root
sense of “care”. Not only that, the proposition that the separation of soul and body is
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the mele,thma of the philosopher is expressed in three different ways in the Phaedo and
with varying terminology.
(a) The programmatic formulation at 64A63 uses evpithdeu,ein, which means
essentially “to pursue”, but “pursuits” can refer either to present activities (a hobby is
a pursuit) or future aims (pursuing a goal). It may seem to refer to future aims in the
next sentence, where Socrates says that it would be absurd for the true philosophers to
be angry at the approach of death, o] pa,lai prouqumou/nto, te kai. evpeth,deuon. But it
certainly refers to present activities at 82A-B, where the potential bees and wasps are
described as oi` th.n dhmotikh.n kai. politikh.n avreth.n evpitethdeuko,tej. . .
(b) Then at 67D-E, after stating that the release and separation of the soul during this
life is the mele,thma of the true philosopher, Socrates asks: ouvkou/n ) ) ) geloi/on a'n ei;h
a;ndra paraskeua,zonq v e`auto.n evn tw|/ bi,w| o[ti evgguta,tw o;nta tou/ teqna,nai ou[tw zh/n(
ka;peiq v h[kontoj auvtw|/ tou,tou avganaktei/n; And since it is agreed that this would be
absurd, it follows that oi` ovrqw/j filosofou/ntej avpoqnh|,skein meletw/si( kai. to.
teqna,nai h[kista auvtoi/j avnqrw,pwn fobero,n. It seems therefore that paraskeua,zein is
here used synonymously with meleta/n, but paraskeua,zein itself can have either future
or present connotations: to be “prepared” can mean either to be ready for a change
which is still in the future, or to have changed already. And the use of the perfect
infinitive at 67C clearly implies the latter.64
63 Kinduneu,ousi ga.r o[soi tugca,nousin ovrqw/j a`pto,menoi filosofi,aj lelhqe,nai tou.j a;llouj o[ti
ouvde.n a;llo auvtoi. evpithdeu,ousin h' avpoqnh|,skein te kai. teqna,nai.
64 Phaedo 67B-C, where the purification involved in the separation of soul and body during this life is
said to be a process of habituation – evqi,zein – and this purification by habituation is envisaged as
something which is completed in this life: w[ste h[ ge avpodhmi,a h` nu/n evmoi. prostetagme,nh meta.
avgaqh/j evlpi,doj gi,gnetai kai. a;llw| avndri, o]j h`gei/tai, oi` pareskeua,sqai th.n dia,noian w[sper
kekaqarme,nhn.
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(c) Finally at 80E – 81A, from the perspective of the pure soul of the philosopher
departing at death to the realm of the pure, it can be stated (rather disjointedly in the
Greek) that since during life the soul had never willingly associated with the body and
since this was its constant concern,65 to. de. ouvde.n a;llo evsti.n h' ovrqw/j filosofou/sa
kai. tw|/ o;nti teqna,nai meletw/sa r`a|di,wj\ h' ouv tou/t v a'n ei;h mele,th qana,tou;
An additional difficulty may seem to arise from the different forms relating to death:
avpoqnh,|skein and teqna,nai. Burnet66says that "in such phrases teqna,nai may properly
be translated 'to die'; for avpoqnh,|skein lays stress on the process of dying, of which
teqna,nai is the completion." And he applies this rule to 64A6,C5, 67E2, and 81A1.
Gallop67 disagrees, and translates teqna,nai as "to be dead" (that is, the state of being
dead) in all these passages except 81A1.
Now in (a), where the true philosophers are said to pursue or practise nothing but
avpoqnh,|skein te kai. teqna,nai, to apply Burnet's rule is to produce a distinction
without a difference: to practise "'dying' (the process) and 'death' (its completion)"68
is no different from practising the process of dying or practising its completion. That
is to say, what is involved in 64A is a hendiadys. But if it is a hendiadys, there is no
reason why the meaning of the whole should not be controlled by teqna,nai, i.e. the
philosophers practise the state of being dead (which is entered upon by
avpoqnh,|skein).69
65 Phaedo 80E: meletw/sa avei. tou/to)
66 In his note on 62A5.
67 Gallop, p.226, note 4.
68 Burnet on 64A6.
69 Cf. Phaedo 77D: When the soul is born again it cannot be born from anything other than evk
qana,tou kai. tou/ teqna,nai - which is undoubtedly a hendiadys.
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This view is supported by (b) where paraskeua,zonq v e`auto.n ) ) )o[ti evgguta,tw o;nta
tou/ teqna,nai ou[tw zh/n is parallel to oi` ovrqw/j filosofou/ntej avpoqnh,|skein meletw/si,
and since the former clearly envisages the state of being dead, so must the latter.
In (c) both Burnet and Gallop translate teqna,nai as "die", presumably because of the
presence of r`a|di,wj. Now r`a|di,wj is used with avpoqnh,|skein, of philosophers being
willing to die, at the very beginning of the discussion and before the paradox of the
practice of death has been broached.70 Here at (c), when it is used in conjunction with
teqna,nai and in the context of the constant meleta/n involved in the soul gathering
itself together apart from the body, it makes much more sense to understand it as
referring to a willing participation in the state of being dead. Moreover the subject in
(c) is no longer the philosopher but the soul itself, and it is more intelligible that the
soul should be in a state of death than that it should die.71
In other words, there is nothing to prevent the "practice" of the true philosophers in
(a), (b) and (c) being understood as related to the state of being dead rather than to the
act of dying; and the thought is certainly more coherent if it is so understood: after
all, the concentration throughout the Phaedo is on what happens after death, not on
the process of dying.
70 Phaedo 62C.
71 Burnet says, on teqna,nai at 81A1: "The use of the perfect infinitive need cause no difficulty; for it
is often used of the moment of death which completes the process of to. avpoqnh,|skein." But it cannot
often be used in this sense with the soul as the subject. And Gallop has clearly overlooked the fact that
the soul is the subject at 81A1. On p.226 he argues that teqna,nai requires the meaning "to die" (rather
than "be dead") only at 62C3 and 81A1. But on p.86 he says that "Socrates will generally avoid
speaking of 'dead souls' - although the soul is twice said to 'die' (77d4, 84b2) - perhaps because this
would produce a conflict with the conclusion of the dialogue, that the soul is 'deathless' (106b3-4)."
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Taken together, therefore, the vocabulary indicates that the separation of soul and
body in this life is sometimes presented as a present practice, or occupation, or
habitual activity, or study, which amounts to a kind of purification, and that this
purification is something which is in principle completed before death and which
qualifies the soul on death to dwell with the gods.72 And at other times it is presented
as a kind of imitative anticipation by the philosopher of the state of death, a training,
or practice, or preparation, or dress rehearsal, or holding himself in readiness for that
state, so that he may enter upon it r`a|di,wj.73
The matter is, however, further complicated by the second major problem, which is
the apparent confusion over whether the mele,thma of the philosopher exhausts his
activity (i.e. is in fact what is involved in philosophy), or whether it is simply the sine
qua non for what is involved in philosophy – because there are passages which
support each of these possibilities.
For example, 64A (o[soi tugca,nousin ovrqw/j a`pto,menoi filosofi,aj ) ) )ouvde.n a;llo
evpithdeu,ousin h' avpoqnh,|skein te kai. teqna,nai) implies that the separation of soul
and body during this life is an end in itself, so that philosophical activity is reduced to
a kind of asceticism. So does 67D: to. mele,thma auvto. tou/to evstin tw/n filosofw/n(
lu,sij kai. cwrismo.j yuch/j avpo. sw,matoj) And 80E is even more emphatic, since it is
now the soul itself which is the subject of meleta/n: the constant activity of the soul is
72 Phaedo 67B-C, 69C.
73 Ibid. 81A: tw|/ o;nti teqna,nai meletw/sa r`a|di,wj)
57
separating itself from the body and this is the definition of true philosophy – tou/to de.
ouvde.n a;llo evstin h' ovrqw/j filosofou/sa)74
On the other hand, 65D-66A describes the process involved in searching out or
examining or contemplating absolute justice or beauty or goodness, kai. tw/n a;llwn
e`ni. lo,gw| a`pa,ntwn th/j ouvsi,aj, as a matter of the most careful preparation75 leading to
understanding by the use of pure reason uncontaminated by any of the senses.76 And
here the separation of soul from body is said to be what enables the exercise of pure
reason, since it is the body which impedes that exercise, as the whole of 66 explains
(and in doing so equates the exercise of pure reason with philosophy). In other words,
that separation is envisaged not as the activity which constitutes philosophy, but as the
necessary condition for that activity, which is the exercise of pure reason. The
distinction is most clearly indicated in the following sentence: avlla. tw|/ o;nti h`mi/n
de,deiktai o[ti( eiv me,llome,n pote kaqarw/j ti ei;sesqai( avpallakte,on auvtou/ [sc. tou/
sw,matoj] kai. auvth|/ th|/ yuch|/ qeate,on auvta. ta. pra,gmata)77 There are two stages,
separable at least in thought: withdrawal of the soul from the body, and subsequent
contemplation of the realities by the soul.
74 Cf. D. Frede, p.29 (on 68C-69E): "Unter der katharsis versteht Sokrates auch nicht etwa eine
Reinigung und Verbesserung der Persönlichkeit, sondern ihre völlige Intellektualisierung (67c wird die
Reinigung der Seele mit der der dianoia gleichgesetzt.) Diese Tugendlehre stellt insofern eine starke
Verkürzung dar, als ihre verschiedenen Arten somit auf eine einzige Art von Wissen reduziert werden,
das noch dazu negativer Art ist. Nimmt man diese Botschaft der Empfehlung zur katharsis ernst, so
besteht die Tapferkeit des Philosophen allein in der Einsicht, dass der Tod der Übergang zu einem
besserer Leben ist, die Besonnenheit in der, dass weltliche Genüsse nur vom Wesentlichen ablenken."
75 Phaedo 65E: o]j a'n ma,lista h`mw/n kai. avkribe,stata paraskeua,shtai auvto. e[kaston dianohqh/nai
peri. ou- skopei/)))
76 Ibid. 65E-66A: mh,te th.n o;yin paratiqe,menoj evn tw|/ dianoei/sqai mh,ti tina. a;llhn ai;sqhsin
evfe,lkwn mhdemi,an meta. tou/ logismou/( avll v auvth|/ kaq v au`th.n eivlikrinei/ th|/ dianoi,a| crw,menoj)))
77 Ibid. 66D. This presumably describes the situation after death, but it is presented as the logical
extension of what is experienced during life.
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Now if the mele,thma represents the total activity of the philosopher, i.e. is itself
philosophy, and if what is involved in meleta/n etc. is a kind of rehearsal for the final
separation of soul and body at death, then (leaving aside the somewhat half-hearted
disapproval of suicide at 61C-62C) it is difficult to argue that Cleombrotus
misunderstood the Phaedo. There is no obvious reason why the mele,thma taken in
this way should be prolonged at all, and not concentrated in one decisive moment, the
act of suicide, in which the philosopher demonstrates his willingness to die r`a|di,wj)
And it is then difficult to endorse Friedländer’s interpretation that “Sterbenlernen . . .
heisst . . . leben im Angesichte der Idee,” or Sorabji’s that we are to spend our lives
preparing ourselves to think properly.
But if the mele,thma is the preliminary clearing of the ground (requiring constant
repetition) which enables the philosopher to contemplate the realities during this life
(if only indistinctly), and if that indistinct contemplation during this life is itself in
some sense a necessary purification which in turn clears the way for the soul at death
to dwell with the gods, then both Friedländer and Sorabji are at least partly right.78
In other words, the practice of death either envisages a way of living one's life,
habitually putting philosophical contemplation above sensuality, purifying and so
78 As a matter of fact Cleombrotus may still be right as well, because if the purification can be
considered at any stage complete, as 67C implies, why should death be any further delayed? The
residual objection to suicide could presumably be met by arguing that the consciousness of being
purified was itself the requisite sign from the gods. It is true that Phaedo 62C envisages some sort of
avna,gkh, but these things are a matter of interpretation by the person involved: cf. for example,
Xenophon’s suggestion (Apol. 1, 22-23) that Socrates manipulated events because he now preferred
death to life – and so may be said to have engineered a “necessity”. (Cf. Warren, 2001, p.101: "Indeed,
the circumstances which must obtain for suicide to be appropriate may themselves be interpreted as this
divine sign.")
See also the extensive discussion of the suicide passage in the Phaedo in Gallop, pp.79 ff. Gallop
concludes (p.85): "Socrates is not denouncing suicide at large; he is trying to explain why the
philosopher's desire for death would not justify him in procuring it for himself." But it is possible to
doubt whether Socrates is doing even that at all enthusiastically, given the example of Cleombrotus
himself, who after all committed suicide because of what he had read in the Phaedo, not in spite of it.
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qualifying oneself for the afterlife, as it were studying for one's finals; or it involves a
turning away from life, an anticipation of death, indeed a hastening of death (mentally
at least) because there is no real purpose in being alive except to be in a position to
die. And it may be that the dramatic setting of the Phaedo makes the latter
interpretation more probable. It is obvious that the proximity of death inevitably
plays a greater part here than it does in any of the other dialogues.79 The atmosphere
from the outset is permeated with approaching death,80 and when Socrates sends a
message to Evenus telling him to follow as quickly as he can, he sets the scene for the
discussion of the mele,th qana,tou in such a way that it is bound to seem life-
denying.81 Because what can this message mean if not that Evenus should consider
taking his own life?82 After all, the repeated i;swj with which Socrates proceeds to
qualify the conventional disapproval of suicide hardly give the impression that he
himself disapproves.83 And then the whole activity of the philosopher is presented as
a pale reflection of what can only be done properly after death: nothing else is offered
as being of any significance in life except this philosophical activity, which at the
highest is described as a necessarily incomplete contemplation of reality and at the
79 Cf. D. Frede, p.19: "Dass Platon sich im Phaidon zunächst so negativ über alle Aspekte des
diesseitigen Lebens äussert, mag nun auf die Dramatik der Gesprächssituation wie auch auf die
Konzentration auf die Frage der Unsterblichkeit der Seele zurückzuführen sein. Denn bereits dies
Thema legt eine Betonung des grundsätzlichen Unterschiedes der Natur von Leibe und Seele nahe."
80 Phaedo 58E-59A.
81 On the "locus vexatus" at 62A see the discussion in Dorter, pp.11-18. Dorter identifies "three basic
interpretations", with the following implications: that death is always better (the "traditional
interpretation"), that death is sometimes better, and that suicide is always wrong. And he concludes:
"Ultimately it seems to come down to a question of whether or not one believes that Plato regarded
death as superior in some sense to life. To those who believe this, the traditional interpretation seems
the most natural although not grammatically straightforward; those who do not believe it prefer the
second or third and are similarly willing to live with the difficulties they present." (p.16.) This is a
good description of how the "systematic critic" goes to work.
82 Phaedo 61B: evme. diw,kein w`j ta,cista) The force of w`j ta,cista at 61B seems to be ignored by the
commentators. If that phrase does not imply suicide, what does it imply? Even if it is taken to mean
pursuing as eagerly as possible the separation of soul from body with a view to hastening the final
separation at death, this simply amounts to a less dramatic form of suicide, like hunger strike.
83 Phaedo 61C : ouv me,ntoi i;swj bia,setai au`to,n\ ouv ga,r fasi qemito.n ei=nai) 62C: i;swj toi,nun
tau,th| ouvk a;logon mh. pro,teron au`to.n avpokteinu,nai dei/n)))
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lowest as simply an ascetic renunciation of the body.84 Not only is there no
encouragement to exercise any of the virtues apart from what is involved in the mele,th
qana,tou, but almost the only mention85 of the practical virtues of swfrosu,nh and
dikaiosu,nh is disparaging: the future bees and wasps are those who have practised
these virtues a;neu filosofi,aj te kai. nou/)86
On the other hand, the pervasiveness of these practical virtues in the Gorgias and the
Republic may suggest that to read the Phaedo in a way which unduly emphasises its
negative, life-denying aspects is to take the dramatic context of the Phaedo too much
on its face value,87 and it is therefore necessary to look at what the Gorgias and the
Republic say about the activity of the philosopher and the connection between that
activity and death.
84 Cf. Dorter, p.26: "Socrates does offer a resolution of the tension between the desirability of death
and the duty not to take one's own life but his solution seems at first to be undertaken in bad faith. He
says that the proper way for a philosopher to spend his life is in the 'practising of dying and being dead'
(64ab). Although this observes the letter of the prohibition, does it follow the spirit as well or does it
result in a withdrawal from life so complete that as far as rendering any service to the gods is
concerned we might just as well be dead?"
85 The other references are at 69B-C, where the virtues of avndrei,a( swfrosu,nh and dikaiosu,nh are
said to exist only with fro,nhsij, and to be, together with the latter, a kind of purification from the
skiagrafi,a of such virtues; and at 114E, where they are again etherialized.
On the reference to dikaiosu,nh at 69B-C, D. Frede remarks (p.29): "Für die Annahme, dass Platon
selbst diese via negationis [in 68C-69E] nicht als hinreichende Basis für eine explizite Bestimmung der
Tugenden ansieht, spricht die Tatsache, dass die Gerechtigkeit, die vierte auf der Liste der vier
sogenannten platonischen 'Kardinal-Tugenden', hier zwar mit genannt, in die Diskussion der wahren
Natur der Tugenden der Askese aber nicht weiter einbezogen wird. Dass diese Enthaltsamkeit kein
Zufall sein kann, ist leicht zu sehen. Die Empfehlung einer generellen Abkehr von der gewöhnlichen
Welt und ihrer Scheingüten wäre als Bestimmung der Gerechtigkeit schlechtweg unzureichend. Denn
gerade in Hinblick auf die 'soziale Tugend' lässt sich ein rein kathartisch gefasster Begriff gegenüber
der weltlichen Gerechtigkeit schwer verteidigen."
86 Phaedo 82A-B: oi` th.n dhmotikh.n kai. politikh.n avreth.n evpitethdeuko,tej( h]n dh. kalou/si
swfrosu,nhn te kai. dikaiosu,nhn( evx e;qouj te kai. mele,thj gegonui/an a;neu filosofi,aj te kai. nou/)
87 D. Frede, for example, cautions (p.178): "Die so betonte 'Jenseitigkeit' sollte aber nicht als eine
völlige Ablehnung der körperlichen Welt und als Verzicht auf das Zeugnis der Sinne verstanden
werden. Die Ideenlehre ist von Platon als Erklärung für die veränderliche Welt und ihre Phänomene
eingeführt worden. Es ist kaum anzunehmen, dass er diese Theorie, kaum dass er sie einführt, so
radikalisieren wollte, dass sie für diese Welt gar nicht mehr taugt, sondern nur noch als
Propagandamittel für eine jeinseitige Welt dient."
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(The systematic critic might rear his head at this point and protest that this is exactly
the sort of thing he has been forbidden to do. But the purpose of the comparison is
not to place "the practice of death" on the Procrustean bed of the other dialogues and
force its interpretation to fit with theirs. The purpose is to discover whether either of
the possible interpretations of "the practice of death" in the Phaedo is supported or
contradicted by what is said in other dialogues. Neither support for one nor
contradiction of the other will put the matter beyond doubt: there is no reason in
principle why Plato should not have put into the mouth of Socrates as he stood on the
brink of death ideas and sentiments entirely at variance with those expressed in other
dialogues - for example, because he considered Socrates' last day a suitable occasion
for the discussion of immortality, and the discussion of immortality a suitable
occasion for the discussion of the Forms. But if one interpretation of "the practice of
death" can be more easily combined with the approaches in the other dialogues, we
may feel, if not that there is a presumption in its favour, at least that we have an
inclination to adopt it.)88
88 Vlastos, on the other hand, almost seems to operate with the presumption that the approach in the
Phaedo will not be reconcilable with that in the Gorgias. "In the Crito [Socrates] reveals his faith in
the soul's survival. In the Gorgias he declares it. Nowhere does he try to prove it in the earlier
dialogues...The entity whose imperishableness Sm [the Socrates of the middle dialogues] is so eager to
prove is an immigrant from another world conjoined precariously to a piece of matter in this one. This
conjunction is its great misfortune: corruption, exile, incarceration, entombment, defilement. The
imagery is Pythagorean. In the Phaedo we see that Sm has taken it over. He is now convinced that
both intellectually and morally we would be incomparably better off if we had been spared incarnation,
and that now, stuck inside an animal, our fondest hope should be to break away, to fly off never to
return." (1991, pp.55f.)
That is to say, for Vlastos there is only one possible interpretation of the Phaedo - utterly negative and
utterly different from the Gorgias. But the difficulty with his thesis is that the unbridgeable gulf he
postulates (p.47: "how pronounced and profound are the differences") between the Socrates of the
earlier dialogues and the Socrates of the middle dialogues has ex hypothesi been bridged by Plato
himself, at least in the sense that Plato is the author of both sets of dialogues. In other words, if it was
patently impossible for one man - Socrates - to think both along the lines of the earlier dialogues and
along the lines of the middle dialogues, how was it possible for another man - Plato - to do just that?
(Vlastos presupposes - p.50 - that "Plato in those early works of his [shares] Socrates' basic
convictions.") But rather than having to postulate a historical Socrates reflected in Plato's earlier
dialogues and a radically different Platonic Socrates appearing in the middle dialogues, is it not more
reasonable to admit virtual ignorance about the historical Socrates and postulate instead a Plato who
moves, in a coherently traceable way (expressed in different dramatic guises) from the earlier dialogues
to the later? Vlastos himself agrees (p.81) that the evidence of Plato's dialogues is not enough by itself
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The expression mele,th qana,tou is found only in the Phaedo, but some of the terms
used to explicate it appear frequently in both the Gorgias and the Republic. In the
Gorgias, the significant occurrences of meleta/n / mele,th are at 448E and 511B (on
practice in the art of rhetoric), 500D (together with paraskeuh, on what is involved in
acquiring the pleasant or the good), and 527B (on activity directed at not only
seeming to be good but being good); of evpithdeu,ein at 488A (on the importance of a
person’s character and pursuits), and 524D (on the soul after death bearing the marks
of this life’s pursuits); of paraskeua,zein at 448D (in connection with rhetoric, and
parallel to meleta/n in 448E), 507D (on what is involved in practising – avskei/n – virtue
in such a way as to need no correction) and 511B (again together with meleta/n, on
engineering a secure existence.) In addition, the verb avskei/n( which does not appear
in the Phaedo, is used of the practice of sofi,a( (487C) of r`htorikh, (500C), of
swfrosu,nh (507D), and of avreth, (527E).
The impression is, first, that meleta/n( evpithdeu,ein and paraskeua,zein are used more
or less interchangeably in the Gorgias as in the Phaedo, and that avskei/n is another
to establish his recovery of the historical Socrates. "The most we could learn from his writings is that
in different periods of his life he puts into the mouth of Socrates philosophies which are not only
different but, in important respects, antithetical. And that in itself would not give a particle of support
to my claim. For there is no intrinsic reason why both of these philosophies, despite their polar
differences, could not have been Plato's own original creations, at different periods of his life."
(Vlastos calls the philosophies antithetical, but to take one example, having a "grandiose metaphysical
theory of 'separately existing Forms' and having 'no such theory' (p.148) are not antithetical positions.
The antithesis of the former would be to deny such a theory, whereas according to Vlastos (p.59) the
historical Socrates had no theory at all.) But apart from whether the extrinsic evidence is in fact
enough to support his claim, it is arguable that he has in fact already admitted that both philosophies
are "Plato's own original creation", since what his hypothesis "proposes is that Plato in those early
works of his, sharing Socrates' basic convictions, sets out to think through for himself their central
affirmations, denials and reasoned suspensions of belief...In doing this, Plato is producing, not
reproducing, Socratic philosophising." (p.50.) What precisely is the difference between on the one
hand thinking through for onself and producing rather than reproducing philosophy, and on the other
hand one's "own original creation"? It is hardly open to Vlastos to claim a different sense of originality
for the thinking of the middle dialogues, since he himself argues that much of what is said about the
soul in the Phaedo has its roots in Pythagoreanism - in other words, it could equally be said that Plato
"is producing, not reproducing, Pythagorean philosophising."
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equivalent; and second, that in the Gorgias the activity is in every case devoid of what
might be called an eschatological dimension: what is practised or undertaken or
pursued, whether rhetoric or virtue, is to be achieved during this life and with this life
in mind. Even the final summons to practise virtue (avskw/n avreth,n) is immediately
followed by ka;peita ou[tw koinh|/ avskh,santej( to,te h;dh( eva.n dokh|/ crh/nai(
evpiqhso,meqa toi/j politikoi/j.89 The practice of virtue in the Gorgias is presented
primarily as a sine qua non for the vita activa.
That of course is due just as much to the dramatic setting of the dialogue as the
concentration on the pull of the afterlife is in the Phaedo. The theme of the Gorgias
is not rhetoric but the displacement of man’s real purpose by the popular and
professional obsession with rhetoric. Over and over again, Socrates reminds his
interlocutors of the vital importance of what they are discussing. 458A: there is no
greater evil than do,xa yeudh,j on these matters; 472C: there is nothing finer than
knowing about them and nothing more shameful than ignorance; 487B: these are
questions of the greatest significance; 487C: no subject is more deserving of inquiry;
500C: even a person of little intelligence should be passionately interested in this.
And the reason why the subject is so important, and not only to the philosopher, is
that it concerns the way in which we should lead our lives,90 what sort of person we
should be and what our practices or pursuits should be:91 on it, in a word, depends
our happiness.92
89 Gorgias 527D.
90 Ibid. 500C: o[ntina crh. tro,pon zh/n)
91 Ibid. 487E: poi/o,n tina crh. ei=nai ton. a;ndra kai. ti, evpithdeu,ein)))
92 Ibid. 472C: to. ga.r kefa,laion auvtw/n evstin h' gignw,skein h' avgnoei/n o[stij te euvdai,mwn evsti.n kai.
o[stij mh,)
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Since it is not skill in rhetoric that brings happiness, but leading a good life both in
private and in public, this should be the object of our meleta/n.93 And specifically this
involves the practice and pursuit94 of dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh) Dikaiosu,nh( of
which rhetoric is the perversion or corruption,95 is the essential virtue of the soul;96
the orderly soul is characterised by dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh;97 o` sw,frwn is the
perfection of the good man;98 the good man does well, and whoever does well is
blessed and happy.99 This, accordingly, is what we should aim at all our lives: all our
own and our city’s efforts should be directed at bringing about the dikaiosu,nh and
swfrosu,nh necessary for happiness.100 And that these amount to what is referred to
in the Phaedo101 as h` dhmotikh. kai. politikh. avreth, is underlined at 507E: without
them there can be no koinwni,a or fili,a, since it is precisely dikaiosu,nh and
swfrosu,nh which hold the universe – gods and men – together.
All the emphasis therefore in the Gorgias is on the practical importance of virtue as
leading to happiness in this life, and on practising dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh.
Neither the purely cerebral contemplation of absolute reality nor the connection with
the afterlife are so much as mentioned until the last few pages. There of course they
do figure, and apparently both together in the credo at 526D: th.n avlh,qeian avskw/n102
peira,somai tw|/ o;nti w`j a'n du,nwmai be,ltistoj w'n kai. zh/n kai. evpeida.n avpoqnh,|skw
93 Ibid. 527B: kai. panto.j ma/llon avndri. melethte,on ouv to. dokei/n ei=nai avgaqo.n avlla. to. ei=nai( kai.
ivdi,a| kai. dhmosi,a|)
94 Ibid. 507D.
95 Ibid. 465C.
96 Ibid. 478A-B.
97 Ibid. 504D.
98 Ibid. 507C.
99 Ibid.: w[ste pollh. avna,gkh)))to.n de. avgaqo.n eu= te kai. kalw/j pra,ttein a[ a'n pra,tth|( to.n d v eu=
pra,ttonta maka,rio,n te kai. euvdai,mona ei=nai)
100 Ibid. 507D.
101 Phaedo 82A.
102 Dodds remarks: "skopw/n is adopted by many editors and translators, but gives a less suitable sense:
Socrates is vowing himself not to research but to a way of living and dying."
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avpoqnh|,skein. And yet h` avlh,qeia by itself is somewhat vague, and it is immediately,
in the next sentence, interpreted as an invitation to all men to live their lives properly;
nor is it at all clear what, if anything, be,ltistoj w'n ) ) )avpoqnh|,skein adds to be,ltistoj
w;n ) ) )zh/n (unless it simply means dying r`a|di,wj.)103
Moreover, the myth at the end of the Gorgias is presented only as a last resort, since
the previous arguments have failed to persuade.104 Socrates declares himself
convinced by it, but he acknowledges that others may regard it as a mu/qoj grao,j.105
And although it indicates that the practice of virtue will make us happy both in life
and after death,106 the whole point of everything which has gone before is that the
practice of virtue (or paying the penalty if virtue has not been practised) will make us
happy even during this life.
On these two matters – the centrality of philosophical contemplation and of death and
the afterlife – the Gorgias may be said to be at the opposite pole from the more
negative interpretation of "the practice of death" in the Phaedo. According to that
interpretation the true philosopher is entirely eschatologically orientated: he wants to
withdraw from life as soon as possible and dwell with the gods and other true
103 See Gorgias 522D. And cf. 527E: kai. th.n dikaiosu,nhn kai. th.n a;llhn avreth.n avskou/ntej kai. zh/n
kai. teqna,nai - where perhaps the meaning is "with a view to" or "in respect of both life and death." In
the Republic, at 618B, Socrates interrupts the myth of Er to stress the importance of being able to
distinguish between good and bad not only during this life, but also after death when it comes to
choosing the next incarnation, but this thought is not present in the Gorgias.
104 E.g. Dalfen, p.222: "Die rationale Argumente und alles, was Sokrates sonst aufbietet, können den
Kallikles weder von seiner Lebensphilosophie noch von seinen politischen Vorstellungen und Plänen
abbringen. Als letztes Mittel greift Sokrates zu einem Mythos." And Dodds (p.385, comparing
Gorgias 527a with Phaedo 85cd): "Acceptance of the myth is similarly recommended here, faute de
mieux; but Socrates really bases his appeal on the preceding ethical arguments, which are independent
of the myth, though they lead to the same rule of life."
105 Gorgias 527A.
106 Ibid. 527C: euvdaimonh,seij kai. zw/n kai. teleuth,saj)
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philosophers.107 The Gorgias is concerned principally108 with this life, and what we
are to practise here in this life is not death but the practical virtues of dikaiosu,nh and
swfrosu,nh with a view to present happiness. And “we” means all of us.109
The Republic is in some ways very similar to the Gorgias and in some ways very
different, both with respect to the meaning of dikaiosu,nh and to the terminology
associated with the mele,th qana,tou in the Phaedo. Dikaiosu,nh is the distinctive
human virtue;110 it is more precious than gold;111 the inquiry into its essence is the
inquiry into the most important thing of all – what constitutes the good life.112 The
kalo.j kavgaqo,j seems at one point to be defined in terms of dikaiosu,nh and
swfrosu,nh,113 and in another passage it is dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh themselves
which make up h` dhmotikh. avreth,.114 In the latter passage, moreover, the philosopher-
ruler who is given the task of moulding people into conformity with dikaiosu,nh and
swfrosu,nh is described as practising – meleta/n – that task.115 And at 407A meleta/n
is used in a context very similar to the avskw/n avreth,n in Gorgias 527D: indeed it is
that same juxtaposition (avreth.n avskei/n) which meleta/n is used here to explicate, and
what is in mind is again the straightforward practice of virtue – the activity of
behaving virtuously – with no eschatological connotations.
107 Phaedo 82B.
108 Cf. Rechenauer, p.243: "Doch bewegt sich auch das Plädoyer des Sokrates - und diese Feststellung
ist wesentlich für das rechte Verständnis des Schlussmythos - fast ausnahmelos in einem welt-
immanenten Kontext, der sich auf die irdische Existenz beschränkt."
109 Gorgias 500C: tij kai. smikro.n nou/n e;cwn a;nqrwpoj) And it may be significant that even in the
myth, those who are translated to the Isles of the Blest are especially (ma,lista) but not exclusively
philosophers. (526C.)
110 Rep. 335C: vAll v h` dikaiosu,nh ouvk avnqrwpei,a avreth,;
111 Ibid. 336E.
112 Ibid. 578C: peri. ga,r toi tou/ megi,stou h` ske,yij( avgaqou/ te bi,ou kai. kakou/) Cf. 344D and 618C.
113 Ibid. 490C: avll v u`gie,j te kai. di,kaion h=qoj( w-| kai. swfrosu,nhn e[pesqai)
114 Ibid. 500D: swfrosu,nhj te kai. dikaiosu,nhj kai. sumpa,shj th/j dhmotikh/j avreth/j)
115 Ibid.: 'An ou=n tij )))auvtw/| avna,gkh ge,nhtai a] evkei/ o`ra/| meleth/sai eivj avnqrw,pwn h;qh kai. ivdi,a| kai.
dhmosi,a| tiqe,nai kai. mh. mo,non e`auto.n pla,ttein( a=ra kako.n dhmiourgo.n auvto.n oi;ei genh,sesqai
swfrosu,nhj te kai. dikaiosu,nhj)))
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Now given that the express purpose of the inquiry in the Republic is to divorce
dikaiosu,nh from its artificial116 and eschatological consequences and as it were to
justify justice in and for itself,117 it is not at all surprising that so much of the
atmosphere should be reminiscent of the Gorgias with its leitmotif that doing wrong
is worse than being wronged – and worse in the sense of involving unhappiness in this
life. But of course there is rather more to the Republic than that: dikaiosu,h(
filosofi,a( and what is involved in meleta/n, all share in another dimension altogether.
First, dikaiosu,nh is defined at 433A-B as to. ta. au`tou/ pra,ttein( but this is elaborated
at 443C-D: avll v ou; ti peri. th.n e;xw pra/xin tw/n au`tou/( avlla. peri. th.n evnto.j( w`j
avlhqw/j peri. e`auto.n kai. ta. e`autou/) ) ) It is a harmony or balance or order in the
soul which must not only precede any political or business activity,118 but which is
specifically to be distinguished from the popular119 principles of dikaiosu,nh as
practised in everyday life (i.e. as h` dhmotikh. avreth,), although it will nevertheless
prove to be in conformity with those principles.120
Second, what appeared to be a definition of the philosopher at 490C – u`gie,j te kai.
di,kaion h=qoj( w-| kai. swfrosu,nhn e[pesqai – turns out to be more a case of the
minimum qualification necessary for becoming a philosopher, because the true nature
of philosophical activity, like the true nature of dikaiosu,nh, can only be properly
116 Although see the discussion in Annas, 1981, pp.59-70.
117 Rep. 367B, 612A-B.
118 Rep. 443E (cf. Gorgias 527D).
119 ta. fortika, - Rep. 442E.
120 Ibid.
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understood in contrast with the mundane.121 The distinction is formulated in terms of
a higher and lower order at 500B,122 and again in the application of the cave allegory
at 517C.123
And third, at 535C the philosophical curriculum is said to involve tosau,thn ma,qhsi,n
te kai. mele,thn, a phrase which is paralleled at 536B by tosau,thn ma,qhsin kai.
tosau,thn a;skhsin: here mele,th and a;skhsij apply not to the exercise of already
acquired social and civic virtue, but to the lengthy training, or study, or discipline, or
preparation necessary for the acquisition of philosophical virtue.
But the distinction between the higher and lower aspects of dikaiosu,nh( filosofi,a
and mele,th does not, or should not, constitute an unbridgeable gulf. On the contrary,
those philosophers who refuse to bridge it, who remain with their heads in the clouds
thinking that they are already living in the Isles of the Blest,124 have no place in the
ideal state. They are to be compelled to re-enter the cave125 in order to practise
instilling into the citizens the dhmotikh. avreth, of dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh.
In other words, the Republic envisages a lower-level activity consisting in the mele,th /
a;skhsij of civic virtue (like the Gorgias); a higher-level philosophical activity
requiring a long and rigorous mele,th, which consists in the contemplation of absolute
121 Ibid. 484B: evpeidh. filo,sofoi me.n oi` tou/ avei. kata. tauvta. w`sau,twj e;contoj duna,menoi evfa,ptesqai(
oi` de. mh. avll v evn polloi/j kai. pantoi,wj i;scousi planw,menoi ouv filo,sofoi)
122 Ouvde. ga,r pou)))scolh. tw|/ ge w`j avlhqw/j pro.j toi/j ou=si th.n dia,noian e;conti ka,tw ble,pein eivj
avnqrw,pwn pragmatei,aj)))
123 )))mh. qauma,sh|j o[ti oi` evntau/qa evlqo,ntej ouvk evqe,lousin ta. tw/n avnqrw,pwn pra,ttein( avll v a;nw avei.
evvpei,gontai auvtw/n ai` yucai. diatri,bein)
124 Rep. 519C: tou.j de. o[ti e`ko,ntej ei=nai ouv pra,xousin( h`gou,menoi evn maka,rwn nh,soij zw/ntej e;ti
avpw|ki,sqai)
125 Ibid. 520C: katabate,on ou=n evn me,rei e`ka,stw| eivj th.n tw/n a;llwn sunoi,khsin kai. suneqiste,on ta.
skoteina. qea,sasqai)
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reality (like the Phaedo); and a combination or synthesis of both of these, in which
the philosopher-ruler puts into practice on the lower level the visions which he has
glimpsed on the higher.126 It might be said that the Gorgias concentrates on the vita
activa, the Phaedo on the vita contemplativa, and the Republic on both. Or that the
Gorgias concentrates on the practice of virtue,127 the Phaedo on the practice of
death,128 and the Republic on the practice of philosophy.129
This is of course over-simplified. The Gorgias is more complicated than that because
the concluding myth of a last judgement, although it is presented as an afterthought,
seems actually to be intended as the ultimate basis for the whole argument.130 The
Phaedo is more complicated because it contradicts itself by its very nature: it
purports to be the manifesto of the ivory-tower philosopher, detached from the world
of phenomena and intent only on anticipating the contemplation of eternal reality, yet
in fact it is an account of the philosopher re-entering the cave and stamping his vision
of eternal reality on the minds of the cave-dwellers.131 And the Republic is more
126 On the difference here between the Phaedo and the Republic, see D. Frede, p.29: "Es spricht wohl
für sich, dass Platon fur die Differenzierung zwischen der ordinären und der wahren Gerechtigkeit in
der Politeia einen ganz neuen Ansatz vorsieht und dafür eine radikale Neuordnung der Gesellschafts-
strukturen entwirft. So tritt an die Stelle des Postulats der Weltfremdheit der Philosophen die
Forderung nach einer anspruchsvollen Bildung und Erziehung als Vorbedingung für die Fähigkeit zur
Leitung der Staates."
127 avskw/n avreth,n - Gorgias 527D.
128 mele,th qana,tou - Phaedo 81A.
129 See Rep. 486E-487B (concluding the description of the qualities necessary in the philosopher): mh,
ph| dokou/me,n soi ouvk avnagkai/a e[kasta dielhluqe,nai kai. e`po,mena avllh,loij th/| mellou,sh| tou/ o;ntoj
i`kanw/j te kai. tele,wj yuch|/ metalh,yesqai;)));Estin ou=n o[ph| me,myh| toiou/ton evpith,deuma( o] mh, pot v a;n
tij oi-o,j te ge,noito i`kanw/j evpithdeu/sai( eiv mh. fu,sei ei;h mnh,mwn( euvmaqh,j( megalopreph,j( eu;carij(
fi,loj te kai. suggenh.j avlhqei,aj( dikaiosu,nhj( avndrei,aj( swfrosu,nhj;
130 Gorgias 527A. Cf. Rechenauer, p.244: "Sokrates liefert also eine logisch in sich schlüssige
Argumentation, die aber noch nicht den entscheidenden Ansatzpunkt, dass das Sein der Seele über die
irdische Perspektive hinausweist, klar ausgemacht hat. Damit bleibt in der dialogischen Darlegung
eine entscheidende Deckungslücke offen, gegen die natürlich aus sophistischer Sicht leicht anzugehen
war." And p. 246: "Die eigentliche Antwort auf die Zentralfrage im Gorgias, wie man leben müsse,
erwächst nicht aus dem Logos, sondern aus dem Mythos."
And cf. Rutherford (pp.176 ff.) on the thematic connections between the Gorgias myth and what
precedes it.
131 See e.g. Phaedo 78A: Po,qen ou=n( e;fh( w= Sw,kratej( tw/n toiou,twn avgaqo.n evpw|do.n lhyo,meqa(
evpeidh. su,( e;fh( h`ma/j avpolei,peij; And cf. 115B. Cf. also D. Frede, p.10: "Wie der Schwanengesang
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complicated because it envisages the philosopher re-entering the cave only in the
perfect state, whereas until the perfect state comes about it advises him not to
meddle:132 in other words, it seems to countenance only the ivory-tower philosopher
in the real world, and the practical philosopher only in the ideal world.133
But it is a question of emphasis. The Gorgias concentrates on the practice of virtue
and the vita activa, the Phaedo concentrates on the practice of death and the vita
contemplativa, the Republic concentrates on the synthesis.134 The comparison
therefore suggests that the three dialogues can be integrated in such a way as to make
the less negative interpretation of "the practice of death" in the Phaedo more
plausible.135 That is to say, it allows us to assume that the three dialogues
complement rather than contradict each other. Each discloses a different perspective
on the art of life or on the art of death, or on the necessary connection between the
in Wirklichkeit ein Ausdruck der Freude über die bevorstehende Rückkehr zu ihrem Gott ist, so ist
auch sein letztes Gespräch mit den Freunden ein Ausdruck dieser Hoffnung - und zugleich eine
Ermahnung an seine Freunde, diese Botschaft in ihrer Lebensführung zu beherzigen. Diese
protreptische Rede ist also der letzte Dienst, den Sokrates seinem Gott und seinen Freunden auf Erden
erweist." And p.179: "Sokrates' Fürsorge für seine Freunde zeigt überdies, dass ihm auch am
diesseitigen Fortleben seiner Erkenntnisse gelegen war."
132 Rep. 496C-497A.
133 Rep. 592. But at the same time Plato acknowledges the inadequacy of both – 497A: ouvde, ge(
ei=pon( ta. me,gista( mh. tucw.n politei,aj proshkou,shj\ evn ga.r proshkou,sh| auvto,j te ma/llon auvxh,setai
kai. meta. tw/n ivdi,wn ta. koina. sw,sei)
134 Dodds (p.384) says something similar in different terms, when he compares the Gorgias with the
Phaedo and the Republic: "The programme [in the Gorgias] of first reforming ourselves and then
society may also be said to look forward to those dialogues. The theme of self-reform is given a new
and positive development in the Phaedo, where it is explained as a process of ka,qarsij or withdrawal
from the body (64c-67b). And in the Republic, where the Platonic Socrates at last evpiti,qetai toi/j
politikoi/j, we are shown that the possibility of a Just Society depends on the right moral and
intellectual training of the individual - in other words, that the only road to true statesmanship leads
through the discipline of the Academy."
135 Dorter arrives at a kind of integration rather differently. He argues that the practice of death (a)
entails only a "moderate asceticism" (p.29) which is really tantamount to indifference and as such is
compatible with the other dialogues; and (b) "is not merely an attempt to approximate suicide without
technically committing the offence. It is in fact the resolution of the tension between our selfish
fulfilment in death and our duty to life; for it not only accords with that fulfilment in that it is a
practising of it, but it is also equivalent to virtue or excellence, the highest manifestation of life...It may
indeed turn out that once we have attained such excellence we will discover therein - like the
philosopher of the Republic - an obligation to work for the well-being of others as well as ourselves
and thus to propose specific political measures, but all that is subsequent to what is meant here." (pp.
31f.)
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two – a connection so close that it is sometimes unclear whether they are not the same
thing. So that it may be said that each dialogue deals with approaching death, and
none deals with it finally.
4. Mu/qoj
But each dialogue does deal with death by way of a final myth - final in the sense of
closing the dialogue and final in the sense of eschatological - so that the full
interpretation of "the practice of death" requires a consideration of the status of these
Jenseitsmythen. What authority are we to ascribe to them? Are they intended to
provide a basis for belief in immortality, or do they simply express such a belief?
The first problem is how to define mu/qoj in Plato’s usage. Socrates offers a
potentially useful definition in the Republic during the discussion of h` mousikh, as part
of the programme of education.136 Included in "music" are lo,goi, and these are said
to be of two kinds, one true, the other false. The false lo,goi are mu/qoi, but “false” is
not quite correct, because he says of mu/qoj: tou/to de, pou w`j to. o[lon eivpei/n yeu/doj(
e;ni de. kai. avlhqh/)137 A mu/qoj therefore is a lo,goj which is not true but which
contains truth. Unfortunately this definition immediately seems to break down
because in the ensuing discussion, concerning which mu/qoi are to be permitted in
musical education and which rejected, he argues that those of Homer and Hesiod
136 Rep. 376E-377A.
137 This can mean either "mu/qoi on the whole are false, but they (some of them at least) contain some
truth" or "mu/qoi are false, taken as a whole, but they (all of them) contain some truth." Translators and
commentators seem to favour the second. E.g. Shorey's Loeb translation: "the fable is, taken as a
whole, false, but there is truth in it also", and Morgan (p.160): "stories that are on the whole false but
have some truth in them."
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which tell lies about the true nature of the gods should be rejected:138 in other words
there are some mu/qoi which do not contain truth.
To compound matters, when Socrates begins to tell the myth at the end of the
Gorgias, he says that he considers it to be lo,goj, whereas he imagines Callicles will
consider it mu/qoj;139 yet the Gorgias myth seems to belong to the same category as
the myth of Er, which is referred to by Socrates as mu/qoj.140 And when he says that he
imagines Callicles will consider it mu/qoj what he means is that Callicles will see it, not
as a lo,goj which although untrue contains truth, but as a mu/qoj grao,j.141 Conversely,
when he says that he himself considers it lo,goj what he means is that he sees it, not as
one of the subclass of lo,goi which consists of mu/qoi, but as actually being true: w`j
avlhqh/ ga.r o;nta soi le,xw a] me,llw le,gein.142
Mu/qoj therefore is a somewhat fluid concept: it may be a tale which is not true but
which contains truth (Rep. 377A); or a tale which is neither true nor contains truth
(Rep. 377D); or a tale which is entirely true (Gorgias 523A + Republic 621B).
Indeed the second category is itself divisible into those tales which are to be rejected
138 Ibid. 377D.
139 Gorgias 523A.
140 Rep. 621B: kai. ou[twj))) mu/qoj evsw,qh avll v ouvk avpw,leto. Dalfen (p.216) concludes: “Ob eine
Geschichte ein mythos oder ein logos ist, hängt nicht allein von der Geschichte ab, sondern von der
Einstellung des Erzählers oder des Hörers zu ihr.” But this fails to address the problem: Socrates, the
Erzähler in each case, refers to the myth of Er as mu/qoj and to the Gorgias myth as lo,goj; and in each
case he maintains that the myth should be believed: Rep. 621B: kai. h`ma/j a'n sw,seien( a'n peiqw,meqa
auvtw|/. Gorgias 526D: evgw. me.n ou=n)))u`po, te tou,twn tw/n lo,gwn pe,peismai.
141 Gorgias 527A.
142 Ibid. 523A. On the difficulty of distinguishing between mu/qoj and lo,goj see Halliwell (2007, pp.
453f.): "Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, no simple, unqualified muthos / logos dichotomy is
presupposed in Plato's work. The juxtaposition of the two terms, when it does appear, has a contextual
not overarching force and can be used to draw more than one distinction."
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because they tell undesirable untruths, and those which are to be encouraged because
they tell a noble lie.143
The second problem is whether to confine the concept. Because not only is it unclear
what is meant when the word mu/qoj is used: whatever it means may be intended even
when the word is not used. There is an obvious example of this in the Phaedo. At
110A-B Socrates offers to describe the “higher” earth with the words: eiv ga.r dh. kai.
mu/qon le,gein ) ) ) But of course he has just finished what is essentially the first
instalment of that description without having used the word mu/qoj at all.144 Similarly,
a little earlier at 107D Socrates begins his description of the soul’s journey to the
underworld, guided by its dai,mwn, with the bare expression le,getai de. ou[twj, but
what follows is nonetheless mu/qoj.
There are other places, however, where it is not quite so clear that what we are
confronted with is mu/qoj in one of its aspects. For example, the duoi/n qa,teron in the
Apology145 gives little indication that what is coming is in the nature of a mu/qoj
(understood in terms of the above definition as a false lo,goj which contains or may
contain truth).146 Yet mu/qoj it certainly is, and not only the second alternative with its
143 Rep. 414B ff. (The “noble lie” is referred to as a mu/qoj at 415A.)
144 The first instalment he introduced with the words: w`j evgw. u`po, tinoj pe,peismai. (108C). Ebert, on
the other hand, maintains (p.265) that 108C-110A is in fact not myth at all but "naturwissenschaftliche
Spekulation". But Hackforth (pp.172f.) argues that the description of the earth as a sphere is the only
"fact" in this passage: "What follows...is extension of fact, and mythical extension; by which I mean
that it is not offered as 'science', although it makes use of existing scientific theories." And cf. Morgan,
p.200: "It is not possible to separate 'mythical' from 'non-mythical' sections of the narrative by content:
it is all 'myth'. Both before and after the explicit introduction of mythos there is material on the
judgement and fate of souls and on the nature of the world. What distinguishes the final section of the
narrative is its narrative elaboration."
145 40C.
146 Although perhaps a hint has been given at 39E, where Socrates turns to those who have voted for
his acquittal and says: avlla, moi( w= a;ndrej( paramei,nate tosou/ton cro,non\ ouvde.n ga.r kwlu,ei
diamuqologh/sai pro.j avllh,louj) Cf. Phaedo 70B: h' peri. auvtw/n tou,twn bou,lei diamuqologw/men;
Rowe points out (1993, on 61E) that the metaphor is far from dead.
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tell-tale introductory kata. ta. lego,mena147 and the familiar figures of Minos and
Rhadamanthus:148 because the first alternative, the notion of death as nothing, is also
mythical, certainly if it is compared to a dreamless sleep (which is simply a very
truncated story about what death is like), but even if it envisaged only as mhdemi,a
ai;sqhsij. The fact is that we cannot envisage what it might be like to have no
sensation. Nothingness or extinction is beyond our ken, so that any words used to
describe it – even the words nothingness or extinction – are attempts to imagine the
unknowable, and no different in essence from the most sublime account of the soul
dwelling with the gods.
At the other extreme, the process of planning the education of the guardians is
described by Socrates as w[sper evn mu,qw| muqologou/ntej.149 And indeed the entire
dialogue is referred to at one point as h` politei,a( h]n muqologou/men lo,gw|.150 So that
the content of mu/qoj can range from one word to the whole of the Republic.
Then there are the stories about the jars in the Gorgias151 which seem more like
parables or allegories than the other mu/qoi, and which indeed are called by a different
name – eivkw,n. The trouble is they are called not only by a different name. The
source is referred to as tij muqologw/n komyo.j avnh,r, and at the end of the first one
Socrates asks Callicles if he is having any success in persuading him, h' ouvd v a'n a;lla
polla. toiau/ta muqologw/( ouvde,n ti ma/llon metaqh,sh|; Now the allegory of the cave is
147 Cf. Apol. 41C: ei;per ge ta. lego,mena avlhqh/ evstin)
148 Also present in the myths in the Gorgias (524A) and (unnamed) in the Phaedo (107D) and the
Republic (614C).
149 Rep. 376D.
150 Ibid. 501E (lo,gw| being contrasted with the following e;rgw|.)
151 Gorgias 493-494.
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also referred to as eivkw,n,152 and if that word can be used of both the cave and the
jars, and if muqologei/n can be used in connection with the jars, there seems no reason
why the allegory of the cave should not also be called the mu/qoj of the cave.153
Moreover, not only does Socrates refer at the beginning of the Phaedo to the fables of
Aesop as mu/qoi,154 but he fashions a fable or mu/qoj of his own, in the style of Aesop,
explaining the inseparableness of pleasure and pain as the result of god joining their
heads together - which as Frede points out155 turns into a parable of the relationship
between the soul and the body.
In other words, not only is the word mu/qoj given three mutually irreconcilable
meanings, but the content of what are called mu/qoi, or may by analogy be considered
as mu/qoi, can vary (even when the evidence is confined to the four dialogues under
consideration) from a word or two to a whole book, and can include allegories,
parables, fables, similes, as well as the full-blown Jenseitsmythen at the end of the
Gorgias, the Republic and the Phaedo.156
152 Rep. 517B and D. Both the allegory of the cave and the stories of the jars contain the verb
avpeika,zw as well (Rep. 514A, Gorgias 493B), and both are described as a;topoj- Rep. 515A, Gorgias
493C.
153 Cf. Halliwell, 2007, p.454: "Nor does it make much sense to draw a sharp dividing line between
narratives, like that of Gyges' ring, that are called muthoi in Plato's text, and those, such as the cave in
Republic 7...that are not." But cf. Frutiger (pp.101 ff.), who distinguishes between allegory and myth
and insists that the story of the cave is an allegory: "L'allégorie est immobile comme un tableau; il ne
s'y passe rien...elle a pour objet, non pas une action, mais un état. Le mythe, au contraire, est animé
comme un roman; c'est une histoire comportant une succession d'événements."
154 Although Cebes refers to them as lo,goi (60D), i.e. the reverse of the situation at Gorgias 523A,
where Socrates calls lo,goj what he assumes Callicles will think of as mu/qoj) Cf. Morgan, p.192:
"Studying the Phaedo as it weaves back and forth between myth and argument is an exercise in
determining the boundaries of Platonic mythos."
155 D. Frede, pp.13f.
156 Cf. Halliwell, 2007, p.454: "We need...to beware the pitfall of equating a formal dialogue / myth
distinction with a functional argument / myth distinction. The latter cannot be altogether clear-cut, if
only because there is no uniform model of 'argument' in Plato's writings as a whole...The philosophical
role of Platonic myths or narratives varies with the thematic and dramatic counterpoint in which they
stand to their compositional settings." Or in Morgan's terms (p.155): "Myth cannot be identified by
content, since the same material may function differently in different contexts."
76
The third problematic aspect of Plato’s mu/qoi is their status, their authority. Socrates
gives his assent, whether implicit or explicit, to all the Jenseitsmythen, an assent
ranging from the eu;elpij of the Apology,157 to the kai. h`ma/j a'n sw,seien( a'n
peiqw,meqa auvtw|/ of the Republic,158 to the pe,peismai of the Phaedo,159 to the lo,goj
avlhqh,j of the Gorgias.160 And yet he has had each Jenseitsmythos at second-hand,
and usually anonymously. In the Gorgias he has simply heard it,161 in the Phaedo he
has got it from someone,162 in the Apology he is repeating what is said,163 in the
Republic he attributes it to Er who is otherwise unknown.164 The question naturally
arises, therefore, why he gives his assent to these second-hand tales?
That their authority is not irresistible is acknowledged more than once by Socrates.
They may seem strange or absurd,165 they may strike people as old wives’ tales,166
God knows whether they are true,167 no sensible man would insist on their literal truth
in all respects.168 So where does their persuasiveness come from? Why does Socrates
himself not reject them as old wives’ tales? Is it because they accord with what he
already believes? Are they, in other words, the expression of his belief rather than its
ground?
157 Apol. 40C, 41C. Cf. Gorgias 526D. Cf. Phaedo 63C, 114C.
158 Rep. 621C.
159 Phaedo 108C, 109A.
160 Gorgias 523A, 524B.
161 Ibid. 524A: a] evgw. avkhkow,j.
162 Phaedo 108C: w`j evgw. u`po, tinoj pe,peismai.
163 Apol. 40C, 40E: kata. ta. lego,mena) Cf. Phaedo 63C.
164 Rep. 614B. Cf. Halliwell (2007, p.450) on the use of indirect speech in the myth of Er: "It is
equally readable as a marker of transcription, purporting to transmit a message with total fidelity, or as
a constant reminder that this is someone else's version of events."
165 a;topoj: Gorgias 493C, Rep. 515A.
166 Gorgias 527A.
167 Rep. 517B: qeo.j de, pou oi=den eiv avlhqh.j ou=sa tugca,nei)
168 Phaedo 114D : to. me.n ou=n tau/ta diiscuri,sasqai ou[twj e;cein w`j evgw. dielh,luqa( ouv pre,pei nou/n
e;conti avndri,) But cf. Phaedo 63C : o[ti me,ntoi para. qeou.j despo,taj pa,nu avgaqou.j h[xein( eu= i;ste
o[ti ei;per ti a;llo tw/n toiou,twn diiscurisai,mhn a'n kai. tou/to)
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It has to be said that if the Jenseitsmythen are offered as the reason why Socrates
believes in the kind of afterlife they represent, the only proper response is one of
polite interest.169 It would be as if a man were to tell us he believed in flying saucers,
adducing as evidence only the fact that other people believed in them too.170 This
being the case, and given that Plato is so disparaging elsewhere about the unexamined
opinions of the many,171 it is tempting to adopt the alternative construction, that
Socrates presents these myths as illustrations or explanations of his beliefs; so that
when he says he is convinced by them or believes them or regards them as true, what
he means is that as myths they contain aspects of truth, and he believes that these
aspects are true because they correspond with what he already believes to be true.172
The trouble is that this takes us no further forward, since there is nothing to explain
why Socrates already believes these things to be true:173 even if all the arguments in
the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul were cast-iron, it would not follow that
immortality takes the form envisaged in the myths, involving judgements, rewards
169 Cf. Morgan, p.201: "If, however, one does not found myth on a logical basis that is accepted by the
interlocutor, it becomes a mere story."
170 Cf. Halliwell, 1993, p.18: "Nor should we shirk the ultimate question whether Plato's myths are
inevitably in some degree elusive and opaque, by relying on a show of symbolism in spheres where we
have no other access to what is symbolised. If so, what standing does this leave the myths in the work
of a philosopher whose oeuvre so consistently values rationality?"
171 E.g. Rep. 479D.
172 Morgan, p.187: "Sokrates believes that the soul is immortal, that nothing truly bad can happen to
the soul of a good person. How does he know these things? He intuits them. But this means that he
cannot present them as knowledge until they have been established by argument." And p.209: "These
final myths are constructed on the basis of reasoned argument and express a meta-logical intuition
about the nature of the soul."
173 Cf. Halliwell (2007, p.458) on the myth of Er: "The myth itself could count as an 'argument' for
belief in immortality, but only if Er's testimony is treated as authoritative, which, on the face of it,
Socrates takes for granted but can do nothing to validate." And at p.460: "Given the Republic's
wavering images of the afterlife, Er's story appears out of nowhere, professing to carry an
eschatological authority that the Republic had not previously envisaged."
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and punishments, Tartarus and Isles of the Blest.174 (It is as if, to vary Pascal, Plato
offers us both the immortality demonstrated by the philosopher and the immortality
promised by the theologian, without either acknowledging the difference or
explaining the connection.) And this also gives rise to the next problematic area: in
what sense are we expected to understand these myths as illustrations of his beliefs?
There are at least three possibilities. First, at the lowest level of commitment,
Socrates may be preserving an ironic distance and putting forward mere hypotheses
for discussion:175 that is to say, these myths are illustrations not of his beliefs but of
some people's beliefs.176 The various protestations of conviction (pe,peismai etc.)
would then have to be interpreted as dramatic subterfuges177 designed simply to lend
verisimilitude, and we would have to speak not of Platonic anonymity but of Platonic
disguise, bordering on deceit: Plato dresses up Socrates / himself as a "believer".
This may seem improbable, especially perhaps in relation to the Phaedo,178 but
Bolotin actually argues that the case for immortality as it is presented in the Phaedo is
174 Cf. Morgan (p.195) on Phaedo 70D: "Transmigration may seem to be verified by the three
arguments for immortality, but even aside from the soundness of these arguments, it is verification by
juxtaposition. Transmigration is not a logos in the sense of 'argument'."
175 Cf. Bolotin, p.50: "This conversation, or story-telling, about immortality might not really be
philosophizing so much as it is Socrates' way of passing the day of his death, in company of his young
friends, as pleasantly as possible."
176 As seems to be the case, for example, with the parables of the jars in the Gorgias: they may sound
absurd, says Socrates, but that doesn’t matter if they serve the purpose of inducing Callicles to change
his mind. Gorgias 493C: tau/t v evpieikw/j me,n evstin u`po, ti a;topa( dhloi/ mh.n o] evgw. bou,lomai, soi
evndeixa,menoj( eva,n pwj oi-o,j te w=( pei/sai metaqe,sqai)))
177 On the dramatic subterfuges involved in the myth of Er, see Halliwell, 2007, p.450: "There is
consequently a sort of diegetic ambiguity to the myth, leaving it suspended between testimonial
confidence and imagined distance, between an air of plain truth telling and of exotic fiction. All in all,
the presentation of Er's story makes its status deliberately puzzling: ostensibly factual yet astonishingly
bizarre; quasi-historiographical yet shot through with traces of the poetic; redolent of traditional
Greek myths...yet with a putatively non-Greek origin that lies beyond the reach of verification."
178 Cf. D. Frede, p.178: "Ob es aber plausibel ist, dass Platon Sokrates als seinen 'Schwanengesang'
eine nur ironisch gemeinte Diskussion über die Seele und ihr Schicksal nach dem Tod vortragen lässt,
ist höchst zweifelhaft. Im Phaidon spricht nicht allein der 'Ernst der Lage' gegen eine Distanz auf
Platons Seite. Auch die Tatsache, dass er offensichtlich über den historischen Sokrates weit hinausgeht
und pythagoreisches Gedankengut mit einbezieht, spricht gegen eine ironische Distanzierung. Denn
warum sollte er Sokrates unmittelbar vor dessen Tod Vorstellungen über das Leben und den Tod
vertreten lassen, die nicht einmal er selbst teilt?"
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a front, a device designed by Socrates to wean his disciples "from their reliance on his
opinions. His arguments on behalf of immortality, by their clear enough weaknesses
and even their falsity, may compel some of the boys, as they think back upon them
after his death, to become more independent."179
Second, there is the possibility that the deceit involved is somewhat less cynical - that
Socrates is perpetrating more “noble lies”. That is to say, the myths are not in fact the
expression of any beliefs, they are simply presented as such for the sake of "the
weaker brethren".180 It may be significant that the noble lie in the Republic is
described as mu/qoj,181 and that the heart of the deception is referred to as th|/
avlhqei,a|:182 the rulers are to think of their actual education as merely a dream, and the
mu/qoj they are to learn to regard as the truth. We ourselves would then be in the
position of the rest of mankind who come afterwards,183 who believe184 the myth
because, human nature being what it is, the tale grows more plausible in the telling
and eventually mu/qoj is accepted as lo,goj – kai. tou/to me.n dh. e[xei o[ph| a'n auvto. h`
fh,mh avga,gh|.185 The points of resemblance between that noble lie and the
Jenseitsmythen – mu/qoj( avlh,qeia( h` fh,mh (le,getai / kata. ta. lego,mena), pei,qesqai –
lend some plausibility to the suggestion that Socrates did not shrink from deception in
the latter any more than, eventually, in the former.
179 Bolotin p.54.
180 Cf. Dorter, p.81: "Socrates and Plato clearly believed that goodness is intrinsically desirable and
evil intrinsically undesirable, but in a popular dialogue like the Phaedo, on a subject that appeals to
non-philosophers as much as to philosophers, such intrinsic worth and worthlessness is illustrated at
another level by the extrinsic rewards and punishments related in popular religion. Plato would be
content to use these illustrations as metaphors, while allowing those who would to take them literally,
like the Republic's 'noble lie'." And at p.7: "Like the Republic's 'noble lie', they are in reality
metaphors, but metaphors put forward as if literal."
181 Rep. 415A, 415C.
182 Ibid. 414D.
183 Ibid. 415D: oi` e;peita oi[ t v a;lloi a;nqrwpoi oi` u[steron)
184 Ibid. 415C: tou/ton ou=n to.n mu/qon o[pwj a'n peisqei/en( e;ceij tina. mhcanh,n;
185 Ibid. 415D.
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And the noble lie may be told more effectively when it is accompanied by the same
kind of rhetorical or forensic trick which Socrates ridicules in the Gorgias.186 There
Polus tries to bolster his case by appealing to the many who think as he does, but in
doing so he simply adds to the number of witnesses rather than to the weight of the
argument. In the Jenseitsmythen Socrates may be doing the same thing, with his w`j
le,getai( and his kata. ta. lego,mena( and his u`po, tinoj pe,peismai) This should really
be no more persuasive than if he had said, “I imagine the afterlife will be something
like this. . .”, yet it sounds more persuasive to a gullible jury.187
But the trouble about the approach which explains the eschatological myth in terms of
the noble lie is its assumption that Plato was as ready as modern commentators are to
demystify and demythologize his ideas. Julia Annas, for example, after pointing out
the depressing and (in relation to the previous nine books of the Republic)
unsatisfactory consequences of understanding the myth at all literally, suggests that
Plato (demythologizing his own myth) intended it to show us that "we are responsible
for the people we are in making the choices we make. . .The myth, with its apparatus
of judgement day eternally going on, makes us aware of the existential nature of
decisions that make us the people we are." But she is by no means convinced by her
186 Gorgias 471E.
187 There is a good description of what is going on in the mind of a gullible member of the jury when
Rechenauer says (p.240): "Die Präsentation des Mythos stützt sich nicht auf die Autorität des
Dialogführers Sokrates, sondern auf eine höhere anonyme Instanz. Es is nicht die Person Sokrates, die
hier versucht, sein Gegenüber zu bereden, sondern seine Stimme gibt nur wieder, was als 'wahr seiend'
aus einem unfassbaren Anderswo zu ihm gekommen ist (Gorgias 523a2-3). Durch die Verlagerung
der auktorialen Stimme an eine ungenannte Wahrheitsquelle verändert sich auch die
Rezeptionssituation. Die mythische Erzählung erlangt eine höhere Objektivität, sie entrückt den Hörer
gleichsam wie durch ein Fenster aus der augenblicklichen Dialogsituation und bringt hin in ein neues
Objektivitätsverhältnis zu der jenseitigen Welt, die zugleich die Aussenseite seiner Innenwelt, seiner
Seele ist. Damit wird im Mythos wie in einer Synopse die eigene Subjektivität mit der Objektivität des
Wirklichen zur Deckung gebracht." That is, Rechenauer explains what he has been persuaded to
believe by the appeal to external authority, not why he (or we) should be persuaded by it.
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own suggestion: "If the myth is not threatening us with future punishments in a
terrifyingly impersonal universe, but bringing home to us the importance of what we
are doing to ourselves now, why is it cast in the most misleading possible form from
the point of view of its message?" And she concludes: "We simply cannot be sure
about how Plato expected us to interpret the myth."188
Dorter, on the other hand, is quite sure how to interpret the closing myth of the
Phaedo. Having demythologized the "doctrine of reincarnation" into "religious
metaphor", he claims: "There seems no doubt that these are Plato's views, and I see
no reason to believe that Plato thought that these analogies must manifest themselves
also as literal transformations after death. His religious language conveys images that
vividly bring home to us the implications of our choice of a way of life and of the
kind of persons that we are, and I take it that the truth of these images is intended not
in their application to some incomprehensible future but to the present."189 In the
preface to his book, Dorter draws attention to the antithesis between the analytic and
dramatic approaches, and states that his intention is to synthesise the two. But what
emerges from these remarks on Plato's "religious language" is a different antithesis,
the age-old one between the philosophic and the poetic, between lo,goj and mu/qoj.
And Dorter makes no attempt at a synthesis here: he sees himself, Plato and lo,goj as
firmly on the side of the angels.190
188 Annas, 1981, pp. 352f.
189 Dorter, p.81.
190 Halliwell (2007, p.469), like Annas, proposes a "this-worldly" interpretation of the myth of Er:
"If...we focus on a this-worldly reading of the myth, the motif of a prenatal life choice can be
interpreted as a stark emblem of the inescapably self-forming consequences of ethical agency, a
magnified image of how at every moment ('always and everywhere') the individual soul / person is
intrinsically responsible for what matters most about its existence." But unlike Annas, who gives up in
despair, and Dorter, who dismisses the future dimension altogether, Halliwell concludes that "the myth
does not permit its readers to settle on a definitive either-or adjudication between literalism and
allegory. Appropriately, in a work whose fabric is threaded with many metaphors of journeying
(through life, dialectic, and the quest for justice), each reader is left with the prospect of a continuing,
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Yet there is the third possibility that Socrates, rather than simply trying to make his
ideas more attractive and accessible by putting them in mythical dress, may be
operating on the principle (and perhaps the parables of Jesus are an analogy) that
some ideas can only be expressed by putting them in mythical dress - as a kind of
Veranschaulichung des Unanschaulichen: he is painting pictures in words which
conceivably have more power to reveal what may lie in store for us than any rigorous
argument. Far from being a kind of postscript, or an optional extra, the eschatological
myths would then have to be seen as the culmination, the crown, the nearest approach
to the truth. Their status in relation to the preceding dialogue would be that of singing
and dancing in relation to the Homeric feast - its avnaqh,mata.191
At the close of the Phaedo myth, Socrates proposes that the venture of believing
something like it is well worthwhile192 and (taking up an earlier remark about
charming away the fear of death)193 that it is a good thing to sing such incantations to
oneself194 - which is why he has prolonged the tale.195 The mu/qoj, on that view, the
incantation (the bedtime story for "the child within"), is the supreme weapon against
ta. mormolu,keia, against the fear of death.196 And Socrates himself is the best teller of
bedtime stories.197 But it is not the case that "incantation is meant to supplement
rational argument by appealing to our pre-conceptual nature - 'the child within' - at the
upward journey (621c), which is also a choice of how far to follow Socrates in the moral imagination
along the cyclic path between this world and the other (619e)."
191 Od. I.152 - taking that word to mean something like "crowning justification" (which seems to be
the implication of such passages as Od. VIII.38-45, 62-99) rather than simply "ornament" or "proper
accompaniments" (see West on I.152).
192 Phaedo 114D: tou/to kai. pre,pein moi dokei/ kai. a;xion kinduneu/sai oivome,nw| ou[twj e;cein)
193 Ibid. 77E: vAlla. crh,( e;fh o` Swkra,thj( evpa|,dein auvtw|/ e`ka,sthj h`me,raj)))
194 Ibid. 114D: kai. crh. ta. toiau/ta w[sper evpa|dein e`autw|/)
195 Ibid.: dio. dh. e;gwge kai. pa,lai mhku,nw to.n mu/qon)
196 As Edelstein puts it (1949, p.475): "That is why we must counteract sorcery by sorcery."
197 Phaedo 78A: Po,qen ou=n( e;fh( w= Sw,kratej( tw/n toiou/twn avgaqo.n evpw|do.n lhyo,meqa( evpeidh. su,(
e;fh( h`ma/j avpolei,peij;
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level of emotion and imagination"198 (where "supplement" implies a "non-rational
reassurance" which is superfluous for the philosopher), because it is specifically the
"man of sense"199 whom Socrates recommends to sing charms to himself.200 The
point is that perhaps at some stage lo,goj has to give way to mu/qoj (for the
philosopher just as much as for the unsophisticate), and if this is the case it would
make sense to see mu/qoj as avlh,qeia, indeed as lo,goj201 - not in the sense of the logical
basis for one's beliefs, but as the only way of putting one's beliefs into words.202
But whatever status these myths have, and whether they are demythologized or not,
each expressly makes ethical demands on the way we lead our lives. In the
Gorgias203 Socrates deduces from the accounts of the judgement the obligation to live
as good a life as possible. In the Phaedo204 he says that because of what he has
recounted we must do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life. In the
Republic he interrupts the myth of Er205 to infer that we must avei. pantacou/ choose
198 Dorter, p.8.
199 nou/n e;conti avndri, - Phaedo 114D.
200 In other words, the strategy of incantation is both available and necessary to everyone, not just the
naive. Cf. Halliwell, 2007, p.470: "In such cases [as the myth of Er and the noble lie], acceptance of a
story's literal veracity (cf. Phaedrus 229c) is not the only option; confidence in its normative authority
must also be reckoned with. If we look for illumination outside the Republic, we find that the myth
that underwrites the soul's immortality in the Phaedo needs to be 'repeated as incantation' (epaidein):
that is, employed as a nonepistemic, partly self-persuasive device, used by Orphics, among others, for
dealing with recurrent fears or problems. On that analogy, the mythic epilogue to the Republic invites
a trust that might be as much affective as rational." Cf. also Edelstein, 1949, p.474. And cf. Morgan,
p.200, on the emotional satisfaction which the Phaedo myth provides and which was lacking in the
immortality arguments.
201 Gorgias 523A: ;Akoue dh,( fasi,( ma,la kalou/ lo,gou( o]n su. me.n h`gh,sh| mu/qon( w`j evgw. oi=mai( evgw.
de. lo,gon\ w`j avlhqh/ ga.r o;nta soi le,xw a] me,llw le,gein)
202 Cf. Dodds, p.376: "[Plato's] eschatological myths describe a world which he admits to be beyond
ordinary human knowledge (cf. [Gorgias] 527a); they are the imaginative expression of an insight
which could not be expressed save in symbolic terms." Dodds then refers to the Seventh Letter 335a2
and proceeds: "The writer plainly has the Gorgias in mind; and if the writer is Plato we must, I think,
say that the Gorgias myth is called a lo,goj because it expresses in imaginative terms a 'truth of
religion'." (Morgan disagrees (p.191): "Sokrates may think that his eschatological mythos is a 'truth of
religion', but this is not why he calls it a logos. He does this because he views it as an extension of his
philosophical logos...")
203 526D.
204 114C.
205 618C.
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the best life possible, and he closes it with the observation that it will save us if our
souls remain uncontaminated.206 And this seems to lend additional support to that
interpretation of the "practice of death" which sees it not as an ascetic renunciation
tantamount to "an attempt to approximate suicide without technically committing the
offence,"207 but rather as a part - a vital part - of the art of life.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Plato's dialogues are more concerned with the relationship between this life and the
afterlife, between how we lead our lives and what happens to us after death, than with
dying and the death of others. But the formula in the Phaedo which appears to
encapsulate that relationship - that true philosophers "practise death" - is ambiguous,
both in terms of vocabulary (meleta/n and its various apparent synonyms), and in terms
of how "practice" relates to "philosophy" (sometimes it is simply equivalent to
philosophical activity, sometimes it is the necessary condition for that activity), so
that it is unclear whether the practice is oriented to this life or to the afterlife.
The dramatic setting of the Phaedo inevitably encourages the latter interpretation but,
conversely, the absence of certain themes which are conspicuous elsewhere,
particularly in the Gorgias and the Republic, suggests that such an interpretation may
be distorted, and may need to be qualified or complemented. An examination of the
Gorgias shows that it is at the other extreme from the Phaedo in its emphasis on the
practical or civic virtues of dikaiosu,nh and swfrosu,nh, and in its corresponding lack
206 621 B-C.
207 Dorter p.31.
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of emphasis on purely cerebral philosophical activity and - until the closing myth - on
the afterlife as an inducement to ethical behaviour during this life. The Republic, on
the other hand, seems to offer a synthesis of these opposing tendencies in its
insistence that - in the ideal state - the philosopher, having glimpsed the eternal
realities, must be prepared to re-enter the cave before qualifying for translation to the
Isles of the Blest.
The comparison suggests that each dialogue represents a different perspective on the
relationship between life and death, and that the less negative and life-denying
interpretation of the practice of death in the Phaedo is more in tune with the
implications of the Gorgias and the Republic. That suggestion has then to be tested
against the eschatological myths which close the three dialogues. But Plato's
understanding of mu/qoj turns out to be elusive,208 both in definition and in scope, and
on the question whether the Jenseitsmythen are the basis for his beliefs or simply
express his beliefs, the evidence is inconclusive. Finally, it is uncertain whether his
intention in using these myths is that we should be deceived by a noble lie,
mesmerised by incantations, or enlightened by poetic imagery.
In the light of so many imponderables, a wise agnosticism may be in order. On the
other hand, it could be argued that the multiplicity of problems is true to life. Death
itself is so imponderable, and our attitude to approaching death so shifting with age
and circumstance, that none of us can take up a permanent, unvarying stance over
208 Intentionally, in Morgan's view: "Given [Plato's] doubts about the efficacy of language and written
discourse...we cannot expect that he would give a stability to myth that he denies to his own
dialogues." (p.157.) On the contrary, "the richness and complexity of this mythological material is of a
piece with Platonic philosophical complexity; the permeable boundaries of myth reflect the
elusiveness of the dialogues...Plato writes myths for precisely the same reason that he writes dialogues:
to ward off certainty and keep the philosophical quest alive in terms that acknowledge its frailty."
(p.161.)
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against it. The differences, tensions, contradictions between and within these
dialogues, however perplexing or at times exasperating, are perhaps more of a
strength than a weakness; and perhaps the proper response is not to try to reduce them
all to a coherent system, nor to insist that any one of them represents Plato’s real
thoughts on the subject, but to allow the tensions to co-exist and each dialogue to
compete with and so to complement and complete the others.
This means that the mele,th qana,tou in the Phaedo need not be understood as a
blueprint for the philosopher at the outset of his career, any more than the schoolboy
could expect to get away with it who instead of answering the question in his exam
paper quoted Socrates: “All I know is that I know nothing.” The Socratic profession
of ignorance is plausible only at the end of the process, and it is only when the
prospect of hemlock has concentrated the mind that the art of life can be reduced to
the mele,th qana,tou. Of course the implications of Socratic ignorance can be salutary
at every stage in life, and so can those of the mele,th qana,tou. But neither offers a
short cut: Cleombrotus probably made the same mistake as the schoolboy.209
And yet, whether or not Cleombrotus made a mistake, at least he responded, at least
he acted, at least reading Plato made a difference to him. Whereas an uncommitted,
detached, objective verdict that on the whole the Phaedo probably does not mean
209 As G.D. Williams puts it (p.156), Cleombrotus "jumps first to his conclusions and then to his death
without testing his inferences..." Williams refers (p.162) to the comments of the neo-Platonist
Ammonius on Cleombrotus and h` qana,tou mele,th. Ammonius distinguishes "two kinds of death, the
natural separation of the soul from the mortal body at the end of life (o` fusiko,j qa,natoj) and
'purposive death' (o` proairetiko.j qa,natoj), or what the true philosopher undergoes in preparing his
soul for its release from the body when natural death eventually claims him. By the words h` qana,tou
mele,th, claims Ammonius, Plato means this stage of preparation (o` proairetiko.j qa,natoj), but
Cleombrotus misunderstood him: interpreting the phrase h` qana,tou mele,th as an injunction to commit
suicide (h` tou/ fusikou/ qana,tou mele,th), he took his life accordingly." In other words, Ammonius
portrays Cleombrotus "as a keen young student who studied the Phaedo with more enthusiasm than
intelligence."
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quite what it says about approaching death, seems hardly to do justice either to the
solemnity of the setting or the importance of the subject. Putting it another way, and
recalling the main purpose of this exercise, does Plato actually offer us any help when
we come to approach our own death? Or rather, since he certainly appears to offer
help, does he succeed in helping us?
The answer depends on whether we are philosophers or not. If we are not, then
things are far from rosy, unless we are content with the prospect of coming back as
bees, because that seems to be as much as we can hope for. Without philosophy we
will be afraid to die, we will be inconsolable when others die, and our future will
consist of an endless process of reincarnation. The only solution is to become
philosophers, since philosophers face death fearlessly, accept bereavement calmly,
and have more or less exclusive access when they die to the Isles of the Blest. But
there are two difficulties: how do we know it is true that philosophers go to the Isles
of the Blest, and how do we become philosophers?
To assure us of the first, we have the arguments and stories used by the philosophers.
The trouble is partly that the arguments and the stories relate to different things (the
former to the bare fact of immortality, the latter to the conditions which pertain to it),
the connection between the two being unexplained;210 and partly that the stories seem
to have the status of untested hearsay, or mere assertion, or poetic fancy, or perhaps
simply wishful thinking - because there must be a suspicion of wishful thinking when
a philosopher asserts that paradise entails an eternity of philosophical conversation.
210 Cf. Bolotin, p.44: "And yet even if the soul does continue to exist in the state of death - and this is
of course a large assumption - how can the philosopher be confident that his soul will come to be wise,
or in possession of the truth, after he dies? How can he even be confident that the rulers in Hades are
not ill-disposed to philosophy, and that they will not place obstacles in the way of his soul's quest for
wisdom or enlightenment?"
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And then, on the assumption that those of us who are not philosophers find such a
reward sufficiently enticing, how do we set about earning it? How do we become
philosophers? According to the Gorgias, we are to lead virtuous lives, which sounds
reasonable and even perhaps possible. But according to the Phaedo, lives of ordinary
practical virtue turn out not to be worth very much: as philosophers what we will
really be required to do is lead lives of such contemplative detachment that logically
we will cease to engage with this world altogether.211 And according to the Republic,
there is no point in even thinking about becoming philosophers unless we are
endowed by nature with considerable and unusual mental gifts.
We might perhaps conclude that a recipe for approaching death which appears to be
supported, at the highest, by intuition or revelation, and which benefits only the class
to which the person laying claim to the intuition or revelation belongs, is less than
helpful to the very large majority who are not members of that class and have no
prospect of joining it. But this may be because we are looking for something which
Plato does not intend to offer. To some extent, this would be Plato's own fault, since
it does seem as if in the eschatological myths he is offering us a future on certain
conditions which most of us are unable to fulfil, and so we turn away empty-handed
in confusion or despair. It is possible, however, that if we expect less we will receive
more. That is to say, if we read Plato as challenging us to view approaching death as
the most important thing in life, as the controlling element in our lives, which should
determine the way we live, then we will have received a great deal. How that will
work out in practice, must depend on who we are and where we are. The example
which Plato presents in the Phaedo, of the ascetic philosopher practising death or
211 Cf. Bolotin, p.48: "...if, as this [Phaedo 83D] implies, all pleasure and pain is necessarily at odds
with the duty of the philosopher, no human being can possibly fulfil that duty."
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preparing for death and led by the promise of eternal contemplation of the eternal
realities, is only an example; just as the other dialogues present different examples, of
different ways of practising an art of life, led by different kinds of promise - but
always an art of life which is justified, or hallowed, or purified by a proper regard for
the reality of death.212
In other words, if we see Plato as laying down objective rules for how everyone
should live, on the basis of objective truths about what will happen when they die, we
are likely to find him unhelpful. But if I see him as offering me advice on how I
should live my life in the light of my approaching death, then I will be a fool not to
listen to his advice. What will happen then is another story, my story: the "practice
of death" epitomizes the Delphic maxim gnw/qi seauto,n)213
212 Cf. Bolotin, p.55: "...it does seem to me that it is in and through the activity of philosophizing that
we can be most adequately reconciled - as we cannot help but want to be - to the awareness of our own
mortality. In his activity of thinking the philosopher accepts, but does not simply yield to, the sadness
that accompanies this awareness. And it is above all, it seems to me, because philosophy thus
incorporates an acceptance of the necessity of death that Socrates characterizes it as the practice of
dying and being dead."
213 Cf. Schaerer, p.14: "Socrate est et n'entend être qu'un éducateur; une force invincible le pousse à
s'approcher des jeunes gens et à provoquer en eux la connaissance de soi-même, c'est-à-dire l'éclosion
d'un savoir à la fois personnel et général, différent de l'opinion individuelle (do,xa) qui est purement
subjective, et de la connaissance discursive (dia,noia) qui est, ou prétend d'être, purement objective. La
science la plus rigoureuse, c'est dans le moi qu'il va la chercher, et cette objectivation du moi est le but
et la raison d'être de sa pédagogie."
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III. Cicero on Death and Immortality
Fussé je mort moins allegrement avant qu'avoir veu les Tusculanes? J'estime que
non. (Montaigne Essais III.12.)
1. Preliminaries
Two modern biographies of Cicero make rather different claims about his attitude to
immortality. Lacey: "In this work [the Consolatio], Cicero also seems to have felt
what would now be called a growing faith in the existence of an eternal, imperishable
soul."1 Shackleton Bailey: "Cicero had no firm faith in the life after death."2 Lacey’s
assertion could hardly be inferred from the few surviving fragments of the Consolatio:
what he really means is: "The Consolatio seems to support the implication of the
other works, that Cicero felt a growing faith. . ." Shackleton Bailey is also writing in
the immediate context of the Consolatio, but equally obviously it is on the basis of the
other works as well that he has unhesitatingly reached the opposite conclusion.
Now Shackleton Bailey and Lacey published their biographies within seven years of
each other, and their statements relate to one very specific matter on which there is a
wide-ranging body of evidence - in the letters, in the philosophica, and in the
circumstances of Cicero’s life. There are two possible responses to their diametrically
opposed conclusions. The first is that one of them is right and the other wrong. The
second is that neither can be said to be either right or wrong, that it is a question
which we are unable to answer because of the nature of the evidence. Which of these
two responses is correct is now to be explored.
1 Lacey, p.129.
2 Shackleton Bailey, 1971, p.215.
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The written evidence is easily listed: it is contained in the De Republica (the
Somnium Scipionis), in the fragments of the largely lost Consolatio, in the Tusculanae
Disputationes (especially Books I and III), in the De Senectute, in the De Amicitia,
and in the letters (especially of course to Atticus.) But it is one matter to establish
what a man says: it is another matter to establish what he means by what he says, and
another matter again to establish what he actually believes. And in Cicero’s case
there are several complicating factors.
Some of his philosophical works were written during brief respites from intense
forensic and political activity, some at a time of enforced leisure (in effect
retirement),3 some in immediate reaction to a cruel bereavement, and some in a kind
of reaction to that reaction. All of them reflect and some bear the marks of the
background against which they were written: they vary from the detached to the
despairing, from the cynical to the serene, from cool objectivity to naked emotion.
And of course they differ greatly in genre. The De Republica is a "historical"
dialogue, i.e. a fictional dialogue set in a specific historical period with historical
dramatis personae. The Tusculans are contemporary dialogues, perhaps with a largely
factual setting, in which Cicero himself both appears and hides. The Consolatio was
probably addressed to himself, and was certainly directed at himself as an exercise in
self-therapy. The De Senectute and the De Amicitia are again "historical" dialogues,
but in atmosphere more mellow, and in content more moralistic than speculative or
analytical. As well as this variety of genres, there is his habit of presenting both sides
of the question with equal persuasiveness - a habit deriving not just from the practice
3 Cf. De Div. II.7: "philosophiam nobis pro rei publicae procuratione substitutam putabamus."
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of law and the teaching of rhetoric but from his philosophical background.4
Together, these considerations mean that it is sometimes dangerous to base the
interpretation of any particular passage on what is said in another work, or even
elsewhere in the same work. For example, it might be naïve to draw conclusions from
the absence of any real mention in the Somnium Scipionis of the fate of the wicked,
when the point is simply to indicate the ultimate reward of the virtuous statesman.
And it might be unwise to contrast the second half of Book I of the Tusculans either
with the first half of the same book or with the De Senectute and the De Amicitia, and
to argue that because Cicero is just as persuasive when he assumes the soul’s
mortality as he is when he assumes its immortality, therefore there is a tension or a
contradiction within his own thinking.
The letters are rather a different matter. Of course far from being homogeneous
themselves, they are as mercurial in mood as Mozart. But they provide another
dimension, an insight into what Cicero was feeling as well as thinking, a unique
additional tool (unique at any rate in the ancient world) in the interpretation of the
works written for publication. It would be going too far to claim them as a control,
and to assume that they always offer the unvarnished truth about the personality
within. Private letters do not necessarily reveal the unvarnished truth: the writer
inevitably plays a different role with different correspondents, and the role he plays
even to his most intimate friend may not be the role he plays in addressing himself. In
particular, the argument from silence is a dangerous one in this context - for example,
the assertion that Cicero’s mourning for his daughter was short-lived because after the
4 See e.g. T.D. II.9. And cf. De Nat. Deorum II.11. See Long (pp.299-304) on Cicero's strategy in
attributing the philosophical / rhetorical practice of in utramque partem dicere largely to Aristotle.
93
first few months there is no further reference to her in his correspondence.5
But what the letters do say provides a significant commentary on his feelings, and
significant clues to his beliefs. Without them, and without the few surviving
references to the Consolatio, there would only be the handful of brief allusions to
Tullia in the Tusculans, which would scarcely be enough to indicate his devastating
sense of loss and the nature of his reaction to it.
This gives rise to another caveat. We know more about Cicero than we do about
anyone else in the ancient world - more, that is, about his flaws as well as his virtues.
Indeed one of his recurring flaws is his readiness to speak about his virtues, and one
of his occasional virtues his candour about his flaws - though we know more about
both from reading between the lines. As Shackleton Bailey says: "In Cicero’s letters
we see a Roman Consular, on any reasonable estimate one of the most remarkable
men of his eventful time, without his toga. . .The letters that reveal him were never
meant to become public property - his state of mind if anyone had told him that this
would one day happen hardly bears imagination."6
But this exceptional access which we have to his character is liable to make us unfair
in our judgement. We are tempted to compare him unfavourably with other
philosophers, about whom we know nothing apart from what they have chosen to tell
us. We know how they thought the wise man should live, not how wisely they lived
themselves. In Cicero’s case we know a great deal about how he lived, and we know
how far short he fell of his own ideal "wise man". Occasionally he tells us this
5 See Shackleton Bailey, 1971, p.215.
6 Ibid. p.xi.
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himself:7 more often we can infer it from what we know of him from his
correspondence.
An obvious example is the contrast between repeated statements in the philosophica
about Cicero’s deep regard for philosophy, and the absence of any hint of
philosophical reflection or solace in the letters written during the two lowest periods
of his life before Tullia’s death. In the preface to Book I of the Tusculans he refers to
his early proficiency in philosophy and his life-long devotion to it, and in the preface
to Book V he extravagantly expresses his debt.8 Yet the letters from exile in 58 and
from Brundisium in 47 after Pompey’s defeat not only make no mention of any
turning to philosophy - even in small measure - but they are filled with evidence of
precisely the perturbationes from which in the Tusculans the wise man is alleged to
be entirely free.9
On the basis of this glaring contradiction it is easy to accuse Cicero of hypocrisy.
And it has to be said that he sometimes brings it on himself, not just by removing his
toga in the letters but by taking a rather de haut en bas tone in the philosophica. The
occasional admission of past weakness in the Tusculans is more than offset by the
Olympian manner in which he instructs, and sometimes mocks, his young
interlocutor. And at one point he offers a hostage to fortune in the form of a lament
7 E.g. T.D. IV.63.
8 Ibid. V.5 "O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! quid non modo nos,
sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset?. . .Ad te confugimus, a te opem petimus, tibi nos, ut
antea magna ex parte, sic nunc penitus totosque tradimus."
9 All the key terms of the Tusculans are present in the letters of those years - dolor, maeror, aegritudo,
miseria, malum, molestia (see e.g. Att. 11.9; 11.10; 11.17a; 11,25) - without any suggestion that the
emotions they describe are at all unworthy. Cf. Pro Sestio XXII.49, where he even makes a political
virtue of his dolor, and contrast Par. Sto. 29-32, where he claims that his exile was no hardship to him
since he possessed the Stoic virtue of equanimity. And cf. Livy's assessment (Seneca, Suasoriae
VI.22): "sed in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus, exilio, ruina partium pro
quibus steterat, filiae morte, exitu tam tristi atque acerbo, omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum
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over the inability of philosophers to practise what they preach. They are worse than
grammarians who commit solecisms, or music teachers who sing out of tune.10
Yet there are two reasons why it would be simplistic to regard fortune as having
accepted that hostage by preserving the letters, and to mock Cicero in turn. The first
is that as he himself points out the "wise man" of the philosophers does not exist: he
is a hypothetical goal to be striven for, not an actual example to be emulated.11 And
the second is that what the contrast between the philosophica and the letters reveals
may be not so much a charlatan as a human being like everyone else. Because there is
no doubt that the letters are an invaluable window into Cicero the human being.
And on the face of it that window is the more necessary because of his professed
intention in the philosophica of keeping his own views to himself.12 Several times in
the Tusculans he says that his custom is to refrain from committing himself to any
school, and rather to look for what seems to be the most probable solution in every
problem;13 and he expressly states that in these discussions he has used Socrates as
his model "ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus".14 It sounds therefore as if the
Tusculans are a detached search for the truth which will tell us nothing about Cicero
himself, but against this there are two considerations. In the first place, the view
erat tulit praeter mortem."
10 T.D. II.12. Ironically enough, Cicero himself is warned of this very thing by Servius Sulpicius
Rufus in his consolatio on Tullia's death (Fam. IV.5.5): "Denique noli te oblivisci Ciceronem esse et
eum qui aliis consueris praecipere et dare consilium, neque imitare malos medicos, qui in alienis
morbis profitentur tenere se medicinae scientiam, ipsi se curare non possunt."
11 T.D. II.51. Cf. IV.58.
12 See e.g. De Nat. Deorum I.10: "Qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id
faciunt quam necesse est."
13 I.17, II.5, IV.7. See also De Div. II.72, 150 and De Nat. Deorum II.12: "Non enim sumus ii quibus
nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta
similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. Ex quo exstitit illud, multa esse
probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et
inlustrem iis sapientis vita regeretur."
14 T.D. V.11.
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which seems to him the most probable15 will presumably be the view he adopts
himself, so that the conclusions of the Tusculans will be his own.16 In the second
place, the setting of the Tusculans is more factual than fictional, in the sense that
Cicero’s own personality and circumstances are frequently in evidence, quite without
disguise. The prefaces to each of the five books are written by Cicero in his own
person, and the dialogues themselves contain several references to his own unhappy
lot, and to the reasons for writing the Consolatio and the benefits it brought him.17
In other words, when it comes to seeing into Cicero’s mind the letters are not
necessarily transparent and the philosophica not necessarily opaque. Indeed a curious
reversal of the argument concerning Plato suggests itself. Plato seemed to the
systematic or dogmatic critic to be expressing in his dialogues his own arguments and
conclusions, and on the basis of these conclusions to be offering advice on, for
15 There are two applications of "probable" here. One - explained in De Nat. Deorum II.12 - relates to
the impossibility of reaching certainty rather than probability in matters of sensory perception. The
other relates to the assessment of competing opinions on the sort of ethical problems discussed in the
Tusculans. Cicero's views on the latter may be so manifest that they can be regarded as certain - i.e. it
may be regarded as certain that he held them. Cf. Long, p.289: "[Cicero's] official allegiance to the
sceptical Academy carries with it no doctrinal commitments outside epistemology, nor, on the other
hand, need it inhibit him from approving the plausibility of philosophical theses - for instance, the
immortality of the soul in Tusculan Disputations book 1 - if he finds the arguments in their favour more
convincing than those against them."
16 Cf. Douglas, 1995, p.205: "In Tusculans 5:11 [Cicero] claims …to be following Socrates (and
Carneades) … in concealing his own opinion and freeing others from error. It is scarcely possible to
reconcile the first part of this claim with what actually happens in the Tusculans, even if we allow that
his conclusions are only 'the most probable', and that…he cannot wholly shake off some hesitancy
about the views he advances with apparent conviction."
On the question whether Cicero was justified in claiming to be a disciple of Socrates in this respect, see
Vlastos, 1991, p.5. According to Vlastos, Socrates certainly acknowledged that his elenctic method
could not achieve "final demonstrative certainty" but it does not follow from this that he suspended
judgement about everything and never made positive assertions. "How Arcesilaus and Carneades
could have associated their systematic adherence to evpoch, with Socrates' ringing affirmations we shall
never know: our information about them is too scant." Vlastos argues that Cicero (and he himself in
an earlier book) fell into the same trap. But on the evidence of the Tusculans it looks as if, while
certainly attributing to Socrates a "systematic adherence to evpoch, " Cicero himself was just as willing to
make "ringing affirmations" as in Vlastos' view Socrates was. Cf. Colish, p.141: "Cicero states in this
work [the Tusculans] that he is merely expounding the views of several scholars without espousing any
one position, on the grounds that philosophical debate assists us on the path to truth even though the
answers it provides may only be probable ones. In actuality, he does arrive at positive conclusions
which he professes without doubting either their certitude or their capacity to strengthen the troubled
soul."
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example, approaching death; whereas the dramatic critic insisted that Plato had
preserved his anonymity. Cicero, on the other hand, claims that his philosophical
works are impartial and say nothing about himself, whereas on closer inspection they
turn out both to reflect the circumstances of his life and to disclose his own thoughts
and beliefs. So in the Tusculans he gives three reasons for his decision to return to
philosophical studies. One is that he now has the leisure to pursue what has always
interested him.18 Another is that he sees an opportunity for continuing service to the
State by making Greek philosophy accessible to his fellow-citizens.19 But a third is
that no other consolation could have been found in his cruel sorrows.20 He means of
course not simply the consolation of activity, of having something to do, but the
consolation which comes from the pursuit of wisdom. Because it is not just the
writing which has brought him relief, it is the conclusions he has come to in his
writing.21
In these circumstances it is reasonable to proceed in Cicero's case in the way which it
was argued was illegitimate in relation to Plato, namely to treat at least some of his
dialogues22 not as dramatic works but as vehicles for his philosophical ideas - as
philosophy dressed up; and specifically it may be reasonable to infer that recurring
themes in the philosophica like the immortality of the soul were for Cicero of more
than simply academic interest, and that he regarded some at least of his conclusions as
more than simply probable.
17 I.66,76,83,109,111; III.76; IV.63; V.121.
18 E.g. T.D. I.1.
19 Ibid. I.1,5-6; cf. De Div. II.1.
20 T.D. V.121, and cf I.111 and Att. 12.14.3.
21 See e.g. T.D. I.111 and De Div. II.3 (the latter about his Consolatio - "quae mihi quidem ipsi sane
aliquantum medetur."
22 E.g. T.D., De Sen., De Am. In others, such as De Nat. Deorum and De Div., it may be that Cicero
deliberately distorts the views of the various schools represented by the speakers in order "to expose
the weaknesses in the ways that the philosophers have dealt with theological questions." (Colish p.110.)
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2. The Evidence
A. Somnium Scipionis
None of the three reasons which Cicero gave for writing the later philosophica applied
to the De Republica. Composed in the years 54 - 51, at a time when he was heavily
involved in law and politics (though "cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus" was
overstating it),23 he had no leisure to occupy, there was no need of consolation, and he
was not systematically engaged in transplanting Greek philosophy to Roman soil.24
And although it might be thought ironic that an eminent statesman should envisage a
special place in heaven for eminent statesmen,25 it would be difficult to argue that the
Somnium Scipionis provides a window into Cicero's soul.
Certainly there is nothing systematic about the Somnium. It is not a treatise on death
and immortality. Its status is similar to that of Plato's eschatological myths (it is
clearly modelled on the myth of Er), and like them it raises the question of what
relation it is intended to bear to reality. After all, it is presented as a dream. It would
obviously be a mistake therefore to treat it as a systematic and exhaustive account of
the afterlife.26 Its function seems to be to indicate that the reward of the eminent
23 De Div. II.3.
24 Cf. Douglas, 1995, p.197: "Nor can everything that Cicero says in the prefaces be taken at face
value. In particular, in the preface to De Divinatione 2, he implicitly treats the whole of his mature
theoretical writings so far completed as forming a coherent programme of works essentially similar in
character and intention. Despite this encouragement from the author himself to regard the whole
corpus as all of a piece, it has long been recognised that only error and confusion can result from
treating the writings of the late 50s as precisely the same in intention, treatment of sources, and the
state of Cicero’s knowledge of various matters, as the later series."
25 De Rep. VI.13. (But cf. Boyancé, 1936, p.140: "Le Songe ne fait pas autre chose qu'appliquer au
moment de la récompense suprême cette même manière d'envisager l'idéal de la vie politique . . .Son
homme d'État garde encore quelque chose du philosophe platonicien.")
26 Cf. Büchner, whose article criticises theories of separate sources behind the Somnium by
emphasising the thematic links between it and the preceding books of the De Republica. The Somnium
is not an independent entity (as the manuscript tradition might suggest), it is a culminating poetic
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statesman will be commensurate to the otherworldliness of his motives. Or as
Macrobius puts it, "illa esse stabiliora et viridiora praemiorum genera, quae ipse
vidisset in caelo, bonis rerum publicarum servata rectoribus." 27
There are certainly several themes in the Somnium which are repeated or developed in
the later philosophica:28 for example, the argument from motion,29 the divinity of the
soul,30 the separation of soul from body as a training for death,31 the image of the
body as the prison of the soul,32 and the notion that the final release of soul from body
must not be anticipated without divine permission.33 But the chief importance of the
Somnium Scipionis in the context of Cicero’s approach to immortality is that it is
evidence for his interest in the idea of an afterlife - to put it no more strongly34 - many
years before his bereavement.
fiction which symbolises the theme of the whole work, the supreme importance of virtus of the Roman
statesman. E.g. p.79: "Die Ewigkeit nach dem Tode in glücklichem Leben sieht wie ein Symbol für
eine irdische Wirklichkeit aus, das im Traum verdichtet, was die grosse virtus erspürt, ersehnt, in sich
erfährt, nämlich den Zusammenhang der objektiven selbstlosen grossen bewussten Tat mit
zeitüberlegener Ewigkeit."
27 SS I.4.2-3.
28 See Boyancé, 1936, p.121, Note 1 for a list of parallels between the Somnium Scipionis and the
Tusculans.
29 De Rep. VI.27, cf. T.D. I.53f For some of the flaws in this argument, see Powell, 1990, p.165.
30 De Rep. VI.26, cf. T.D. I.65f.
31 De Rep. VI.29, cf. T.D. I.74f. But the verb uses in the Somnium is exerceo, and what is envisaged is
the virtus involved in the "curae de salute patriae."
32 De Rep. VI.15. Colish (pp. 94f.) argues that while Cicero in the Somnium is certainly not
presenting a Stoic eschatology, he does nevertheless succeed "in imbuing this common doctrine with a
Stoic aura." But the notion of the body as prison of the soul is scarcely compatible with Stoicism (as
Colish herself points out - at p.133 - in connection with the De Senectute) and the two immortals in the
dream appear to have escaped from the Stoic cycle of conflagrations.
33 De Rep. VI.15. Though as an illustration of the same principle in the Tusculans (T.D. I.74) Cato’s
suicide - subsequent of course to the De Republica - is regarded as legitimate. This implies that Cicero
regarded Cato's moral / political predicament as equivalent to divine permission - and indeed the
inference must be that Cato himself thought so, if as Seneca says (Ep.Mor. XXIV.6) he read the
Phaedo before committing suicide.
34 Cf. Büchner (p. 25), who endorses the view that "Cicero sicher nicht in einem buchstäblichen Sinne
an die Unsterblichkeit der Seele geglaubt hat. Es ist ein Traum." But this seems to slide from "not
necessarily" to "necessarily not". It may be a mistake to read into the Somnium Cicero's belief in
immortality: it does not follow that he had no such belief.
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B. Consolatio and the Letters
Cicero’s daughter Tullia was born in 76. She married three times: she was widowed
while still in her teens, the second marriage ended in divorce, and she was in the
process of divorcing her third husband, the dissolute Dolabella, when she died. Her
first child by Dolabella died in infancy; the second was born in January 45, a few
weeks before her death - and the child itself was dead by the summer.
The letters reveal an extraordinary attachment to this daughter whom he still referred
to in her twenties as "Tulliolam, quae nobis nostra vita dulcior est."35 After
Pompey’s defeat he writes from Brindisium that his Tullia has joined him and extols
his exceptional daughter's virtus, humanitas and pietas.36 Three weeks later, in the
context of the arrangements for her divorce, she is not just exceptional, she is
unique.37
And in a letter written after her death in response to bracing condolences from his
friend Sulpicius Rufus, he apologises for and at the same time justifies his grief.38 He
points out that the examples of fortitude in bereavement cited by Sulpicius Rufus had
the consolation of honourable standing in public life: and when Cicero was deprived
of that he still had the domestic consolation provided by his daughter.39 But now that
has been removed, leaving him doubly stricken.
35 Fam. XIV.7.1.
36 Att. 11.17 (12/13 June 47).
37 Att. 11.25.3: "ego huius miserrimae facilitate confectus conflictor. nihil umquam <si>mile natum
puto."
38 Fam. IV.6.
39 Fam. IV.6.2: "habebam quo confugerem, ubi conquiescerem, cuius in sermone et suavitate omnis
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And he was indeed overwhelmed by grief.40 Tullia died in his villa at Tusculum in
mid-February 45, and he went straight to Atticus’s house in Rome, where he lived for
three weeks and read everything ever written on the alleviation of mourning.41 He
then moved to his villa at Astura, and from then to the end of August (except for two
breaks in April and July when he was again staying with Atticus) he wrote a letter to
his friend almost every single day. And he wrote other things. In fact he wrote all
day long,42 and went on writing for a year and a half, a constant stream of
philosophical works.
The Consolatio seems to have been completed in draft form by the 8 March. In the
same letter in which he describes himself as writing all day long, he says that he has
done something unprecedented in consoling himself through writing.43 (Though he
adds: "sed omnem consolationem vincit dolor.")
What manner of work was this which was written in the three weeks following the
death of his beloved daughter?44 Only a few quotations from it survive, as well as
several references to it in other works by Cicero. In De Divinatione, where he lists
and summarises all the philosophica, he says: "Nam quid ego de Consolatione
dicam? quae mihi quidem ipsi sane aliquantum medetur, ceteris item multum illam
curas doloresque deponerem."
40 Carcopino (p.278) is sceptical: "Il l’étale [sa grande douleur] dans les lettres avec une jactance qui
choque notre sensibilité et ferait douter de la sienne." (Carcopino’s two-volume work is a sustained
stream of invective worthy of Cicero himself. Even the chapter headings are venomous: "un avocat
qui coûte cher... un magistrat qui s’enrichit... un mari trop interessé... un père trop indifférent... un
beau-père trop accomodant... une vanité maladive... fanfaronnades et couardise... malice et fourberie.")
41 Att. 12.14.3: "de maerore minuendo scriptum."
42 Ibid.: "totos dies scribo."
43 Ibid.: "quin etiam feci, quod profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolarer. quem
librum ad te mittam, si descripserint librarii. adfirmo tibi nullam consolationem esse talem."
44 According to Carcopino (pp.286ff) it was simply an exercise in self-inflation: “Sous prétexte
d’amortir et de bercer sa détresse, il l’a rapetissée à la taille d’un exercice d’école, et il l’a profanée en
l’abaissant au niveau de sa vanité littéraire…Avec un empressement fébrile, il saisit la déplorable
occasion d’y [le ‘genre’ de la consolation] exceller comme dans les autres.”
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profuturam puto."45 And he refers to it in a letter to Atticus of 15 March 45 as his
treatise on the alleviation of mourning.46
In that same letter he asks Atticus to check some facts for him, relating to whether
certain historical figures had survived the death of their children, which indicates that
the Consolatio consisted at least in part of examples of fortitude in the face of
bereavement. This is confirmed by a reference in the Tusculans47 where he says that
in his Consolatio he found it helpful to recount the examples of those who had been
able to bear the accidents of fortune, i.e. in the context, bereavement. Other
references in the Tusculans describe the Consolatio as bringing together every
conceivable method of alleviating mourning and grief.48 And one cure apparently
was to contrast the sorrows of this life with the life to come.49 The only quotation
from the Consolatio in the Tusculans is on that theme - the divinity of the soul.50
But there is another quotation from the Consolatio in Lactantius which is more
personal and which introduces what is a dominant theme in Cicero’s correspondence
with Atticus during the months following Tullia’s death - his determination to honour
the memory of his beloved daughter by erecting some sort of shrine for her.51
45 De Div. II.3.
46 "librum de luctu minuendo" - Att. 12.20.2.
47 T.D. IV. 63.
48 Ibid. III.76.
49 Ibid. I.76: "M. Quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus; nam haec quidem vita mors est, quam
lamentari possem, si liberet. A. Satis tu quidem in Consolatione es lamentatus, quam cum lego, nihil
malo quam has res relinquere."
50 Ibid. I.66: ". . . Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi, seiuncta ab his usitatis
notisque naturis. Ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vivit, quod viget, caeleste et
divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. . ." And for very similar language cf. De Rep.
VI.26: "Deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet . . "
51 Lactantius, Inst. Div. I.15.19-20: "'cum uero,' inquit, 'et mares et feminas complures ex hominibus
in deorum numero esse uideamus et eorum in urbibus atque agris augustissima delubra ueneremur,
adsentiamur eorum sapientiae quorum ingeniis et inuentis omnem uitam legibus et institutis excultam
constitutamque habemus. quodsi ullam umquam animal consecrandum fuit, illud profecto fuit. si
Cadmi progenies aut Amphitryonis aut Tyndari in caelum tollenda fama fuit, huic idem honos certe
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The fanum for Tullia is first mentioned in a letter dated 11 March 45, but already it is
"that" fanum.52 He wants Atticus’s approval, but his mind is made up, indeed he
considers himself irrevocably bound.53 The only thing he is uncertain about is the
site, and it is for this that he requires the services of Atticus. There are two
considerations: it must remain effectively consecrated ground ("quasi consecratum")
through any future changes of ownership, and it must be sufficiently in the public eye
("celebre").54 A suburban property or small estate (hortus) would fit the bill, but time
is of the essence: "ita tamen ut hac aestate fanum absolutum sit."55 By the 16 March
Astura itself and Arpinum have been rejected, and on the 18 March he is thinking of
Drusus’ place, or Lamia’s or Silius’.56 Money is no object, in the sense that he is
determined to find something suitable and he no longer cares about plate or fabrics -
this is what he wants now.57
Atticus, clearly disapproving of the whole idea,58 cleverly suggests that the fanum
might combine with an evggh,rama, a retirement pad.59 At first Cicero dismisses this:
"alia magis quaero." But a week later he has come round: the important point is the
fanum, but he admits he does need somewhere for himself - Atticus may call it what
dicandus est. quod quidem faciam teque omnium optimam doctissimam approbantibus diis
immortalibus ipsis in eorum coetu locatam ad opinionem omnium mortalium consecrabo.'"
52 "de fano illo dico."
53 Att. 12.18.1: "ego, quantum his temporibus tam eruditis fieri potuerit, profecto illam consecrabo
omni genere monimentorum ab omnium ingeniis sumptorum et Graecorum et Latinorum. [Which
presumably means that there is an embarrassment of riches to choose from.] quae res fortisan sit
refricatura vulnus meum. sed iam quasi voto quodam et promisso me teneri puto, longumque illud
tempus cum non ero magis me movet quam hoc exiguum, quod mihi tamen nimium longum videtur."
54 Att. 12.19.1 (14 March).
55 Ibid.
56 Att. 12.22.3.
57 Att. 12.23.3: "hoc opus est."
58 See e.g. Att. 12.43.2 (12 May): "res indicat quanto opere id cupiam, cum tibi audeam confiteri
quem id non ita valde probare arbitrer". Cf. Carcopino’s gloss (p.281): "Imperturbable, Atticus
collectionne les instructions contradictoires, et s’abstient d’en exécuter aucune. Il a mesuré le gouffre
que creuserait cette mégalomanie."
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he pleases.60
And from then on till mid-July, there are constant references to the fanum, and to a
growing list of candidates. Some turn out not to be for sale, some are too small, some
are too little frequented. But his enthusiasm for the idea, far from diminishing,
becomes more and more urgent. 5 May: "loco valde opus est."61 11 May: "avide
sum adfectus de fano."62 14 May: "intemperans sum in eius rei cupiditate quam
nosti."63 23 May: "cuius rei cupiditas"64 29 May: "urge, insta, perfice."65
References to possible sites continue until 9 July, when Cicero discovers that the
latest candidate, the Scapula estate, will be affected by Caesar’s plans to expand
Rome.66 "That seems," says Shackleton Bailey, "to have put an end to the whole
fanum project. . .As for horti, Cicero’s acquisition shortly afterwards of some near
Puteoli as part of his inheritance from the banker Cluvius may have consoled him for
the disappointment of his earlier plans."67 He expands this slightly in the biography:
"A year later a casual reference to money ‘put aside for that fane’ shows that it never
materialised. Cicero’s hankering for a suburban residence may have been diverted by
his acquisition in August of a handsome property on the outskirts of Puteoli under the
will of a wealthy banker."68
59 Att. 12.25.2, and see Shackleton Bailey, 1966, Appendix III.
60 Att. 12.29.2 (25 March): "De hortis, quaeso, explica. caput illud est quod scis. sequitur ut etiam
mihi ipsi quiddam opus sit; nec enim esse in turba possum nec a vobis abesse. . . vel tu illud evggh,rama,
quem ad modum scripsisti, vel evnta,fion putato."
61 Att. 12.37a.
62 Att. 12.41.2.
63 Att. 12.26.1.
64 Att. 13.1.2.
65 Att. 13.32.1.
66 Att. 13.33a.1.
67 Shackleton Bailey, 1966, p.411.
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But Cicero’s "hankering" was not for a suburban residence: that had been Atticus’
idea. And it seems improbable69 that such eagerness and urgency should have been
kept up for so many months, and then suddenly and permanently abandoned. It seems
even more improbable when two other factors are considered. The first is that in
several letters Cicero writes that he feels himself bound by a vow,70 or by a feeling of
duty,71 or that it is a debt he owes and that he cannot find relief until he has paid it.72
The second is that he had already gone public, as it were, by referring to the matter in
the Consolatio: "quod quidem faciam."73 It is difficult to imagine that someone who
cared as much as Cicero did about what people thought would have allowed himself
in these circumstances to drop the whole matter.
There is a possible solution. Perhaps the estate at Puteoli which Cicero inherited from
the banker Cluvius fulfilled the role not just of an evggh,rama, as Shackleton Bailey
suggests, but of the fanum itself. The Puteoli estate is first referred to on 11 August,74
only a month after the Scapula property had fallen through, which would certainly
account for there being no further mention of the fanum in the correspondence75 - all
the previous references after all had been in the form of requests that Atticus should
identify or negotiate for possible sites. Moreover, Cicero’s existing villas had all been
68 Shackleton Bailey, 1971, p.210.
69 Though not to Carcopino (p.282): "Ainsi les jardins s’en allèrent rejoindre le bois aux oubliettes, et
l’on chercherait vainement désormais dans la suite de la Correspondance une allusion au dessein que
Cicéron s’époumonnait à vanter depuis quatre mois. Son enthusiasme s’est éteint aussi vite qu’il s’était
allumé et les raisons qui l’ont refroidi ne sont pas plus reluisantes que celles qui l’avaient fait naître."
70 Att. 12.18.1
71 Att. 12.23.3: "levatio quaedam est, si minus doloris at offici debiti."
72 Att. 12.38a.2: "hoc mihi debere videor neque levari posse nisi solvero aut videro me posse
solvere..." And cf. Att. 12.41.4 (11 May): "nisi hac aestate absolutum erit,...scelere me liberatum non
putabo."
73 Lactantius, Inst. Div. I.15
74 Att. 13.45.
75 Except for what Shackleton Bailey (1971, p.210) calls "the casual reference to money 'put aside for
that fane'" (Att. 15.15: "id ego ad illud fanum sepositum putabam.") This need not show that the
fanum "never materialised", but simply that Cicero thought the money put aside for it was still
available to him - which is consistent with the Puteoli hypothesis.
106
considered at one time or another (Astura, Arpinum, Tusculum), but had been rejected
as not sufficiently celebre - which would not apply to Puteoli. And there is no doubt
that he kept and used the house at Puteoli - Caesar visited him there at the end of the
year.76
But whether or not what Shackleton Bailey calls "the bizarre gesture of the fane"77
and Carcopino "l’orgeuilleuse idée"78 was ever anything more than a gesture or an
idea, what was its rationale? In the letter of 11 March which first makes mention of it,
he says that he has found it recommended by several of the authors he has been
reading.79 Presumably these authors are those who write "de maerore minuendo",80
and presumably they recommend a fanum as a way of lessening grief. And clearly
Cicero hopes that it will have that effect.81 The question is why it should have this
effect. It is certainly not a kind of psychological need for a conspicuous tomb or
monument which is involved.82 Indeed he explicitly excludes that. On 2 May he
says that he has discovered, what had never occurred to him, that there is a fine or tax
payable on monimenta: but it is not the fine which worries him,83 it is the thought of a
monument rather than a shrine84 - only the latter is appropriate in the context of
76 Att. 13.52.
77 Shackleton Bailey, 1971, p.215.
78 Carcopino, p.278.
79 Att. 12.18.1: "etenim habeo non nullos ex iis quos nunc lectito auctores qui dicant fieri id oportere
quod saepe tecum egi et quod a te approbari volo: de fano illo dico."
80 And whom he had been reading in Atticus’ house - see Att. 12.14.3.
81 Att. 12.37 (5 May): "quod me a maestitia <a>vocas, multum levaris si locum fano dederis." Cf.
13.1 (23 May).
82 Although for Carcopino (p.283) the desire for a conspicuous fanum is psychologically revealing:
"Le Temple de Tullia, l’imagination de Cicéron ne l’avait jamais dressé qu’en hommage a lui-même.
Il fallait qu’il fût somptueux pour témoigner avec éclat de l’intensité de sa douleur et de la noblesse de
ses sentiments au regard de la postérité sur laquelle il tient les yeux fixés."
83 It is of course according to Carcopino (p.285): "…il avoue [ in Att.12,35] sans ambages que la
construction d’un sanctuaire, non seulement lui permettra d’élever sa fille jusqu’au Ciel, mais le
prémunira lui-même contre le versement au trésor public des sommes égales aux dépassements de la
limite que les lois somptuaires avaient assignée au luxe des monuments funéraires."
84 Att. 12.35: "quod non magno opere moveret, nisi nescio quo modo, avlo,gwj fortasse, nollem illud
ullo nomine nisi fani appellari."
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avpoqe,wsij.85
vApoqe,wsij is the key idea, and it is this which dictates what is a suitable site:86 it
must therefore be celebre,87 it must have timh, 88 its religio must be enduring and
therefore it must be in agro rather than part of a house.89 He does not elaborate
anywhere in the letters on what precisely he means by avpoqe,wsij90 - presumably he
has discussed this with Atticus in the flesh,91 and of course Atticus had read the
Consolatio92 which we know from Lactantius referred to the fanum. It seems to have
little to do with the deification of heroes,93 or statesmen,94 or philosophers,95 or human
beings as such.96 The quotation in Lactantius ("teque . . approbantibus diis
immortalibus ipsis in eorum coetu locatam ad opinionem omnium mortalium
consecrabo") implies something rather different. It implies a devotional cult, both
private and public, centred on a beloved person whose uniqueness can only be
expressed in terms of avpoqe,wsij. This lacked precedent apparently in the Roman
world97 (which is perhaps why he appeals to the many - presumably Greek - authors
who recommend it, and why Atticus was a reluctant aider and abettor.) But rather
than dismiss the very idea as "a bizarre gesture" which was forgotten within six
85 Att. 12.36.1: "Fanum fieri volo, neque hoc mihi <dis>suaderi potest. sepulcri similitudinem
effugere non tamen propter poenam legis studeo quam ut maxime adsequar avpoqe,wsin)"
86 Att. 12.12.1: "insula Arpinas habere potest germanam avpoqe,wsin,sed vereor ne minorem timh,n
habere videatur evkto,pismoj) est igitur animus in hortis."
87 Att. 12.19.1.
88 Att. 12.12.1.
89 Att. 12.36.1.
90 But see Att. 12.37a: "multa mihi eivj a,poqe,wsin in mentem veniunt, sed loco valde opus est." This
seems to imply that the concept was still forming in his mind - see Boyancé, 1944, pp.179-184.
91 See Att. 12.18.1.
92 See Att. 12.14. And see Boyancé (1936, p.143-146) for a discussion of the background to
hellenistic avpoqe,wsij)
93 See e.g. De Leg. II.19, De Nat. Deorum II.62, T.D. I.28.
94 De Rep. VI.13.
95 Ibid. VI.18.
96 Ibid. VI.26. See Büchner (pp. 73-81) for a discussion of the background to these ideas in the
Somnium..
97 See Boyancé, 1944, pp.179-184.
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months of Tullia's death, the whole episode should be taken as evidence of at least a
presumption in Cicero’s mind in favour of some sort of afterlife.
Cicero returned to his villa at Tusculum, where Tullia had died, on 17 May 45.98
"From this point on," says Shackleton Bailey, "the bereavement is seldom
mentioned."99 In the letters perhaps. But later that summer he wrote the Tusculan
Disputations, which may be said to have been entirely inspired by his bereavement.100
C. Tusculanae Disputationes
In the list of his philosophica in De Divinatione, Cicero summarised the Tusculan
Disputations as consisting of five volumes which together contain the ingredients for
the happy life: the contempt of death, the endurance of pain, the alleviation of distress
(the worst disorder of the soul), the alleviation of the remaining disorders, and the
sufficiency of virtue.101 It is the first and third which have most to say about death
and immortality.
(a) Book I. 1-25
98 Att. 12.45.
99 Shackleton Bailey, 1971, p.215. And cf. Lactantius, Inst.Div.I.15,21: "…fortasse dicat aliquis
prae nimio luctu delirasse Ciceronem. Atqui…haec ipsa sententia nullum praefert indicium doloris;
neque enim puto illum tam varie, tam copiose, tam ornate scribere potuisse, nisi luctum eius et ratio
ipsa et consolatio amicorum et temporis longitudo mitigasset."
100 See e.g. S.A. White, p.226: "The entire work is in effect a sustained consolatio composed in the
aftermath of grave personal loss." MacKendrick, p.164: "It is to relieve his grief at Tullia’s death that
he marshals all his hopes about immortality in Book I: the pain, anxiety and irrational emotions for
which he prescribes therapy in the middle three books are his own…" Douglas, 1995, p.214: "In the
Tusculans we see the physician of the soul trying to heal himself."
101 De Div. II.I.2 "res ad beate vivendum maxime necessarias aperuerunt. Primus enim est de
contemnenda morte, secundus de tolerando dolore, de aegritudine lenienda tertius, quartus de reliquis
animi perturbationibus, quintus eum locum complexus est, qui totam philosophiam maxime illustrat;
docet enim ad beate vivendum virtutem se ipsa esse contentam." Cf. M.Schofield (p.103) who thinks
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As the preface indicates, the discussions purport to have taken place at Cicero’s villa
in Tusculum on five successive afternoons. They take the form of "Socratic"
debates.102 The interlocutor begins the proceedings each afternoon by proposing a
topic. On the first day it is: "Malum mihi videtur esse mors."103
There is an immediate skirmish which is intended to clear the ground conceptually.
M. (presumably Cicero) forces A. (the interlocutor)104 to admit that he does not
subscribe to superstitious ideas about the horrors of the underworld ("poetarum et
pictorum portenta"); that if the dead are not in an underworld they are nowhere; that
if they are nowhere they do not exist; and that if they do not exist they cannot be
wretched (miseri).
A. then suggests that it is wretched for us, the living, to know that we have to die (the
difference from the previous stance is captured in the aphorism of Epicharmus:
"Emori nolo, sed me esse mortuum nihil aestimo.")105 M. has no difficulty in
disposing of this: if, as A. has admitted, there is no evil after death since the dead do
not exist, then having to die is not an evil either since it merely involves entering a
condition which is admittedly not evil. And he declares that he has bigger fish to fry
("maiora molior"): to prove that "non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse
mortem."106
In order to do that, it is necessary first of all to examine what death means, and there
that the structure of the preface to De Div.II indicates the central status of the Tusculans.
102 I.8 “fiebat autem ita ut, cum is qui audire vellet dixisset, quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra
dicerem."
103 I.9.
104 The symbols M and A were added later in the tradition and are not included in Pohlenz's text. They
have been retained here for convenience.
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follows a doxography. Death is either the separation of soul from body, or the
simultaneous annihilation of both; if the first, the soul is either immediately dispersed
or it survives; if it survives, it does so either temporarily or permanently. There are
also various theories about the nature and location of the soul: that it is part of the
body, or inhabits a particular part of the body, or that it is breath, or fire, or an
accumulation of atoms, or some kind of harmony, or - as Aristotle thinks - it is
composed of a special fifth “element”.107 But none of those theories conflict with the
proposition that "mors aut malum non sit aut sit bonum potius":108 if the soul is
identified with some part of the body it will perish with the body, and if it is breath or
fire it will vanish or be extinguished - in any case there will be no sensation after
death; and if it is neither corpus nor anima nor ignis, then there is the hope that when
it separates from the body it will find its home in heaven.109
When A. rejoices at this possibility and asks to be persuaded of its reality, M. refers
him to the Phaedo - which A. says is of no great help: while he is reading it he feels
convinced, but as soon as he puts it down he finds his conviction evaporating.110 M.
then drives him into a corner and forces him to agree that if the soul survives death it
is happy and if it perishes it is not wretched; and therefore, since death either makes
us happy or frees us from wretchedness, it cannot be said to be an evil.111
105 I.15.
106 I.16.
107 I.22.
108 I.23.
109 I.24.
110 Ibid.
111 I.25: “M. Quid? hoc dasne aut manere animos post mortem aut morte ipsa interire? A. Do vero.
M. Quid, si maneant? A. Beatos esse concedo. M. Sin intereant? A. Non esse miseros, quoniam ne
sint quidem: iam istuc coacti a te paulo ante concessimus. M. Quo modo igitur aut cur mortem malum
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Objection
There is some confusion here. A. agrees that if the soul survives it is beatus, and that
if it does not survive it is non miser since as M. has forced him to admit previously it
has no existence. But what A. was forced to admit previously was that the dead tout
court do not exist anywhere, since apart from the underworld, which is dismissed as
superstition, there is nowhere for them to exist. And on that basis A. had to agree that
the dead are not wretched.112 At that stage in the argument there were only two
categories, the living and the dead, and since the latter had no existence, and therefore
no sensation, there was nothing to worry about.
What has happened by I.25, however, is that there are now three categories in play:
the living, the dead considered as body and soul perishing together, and the dead
considered as surviving souls. In other words, the category of mortui now allows of
the possibility of existence (not in an underworld but in heaven.) The reason for A.’s
admission in I.25 that the souls which perish are not wretched is that ex hypothesi
they have no existence,113 but that ought logically to apply also to the souls which
survive, since the original hypothesis was that all the dead have no existence.
The point is of course that by what looks like sleight-of-hand Cicero has excluded the
possibility of there being any unpleasant sensation after death. A. is bullied into
accepting that death is not an evil because the dead have no existence and therefore no
sensation at all (logically, that is, they can be neither miseri nor beati.) And then the
possibility is introduced that death may involve the continued existence of the soul,
tibi videri dicis? quae aut beatos nos efficiet animis manentibus aut non miseros sensu carentis?"
112 I.14: "Age, iam concedo non esse miseros, qui mortui sint, quoniam extorsisti, ut faterer, qui
omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse.”
113 "Non esse miseros, quoniam ne sint quidem."
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and it is asserted without argument that if this is the case then the soul will be
beatus.114 If A. had had his wits about him at I.25, he would have replied either:
"How can the soul be beatus, since ex hypothesi when it is dead it can have no
existence and therefore no sensation?" or: "If the soul does exist and have sensation
after death, why should it not be miser?" And if he had been allowed to start all over
again he might have said at the beginning: "I think that death may be an evil because
the dead, if their souls survive and have sensation, may be wretched." Cicero’s only
rejoinder then apparently would be: "If souls survive death they are beati." To which
the reply would be: "How do you know?"
And the upshot is that Cicero has not in fact succeeded even in the lesser aim of
removing the fear of death as something wretched. It is all very well to dismiss the
mythology of the underworld, the abode of the miseri, as mere superstition, but why is
heaven, the abode of the beati, in principle any different?115 (At I.98, ironically, he
cites with approval the passage in Plato’s Apology where Socrates looks forward to
meeting Minos and Rhadamanthus in another place, whereas at 1:20 he has
mockingly asked A. whether he really believes that he will appear in the underworld
before Minos and Rhadamanthus.)116
But although it involves sleight-of-hand, it may be simple wishful thinking that has
induced Cicero to refuse to consider that tertium datur. At the end of Book I he says
114 Cf. Gigon, p.463: "Bezeichnenderweise wird das Nachleben der Seele hier [I:25] ausschliesslich als
ein Aufstieg zur Glückseligkeit in der Himmelsregion verstanden; von einem Nachleben in Unseligkeit
ist nicht die Rede."
115 cf. Gigon. p.460: "Sachlich ist es bezeichnend, dass die Möglichkeit eines Aufenthaltsorts der
Toten unterhalb der Erdoberfläche strikte verneint wird, die Möglichkeit eines Aufenthalts in der
Himmelshöhe dagegen bestehen bleibt."
116 Cf. Kleijwegt, p.360: "Eine Widerlegung dieser Seite der platonische Jenseitslehre in ihrem
mythischen Kleid gibt Cicero nicht; er kann sie auch nicht geben, weil damit die Autorität Platons
geschwächt und die ganze These der persönlichen Unsterblichkeit der Seele gefährdet wäre."
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that the thought of the loved one suffering after death is what makes bereavement
most painful, so that the exclusion of that possibility is the principal source of
consolation - and his principal aim.117
(b) Book I. 26-76
A. then asks M. to show if he can that souls do survive death, and if he cannot, to
prove that death is free from any evil (since although he has conceded that it entails an
absence of sensation, he still thinks that the prospect of being without sensation is an
evil). M.’s reply accordingly falls into two parts: I. 26-76 is devoted to establishing
that the soul is immortal, and I. 77-112 to maintaining that even on the assumption
that the soul is not immortal, "mors tamen non sit in malis."118
The argument in the first part begins with the unanimous belief of all the races of the
world that gods exist and that death is not annihilation; such a belief amounts to a lex
naturae,119 and is further evidenced by the universal human concern for the future of
society and civilization, and by the willingness of so many illustrious men to sacrifice
their lives for the state.120
But while we are informed by nature that souls are immortal, it is by reason that we
learn where and what they are.121 Superstitions concerning the underworld (for
117 I.111: "illa suspicio intolerabili dolore cruciat, si opinamur eos quibus orbati sumus esse cum
aliquo sensu in is malis quibus volgo opinantur. hanc excutere opinionem mihimet volui radicitus. . ."
Cf. Kleijwegt, p.360: "In seinem Trostbedürfnis hat er also die Lehre Platons in diesem Punkte nur
einseitig übernommen; seine Zuversicht auf richtiger Lebensführung war wohl nicht unerschütterlich
genug um die Bestrafung im Jenseits zu erwähnen, nicht einmal als erschreckende Möglichkeit."
118 I.77.
119 I.30.
120 I.32: “nemo umquam sine magna spe inmortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem."
121 Pohlenz (p.64) paraphrases: "Den Glauben an die Unsterblichkeit hat die natürliche Anschauung
richtig bewahrt. Dagegen stellten sich bei den konkreten Vorstellungen über die Art des Fortlebens
Irrtümer ein...Deshalb war die Kritik der volkstümlichen Anschauungen durch die Philosophie nötig."
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example, Homer’s entire ne,kuia) arise before or without the exercise of reason, simply
because of the custom of burying bodies under the ground.122 The absurd notion that
phantoms (imagines) can speak in the absence of tongue, palate, throat, lungs, derives
from an incapacity for abstract thought.123
What reason - in the shape of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and Panaetius - teaches us is
that the soul, whatever it consists of, is carried upwards when it leaves the body,124
and that having passed from our atmosphere and penetrated into the higher regions it
finds its natural home.125 And there, in the contemplation of the heavenly spectacula,
and of the spectaculum of the earth itself, all the longings it felt when it was in the
body will at last be satisfied.126 Because why should the belief of Pythagoras and
Plato in the immortality of the soul not be correct? Those who disagree with them do
so because they are unable to envisage a soul without a body (whereas, says M., it is
probably more difficult to envisage the soul within the body.)127 But the argument
from motion, contained in the Phaedrus128 and quoted in full in the Somnium
Scipionis129 and again here, is proof of its eternity.130 Furthermore, memory - not just
the Platonic theory of recollection, but the faculty of memory in itself - together with
the power of discovery (inventio) are proof of the divinity of the soul,131 as the
Consolatio had already argued.132 It is therefore unnecessary to inquire about the
122 I.37.
123 I.38.
124 I.40: "cum e corpore excesserint, sive illi sint animales, id est spirabiles, sive ignei, sublime ferri."
Cf. Gigon, pp.424f.: "Beachtenswert, dass noch einmal eine Alternative offen gelassen wird: nicht nur
gibt es den Aufstieg, mag die Seele aus Luft oder Feuer sein, sondern auch, mag sie sich nach einer
Weile zerstreuen oder dauerhaft beisammen bleiben."
125 I.43.
126 I.44 and 47.
127 I.49-50.
128 Phaedrus 245C-246A.
129 De Rep. VI.27.
130 T.D. I.55: "ex quo efficitur aeternitas."
131 I.65.
132 I.66.
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appearance or location of the soul: just as we can infer the existence of god from the
stupendous works of creation, so the divinity of the soul can be inferred from these
various attributes.133
M. then turns to the Phaedo and to the two paths which souls, according to
Socrates,134 may take when they depart from the body: one, a road apart, for those
whose lives have been polluted by vice; the other, an easy home-coming, for those
who have kept themselves from bodily pleasures.135 "Tota enim philosophorum vita,
ut ait idem, commentatio mortis est."136 And there follows an eloquent paragraph on
what this commentatio mortis entails.137
This part of Book I concludes with M. inclining to think that, so far from death being
an evil, everything apart from death is an evil for human beings - "si quidem vel di
ipsi vel cum dis futuri sumus."138
Objections
(i) The argument at I.32 in support of the immortality of the soul ("nemo umquam
sine magna spe inmortalitatis se pro patria offerret ad mortem") is somewhat
weakened by the fact that precisely the same argument is used in the second part of
133 I.70: "sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique pulcritudine virtutis vim
divinam mentis agnoscito."
134 Phaedo 81A-E.
135 T.D. I.72.
136 I.74.
137 I.75: “nam quid aliud agimus, cum a voluptate, id est a corpore, cum a re familiari, quae est
ministra et famula corporis, cum a re publica, cum a negotio omni sevocamus animum, quid, inquam,
tum agimus nisi animum ad se ipsum advocamus, secum esse cogimus maximeque a corpore
abducimus? secernere autem a corpore animum, nec quicquam aliud, est mori discere. quare hoc
commentemur, mihi crede, disiungamusque nos a corporibus, id est consuescamus mori."
138 I.76.
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Book I in support of the proposition that death is not to be feared even if there is no
immortality: "quotiens non modo ductores nostri, sed universi etiam exercitus ad non
dubiam mortem concurrerunt! quae quidem si timeretur, non Lucius Brutus . . .in
proelio concidisset. . ."139
(ii) The quotation from the Phaedo, "tota enim philosophorum vita commentatio
mortis est,"140 raises two questions. The first is whether Cicero really means what he
says when he endorses this Platonic teaching and gives, as an example of the sort of
thing we must separate ourselves from, political affairs (res publica) of all things.141
Has the philosopher really supplanted the virtuous statesman of the Somnium
Scipionis? This much, however, is clear, that Cicero endorses a life-denying
interpretation of the practice of death.
The second question, apropos virtue, is whether this reference to the Phaedo is not
rather out of place in the context. M. (Cicero) is demonstrating the immortality of the
soul, and up to this point all his arguments - the lex naturae, the essence of the soul,
its eternity, its divinity - have been presented as objectively valid, in the sense that the
soul per se is immortal and divine and therefore all souls are immortal and divine.
There has been no mention of virtue, except once, incidentally, as one of the things
beside memoria and inventio by which the divinity of the soul may be recognised.142
That is the only use of the word in the whole of the first part of Book I,143 yet it is the
central concept in each of the remaining books: dolor in Book II, aegritudo in Book
139 I.89. Douglas (1985, p.108) attempts to dilute the inconsistency by suggesting that Cicero "is more
concerned with the fact of belief in immortality than the strength of the arguments for it."
140 T.D. I.74. (It is in fact, although it purports to be a quotation - "ut ait idem" - a kind of composite
summary extracted from Phaedo 64A, 67D, 67E and 80E.)
141 T.D. I.75.
142 I.70.
117
III, the other perturbationes in Book IV, are all subservient to and overcome by
virtue, and Book V establishes that virtue by itself is sufficient "ad beate vivendum".
Virtue plays no real role in Book I because the task there is to remove the fear of
death by teaching indifference to it,144 and that is achieved by simply presenting two
alternatives: either death is extinction, or the soul is immortal and happy. There is
nothing, until this reference to the Phaedo, to suggest that the happiness of the
immortal soul is conditional on any particular kind of behaviour during this life.145
And indeed, given that the underworld and its punishments have been ridiculed as
superstitious bugbears,146 Cicero has left himself no room for any such condition.147
This may explain why, even when he does cite the Phaedo, he ignores all references
to the punishment of the wicked in Tartarus:148 the worst that can happen according
to M. is that those who have not separated the soul from the body during this life will
when they die advance more slowly,149 and that for the souls of the wicked there will
be a road apart - apart from the company of the gods.150
143 And it only appears at I.91, 95, and 109 in the second part - see below.
144 See the summary of Book I in De Div. II.1 ("de contemnanda morte"), and T.D. II.2 ("ex ea
disputatione . . .magna videbatur mortis effecta contemptio" etc.)
145 Except perhaps I.27 and 45. Gigon (p.468) remarks on I.45 ("praecipue vero fruentur ea, qui tum
etiam, cum has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant."):
"Damit wird wie schon in I.27 angetönt, dass die jenseitige Seligkeit der Seele nicht von selbst zuteil
wird, sondern durch entsprechendes Verhalten im Diesseits erworben werden muss." But this is very
tenuous. In I.27, only famous men and women are envisaged as entering heaven while the rest are kept
underground; but famous is not the same as virtuous, and the context there is primitive belief. And
I.45 ascribes to the philosopher (in rather the same way as the Somnium Scipionis does to the eminent
statesman) a special ranking in heaven, but says nothing about excluding others.
146 T.D. I.10, 48.
147 Kassel (pp.38f) makes the same point rather differently. The standpoint of the Consolatio
generally, he says, and of Book I of the Tusculans in particular, is essentially incompatible with the
spirit of the Phaedo: the difference is between a fearless and unconditional striving after truth in the
latter and mere wishful thinking in the former. It is a difference encapsulated in the contrast between
A's "errare mehercule malo cum Platone..." (T.D. I.39) and Socrates' u`mei/j me,ntoi( a'n evmoi. pei,qhsqe(
smikro.n fronti,santej Swkra,touj( th/j de. avlhqei,aj polu. ma/llon))) (Phaedo 91 B-C.)
148 Phaedo 113-4.
149 T.D. I.75: "tardius ingrediuntur."
150 I.72: "is devium quoddam iter esse, seclusum a concilio deorum."
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(c) Book I: 77 - 119
M. now turns to the task of showing that death is not an evil even on the assumption
that the soul is mortal. And when A. says that he will insist in any case on clinging to
the idea of immortality M. applauds him but cautions that it is better not to be
overconfident in anything, since we are liable to be swayed by clever arguments even
in straightforward matters, and in the present case there is "aliqua obscuritas".151 But
then, as if unable himself to turn away from the idea of immortality, he proceeds to
discount the Stoic theory of a limited survival of the soul, and to refute the twin
arguments of Panaetius that souls are born and therefore perish, and that they are
susceptible of pain and sickness and therefore perish.
Having done that he pulls himself together, as it were, and gets down to the task:
"spero fore ut contingat id nobis [sc. in caelum migrare]. sed fac, ut isti volunt,
animos non remanere post mortem: video nos, si ita sit, privari spe beatioris vitae;
mali vero quid adfert ista sententia?"152 None at all, is the answer, because then
there will be no sensation after death.
What is painful is the thought that death means a departure from all the good things of
life. But in fact, as the Consolatio showed, life is more wretched than good, so that
death really takes us away from evils.153 He will not go so far as Hegesias, whose
pessimism induced several of his audience to commit suicide, but his own situation
151 I.78.
152 I.82.
153 Cf. Pohlenz, p.102: "Der Nachwies, dass das Leben ein Jammertal sei, war Gemeinplatz der
Trostschriften - cf. I.113-117."
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provides him with a good example: if he had died before his present troubles had
manifested themselves, death would have removed him from evil rather than from
good.154 Other examples of the same principle are Priam before the siege of Troy and
Pompey in his prime. But even if it were admitted that the dead are deprived of good
things, they cannot be said to feel the need of (carere) these good things since they
have no sensation at all. Death is therefore not an evil to be feared, any more than is
sleep, "imaginem mortis".155
As for the notion that it is wretched to die before one’s time, such absurdities are to be
dismissed like old wives’ tales156 because there is no such thing as "one’s time". Life
is like a loan made to us by nature, without any fixed date for repayment, and she can
recall it whenever she pleases.157 And in any case, longevity is a relative concept:
Aristotle’s bestiolae in the Pontus live only for a day, but compared with eternity our
lifespan is like theirs. Rather than pay any attention to such ineptiae, we should
concentrate entirely on the practice of virtue.158 We should take as our models the
deaths of Theramenes159 and Socrates, whose final speech in Plato's Apology is then
given.
There follow some Spartan examples of scorn of death, which leads rather abruptly to
a survey of funerary customs: M.’s advice is that because the bodies of the dead have
no consciousness, and whatever is done concerns only the living, the whole subject of
154 I.84: "Qui et domesticis et forensibus solaciis ornamentisque privati certe si ante occidissemus,
mors nos a malis, non a bonis abstraxisset."
155 I.87-92
156 I.93: "pellantur ergo istae ineptiae paene aniles."
157 I.93.
158 I.95.
159 I.97: “Quis hanc maximi animi aequitatem in ipsa morte laudaret, si mortem malum iudicaret?"
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funerals "est contemnendus in nobis, non neglegendus in nostris."160 And the final
"argument" is that the surest way of facing death on the assumption that it involves
extinction is to have lived a life of perfect virtue - like Cicero himself, for example. 161
The epilogue to Book I162 quotes the judgement of the immortal gods on death - that it
is the greatest gift they can bestow on man - and sums up the whole argument: the
fear of death must simply evaporate before the Socratic alternatives.163
Objections
(i) M.’s answer to the objection that death deprives us of the good things of life,
is that in fact it deprives us of evil.164 For example, in his own case, if he had died
before being robbed of the consolations of family life and the distinctions of a public
career, death would have deprived him of (future) evil rather than of (present) good.165
But the objection to this answer is that it has no relevance where death occurs before
the consolations of family life and the distinctions of a public career have been
experienced at all. And such distinctions can hardly be insignificant if they are
considered to be the ultimate consolation in the face of annihilating death when all
other arguments fail to convince.166 What if Pompey had died before he had become
the Great? What about Tullia?
160 I.108.
161 I.109.
162 I.112-119.
163 I.117: "Quae cum ita sint, magna tamen eloquentia est utendum atque ita velut superiore e loco
contionandum, ut homines mortem vel optare incipiant vel certe timere desistant? nam si supremus ille
dies non extinctionem, sed commutationem adfert loci, quid optabilius? sin autem perimit ac delet
omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitae laboribus obdormiscere et ita coniventem somno consopiri
sempiterno?"
164 I.83.
165 Cf. Pohlenz , p.103: "Kann doch selbst über den, der im höchsten Glücke ist, in der nächsten
Stunde das Unheil hereinbrechen, so dass ihn der Tod wenn auch nicht gegenwärtigen, so doch
künftigen Übeln entrückt."
166 I.109.
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Yet when he claims that nature owes us nothing and that she can call in the loan of
life whenever she pleases, he immediately contradicts himself by saying that a death
in cunis is more to be lamented than the death of an older child (contrary to the
received wisdom) because nature has called in her gift with greater cruelty
("acerbius"): the child had at least begun to taste the sweetness of life ("vitae
suavitatem"), the infant had not.167
In other words he appears to have in mind an optimum age for death (after the vitae
suavitas has been tasted and fame and glory have been acquired,168 but before
anything goes wrong),169 and yet he derides the notion of untimely death as an old
wives' tale.170
(ii) The second significant appearance in Book I171 of the word virtus is scarcely
more suited to its context than the first was. It was out of place in the first part
because the whole thrust of the argument there was that the soul is unconditionally
immortal, divine and happy. And it is out of place in the second part because the
argument here is based on the assumption that death means the annihilation of all
sensation. Virtue can only have any relevance therefore in the sense of fortitude in
facing death - which is presumably the lesson Cicero intends us to learn from
Theramenes and Socrates. But in the case of Theramenes, the question "Quis hanc
167 I.93. Or as Dougan puts it (p.121): "half a loaf is better than no bread." But cf. De Amicitia 10,
where it seems to be asserted that Cato’s fortitude was greater because his son died not in boyhood but
in the prime of life.
168 I.109.
169 I.84.
170 I.93.
171 I.95.
122
maximi animi aequitatem in ipsa morte laudaret, si mortem malum iudicaret?"172 is
confused: it is only if we do judge death to be an evil that calmness of spirit in facing
it deserves to be applauded.173 And Socrates is rather an unconvincing example of
fortitude in the context of death viewed as extinction,174 first because in the Apology
he presents the alternative immortality of the soul as at least equally possible; and
second because in the Phaedo (which Cicero has already appealed to in the previous
argument) he states unequivocally that the soul is immortal.
(iii) The "Socratic" approach to the disposal of dead bodies175 (which of course
would apply whether the soul is considered to be mortal or immortal) raises again the
question of the fanum. Here he says: "quantum autem consuetudini famaeque
dandum sit, id curent vivi, sed ita, ut intellegant nihil ad mortuos pertinere."176 And
he derides the self-deception of Thyestes in thinking that the dead find peace in the
grave (sepulcrum) and that it would be a cruel fate to be deprived of a tomb: he
blames Thyestes’ father for not having taught him "quatenus esset quidque
curandum."177 This may suggest that by now Cicero has, as it were, come to his
senses and realises how "bizarre" a gesture the fanum actually was. But that would be
to forget his insistence to Atticus that what he wanted was not a sepulcrum or a
monimentum but a fanum, whose function was not to house the remains of the body
but in some way to mark the deification of the soul.178
172 I.97.
173 See Dougan, p.126: "Camerarius rightly objected to this reasoning - 'Immo vero quis laudaret
magno opere illam animi aequitatem, si mortem bonum iudicaret? Nam virtus elucescit in adversis,
gravibus calamitosisque casibus, non spectatur rebus prosperis et in molli vita.'"
174 Cf. Gigon, p.431: "Das eigentliche Problem: wie man sich zum Tode verhält, wenn dieser einen
Übergang ins Nichtsein bedeutet, ist beinahe vergessen."
175 I.102-9.
176 I.109.
177 I.107.
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(d) Book III
The argument in Book II (the shortest book of the Tusculans) is straightforward. A.
asserts that "Dolorem existimo maxumum malorum omnium",179 but immediately
concedes that it is a lesser evil than disgrace (dedecus). This means that pain can be
overcome by virtue, specifically by fortitude, fortitude being man’s peculiar virtue
since virtus is taken to be derived from vir.180 The only task therefore is to become a
vir fortis by mastering yourself ("reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes").181
But Book III deals with a different kind of pain, and it is not at all straightforward.
Arguments are repeated, or resumed, or left incomplete, and the central concept is
defined in slightly different ways half-a-dozen times. There is nothing to be gained
by following this confusion in the order in which it appears,182 so the analysis will be
thematic.
A.’s opening assertion is: "Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo",183 and the
purpose of Book III accordingly is to refute this. Aegritudo is said to be one of the
four disorders (perturbationes) of the soul. (The others - laetitia gestiens, libido and
metus - are examined in Book IV.) It is described as the soul’s equivalent of physical
178 Att. 12.36.1.
179 II.14.
180 II.43.
181 II.47.
182 For a summary of the argument in Book III see S.A. White, pp.226ff. And cf. Philippson, who
attempts to disentangle the oscillation in Book III between demonstrating that the wise man does not
suffer from aegritudo and treating therapeutically those who do. But Philippson's analysis is
preliminary to a highly elaborate reconstruction of Cicero's source.
183 III.7.
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pain,184 and it is defined for the first time at III.25 as "aegritudo est opinio magni mali
praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum videatur esse angi, id
autem est, ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere."
Aegritudo is the most damaging of the four perturbationes:185 it is "taetra, misera,
detestabilis."186 And while there are several forms of aegritudo (seven are listed at
III.81 and a further fourteen at III.84 and IV.16), the most serious is that caused by
mourning - luctus (or maeror).187 Essentially, therefore, the task in Book III is to
show that the wise man is not susceptible to luctus. It is a task which is easily
accomplished in a general sense, by the argument that all perturbationes (which
include aegritudo, which includes luctus) are a kind of disease (morbus)188 or
unsoundness of mind (animi insania).189 Those who suffer from perturbationes are
non sani.190 Obviously the wise man is sanus. Ergo the wise man is free from
perturbationes and therefore from aegritudo and therefore from luctus.
But this kind of Stoic argumentation, says M., although it is correct, requires a good
deal of amplification,191 because there are those who claim that aegritudo (specifically
luctus) is in fact natural - sent by nature - and that it is perfectly natural and therefore
not unsound or unwise or wrong to experience it. For example, Crantor is no admirer
of insensibility (indolentia); the Peripatetics countenance moderate states of disorders
of the soul; and for Epicurus the effects of aegritudo are natural, i.e. inevitable.
184 III.23.
185 III.27: "nam cum omnis perturbatio miseria est, tum carnificina est aegritudo." It involves
"tabem cruciatum adflictationem foeditatem, lacerat exest animum planeque conficit."
186 III.25.
187 III.68: "huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est."
188 III.7.
189 III.8.
190 III.10: "ita fit ut sapientia sanitas sit animi, insipientia autem quasi insanitas quaedam."
191 III.22.
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Crantor’s argument is quoted at III.12 and answered at III.71, that of the Peripatetics
at III.22 and III.74 respectively; Epicurus is answered almost immediately. Except
that in no case is "answered" quite the right word. Certainly the remedy for
aegritudo proposed by Epicurus - "bona cogitare, oblivisci malorum"192 - gives
Cicero an opportunity to exercise his sarcasm. In the first place, says M.,
concealment and forgetfulness are not within our control; and second, since by bona
Epicurus means voluptates, what this amounts to is offering our relatives caviar when
they are prostrate with grief,193 or soothing Andromache’s distress by tucking her up
in bed.194
But M.’s "reply" to Epicurus and Crantor and the Peripatetics really takes the form of
a series of re-definitions of his own position, which is that aegritudo far from being
natural involves unsoundness of mind;195 that it is an idea (opinio)196 of an instant
and pressing great evil ("magni praesentis atque urgentis mali");197 that it is a
conviction (iudicium)198 which is voluntary199 and against reason;200 and that it is felt
to be a matter of duty.201
The proofs of the various elements in these definitions are as scattered as everything
else in Book III. That aegritudo is opinio is shown by the example of men like Q.
Maximus and M. Cato (and many others collected in the Consolatio) who accepted
192 III.35.
193 III.43.
194 III.46.
195 III.10.
196 III.24.
197 III.61.
198 Ibid.
199 III.80 and 64.
200 III.24.
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their sons’ death with tranquillity because they considered luctus and maeror to be
unmanly and degrading and aegritudo something to be spurned. "Ex quo intellegitur
non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem."202
That it is a matter of voluntas and iudicium is shown by the fact that grief can be kept
at bay or put aside, either through fear, or through reason indicating that it is useless
(frustra): if it is possible to set it aside, it is possible to refrain from it in the first
place.203
That there is an element of perceived duty or obligation involved is shown by the guilt
which is felt by people who are in mourning when they find themselves momentarily
more cheerful,204 or by the indignation levelled at those who accept the deaths of
relatives calmly205 (although those who face their own death calmly are applauded.)206
"quae nemo probaret, nisi insitum illud in animis haberemus, omnis bonos interitu
suorum quam gravissime maerere oportere."207
All these elements are present in a final comprehensive definition at III.82: "sed ad
eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod
inanis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed
opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri
oportere."
201 III.74. (A view associated particularly with Chrysippus - see T.D. III.76.)
202 III.71.
203 III.66.
204 III.64.
205 III.63.
206 III.72.
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In the course of developing his definition, Cicero introduces two other themes. He
rejects the Cyrenaic view that unexpectedness is the principal cause of aegritudo but
he agrees that this can greatly increase it, and that foresight and anticipation are
therefore valuable weapons against it.208 Indeed anticipation produces much the same
effect on the wise man as lapse of time does on others: the former is protected by
reason, the latter are cured by nature. Yet even in the case of the latter it is reflection
which is crucial.209
Then there are the various remarks here and there throughout Book III on the strategy
of consolatio. The purpose must be to remove aegritudo altogether, or to halt it, or
diminish it, or divert it. But there are different theories on how this should be done:
by asserting that the evil involved is non-existent, or not serious, or was not
unexpected; or by the distraction of “pleasure”; or by attacking the idea that
mourning is a duty;210 or by giving examples of people who have endured the same
loss with tranquillity.211 (Cicero says that he threw all these methods into his
Consolatio, "erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio.")212
Yet not all of them are equally effective: different people respond in different ways to
different treatments. Reminding a bereaved father that his child was only mortal is
unlikely to bring much comfort.213 Nor is it always salutary to say "non tibi hoc
soli."214 And it is difficult to prove to someone that he is mourning out of a sense of
207 III.63.
208 III.30: In the words of Terence, let the wise man "Pericla, damna peregre rediens semper secum
cogitet, / Aut fili peccatum aut uxoris mortem aut morbum filiae."
209 III.74: "Cogitatio igitur diuturna nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas."
210 III.76.
211 III.58,70.
212 III.76.
213 III.55: (although M. seems to be ambivalent about this since he adds: "neque tamen genus id
orationis in consolando non valet, sed id haud sciam an plurimum."
214 III.79.
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duty.215
And finally there is this method of consoling oneself: "acta aetas honeste ac
splendide tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat
aegritudo aut perleviter pungat animi dolor."216
Objections
(i) Cicero never attempts to refute those who say that luctus is natural and
inevitable. Epicurus is sidestepped by ridiculing his remedies; the rejoinder to
Crantor is that we must be manly and courageous;217 and the Peripatetic "mean" is
dismissed on the basis that even a moderate evil is evil.218 But of course that is the
very thing in dispute: whether it is an evil. And Cicero’s own argument, that
aegritudo is an evil, proceeds from the assumption that it is so. Perturbationes are
defined as morbi,219 and those who suffer from them as non sani; the wise man
therefore, being sanus, does not suffer from perturbationes, and therefore cannot be
susceptible to luctus. Given that starting point, he is forced to reject any suggestion
that luctus is in any way defensible.
(ii) This refusal or inability to see luctus as natural and proper, means for example
that he sees it as inconsistent to applaud a man who meets his own death tranquilly
and to censure a man who meets the death of his child tranquilly.220 In other words
having to deny that aegritudo is natural leads to some apparently very unnatural
215 Ibid.
216 III.61.
217 III.13.
218 III.22.
219 III.9.
220 III.72, and cf. III.67. And cf. Seneca, Ep. Mor. XXX.3: "Hoc facit Bassus noster et eo animo
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results - for example that the wise man does not feel compassion.221
(iii) The method of consolation which points to those like Cato who have met the
death of children tranquilly, is based on a fallacy. Their tranquillity is not evidence
that they did not feel grief, nor even that they considered luctus unmanly and
degrading.222 It is simply evidence that they considered the outward forms of luctus
unmanly and degrading. In fact it is difficult to see how any examples could be
produced of the absence of internal grief.223 And in any case Cato himself must be an
example of someone who did feel grief, since if he had experienced no grief there
would have been nothing manly about his conduct.224 He may be a very good
example of a man who conceals his sorrow,225 but Cicero’s argument is not that the
wise man conceals his sorrow, but that he does not feel it in the first place.226
(iv) But the most striking thing about that wise man is how singularly he diverges
from the Cicero of only a few months before. Of course Cicero admits this: "non
enim sapientes eramus,"227 and "erat . . . in tumore animus."228 But it does put rather
vultuque finem suum spectat quo alienum spectare nimis securi putares."
221 III.20: "Etenim si sapiens in aegritudinem incidere posset, posset etiam in misericordiam." Cf.
Kassel, p.52.
222 III.71.
223 This incidentally is the reason why it is impossible to answer the question "Did the ancients care
when their children died?" (the title of an article by Golden) except on the basis of psychological
probability. L. Stone's theory (pp.651f.) of a correlation between demography and emotion ("The
omnipresence of death coloured affective relations at all levels of society, by reducing the amount of
emotional capital available for prudent investment in any single individual, especially in such
ephemeral creatures as infants") is less than convincing when it is applied to ancient Rome, because if
it were true then the constant appeal to examples of stoical fortitude in facing the death of children
would be unintelligible.
224 Cicero acknowledges this himself in De Senectute 84, where he has Cato say: "quem ego meum
casum fortiter ferre visus sum, non quo aequo animo ferrem . . ."
225 Cf. De Amicitia 9, where the manner of Cato’s bearing the death of his son is presented as a proof
of his wisdom: "Aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo
modo, ut alia omittam, mortem fili tulit!"
226 III.80: ". . .nec id putet esse rectum, se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil
esse possit."
227 IV.63.
228 III.76.
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a question mark against the lessons which Book III purports to teach. When M. at the
start of Book II laments the fact that so few philosophers practise what they preach, A.
asks what then is the use of philosophy? M.’s answer is that just as fields must be
cultivated in order to be productive, so philosophy is the cultivation of the soul.229
But Cicero tells us that he has been devoted to philosophy all his life. It sounds
therefore as if he is in the position of Dionysius of Heraclea who, after spending many
years with Zeno in the study of philosophy, was driven by an attack of kidney pain to
assert what Zeno had denied, that pain is evil.230 Presumably if Dionysius after
recovering from his attack had written a book denying that pain is an evil, it would
not have been well-received.
As for Cicero’s claim that those who have lived honourable and brilliant lives (among
whom he certainly counted himself) are immune to distress, or suffer a pinprick at
most,231 four words written in March 45 are enough to demolish it: "omnem
consolationem vincit dolor."232 Yet the Cicero of that letter is much more real and
sympathetic than the inhuman wise man of Book III.233 The question is, what induced
him to make an ideal of the latter?
The special consolatio which lies in the knowledge that the dead are not only non
miseri but actually beati, is conspicuously absent from Book III of the Tusculans,
which is devoted to how the wise man deals with another’s death, or to the luctus
which the wise man does not feel - and cannot feel without ceasing to be a wise man.
229 II.13.
230 II.60: "cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore dedoctus est."
231 III.61: "aut non attingat aegritudo aut perleviter pungat animi dolor."
232 Att.12.14.3.
233 cf De Amicitia 48: "Si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo
exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur . . ."
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That it is absent is curious, given that the whole of the first part of Book I argues the
case for the immortality of the soul. And in fact Book III omits even to mention the
consolation of knowing that if the soul is mortal the dead are nevertheless non miseri.
One might have thought, after the message of Book I, that Book III was largely
superfluous: what greater consolation could there be than in knowing that the dead are
either happy or not unhappy? But strictly speaking Book III is not really supposed to
be about consolatio at all:234 it is about luctus, the most tormenting of the
aegritudines, and its stated object is to demonstrate that the wise man is impervious to
luctus, not to console those who in fact experience it.235 And the argument used is
based entirely on an extreme Stoic view of the manliness of virtue, or the virtue of
manliness, and the impossibility of the wise man being assailed by any disorder of the
soul.
What makes Book III stand out as harsh and unnatural, is not only its contrast with the
pathos of the real-life luctus related in the letters to Atticus, but its contrast with the
De Amicitia, where the same Stoic principles in the context of friendship are rejected
with disgust as inhuman and as incompatible with virtue properly understood.236
It is conceivable that Cicero was driven to the stance represented in Book III by a
reaction to the way he had dealt with his own bereavement.237 The repeated allusions
in Book III to the role played in mourning by a sense of duty echo several passages in
234 Even though Cicero himself in De Div. II.1 describes it as "de aegritudine lenienda."
235 cf. S.A. White, p.226: "The question at issue in Tusculans 3 is whether the wise are immune to all
suffering (3.7). It would have been enough, therefore, for Cicero to defend the Stoic paradox that a
sage never suffers." Cf. Kassel, p.19: "In dem Nachweis, dass der Weise, wie von der aegritudo (Buch
III), so überhaupt von jedem Affekt (Buch IV) durchaus frei ist, hat die Therapie des Nichtweisen
eigentlich kein Platz..."
236 See below.
237 Cf. Phillipson, who argues (p.276) that Cicero rearranged his source to give prominence to luctus as
a result of his own bereavement and his consequent familiarity with the consolationes.
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the letters.238 And the many references to the fortitude with which the old Romans
met the death of children suggest an embarrassment at his own weakness.239 The De
Amicitia would then represent a reaction against the reaction, a return to a more
balanced and humane approach. Bereavement after all is notoriously liable to upset
the judgement, and it would not be surprising if in the dozen works composed in the
eighteen months following Tullia’s death there should have been swings between
different moods and different philosophical positions.
D. De Senectute
Written probably within six months of the Tusculans, the Cato Maior repeats the main
themes of Book I, presented now not as theses to be defended but as the mature
conclusions of an aged man. That they are to be taken as Cicero’s own conclusions is
expressly stated at the end of the preface to Atticus.240
The work takes the form of Cato's rejoinders to the four reasons for thinking old age
unhappy: that it brings the end of active pursuits, of bodily strength and of most
physical pleasures, and that death is close at hand.241 And it is the fourth -
238 e.g. Att.12.14.3: "idque faciens interdum mihi peccare videor"; Att.12.23.3 [the fanum project]:
"levatio quaedam est, si minus doloris at offici debiti"; Att.12.28.2: "maerorem minui, dolorem nec
potui nec si possem vellem."
239 See the inferences in the letters that Atticus is trying to get him to behave more robustly, e.g.
Att.12.20.1: "quod me hortaris idque a ceteris desiderari scribis ut dissimulem me tam graviter
dolere." Indeed a mere six months before Tullia's death Cicero had written a very Roman letter of
"consolation" (Fam. V.16) to one Titius, who had lost two sons, pointing out that as far as the latter
were concerned they were much better off out of it, given the political climate, and as far as Titius was
concerned, his duty as a man was to maintain his dignity and to anticipate the healing effect of time by
the use of reason.
240 De Senectute 3: “Iam enim ipsius Catonis sermo explicabit nostram omnem de senectute
sententiam."
241 Ibid. 15.
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appropinquatio mortis - which seems to be the most cogent.242 But on the contrary,
even in that respect Cato finds old age not only "non molesta, sed etiam iucunda".243
On purely rational grounds (that is to say, on the grounds of the Socratic alternatives)
death should hold no fears.244 And even more categorically than in the Tusculans, any
other possibility is excluded.245
But as well as these considerations there is the authority of the great philosophers,
principally Pythagoras and Plato, for accepting the immortality of the soul. And Cato
is convinced.246 He believes that those who have died are still living, and living the
only life deserving of the name.247 He looks forward to seeing his old friends, and the
great men he has read about, and especially his son,248 in language which recalls the
description of Tullia in that letter to Atticus as "nihil umquam simile natum puto".249
It is impossible not to feel that this passage reflects and records Cicero’s own
experience.250
242 Ibid. 66.
243 Ibid. 85.
244 Ibid. 66: "Quae aut plane neglegenda est, si omnino exstinguit animum, aut etiam optanda, si
aliquo eum deducit ubi sit futurus aeternus."
245 Ibid.66-67: "atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. Quid igitur timeam si aut non miser post
mortem aut beatus etiam futurus sum?" Powell (1988, p.239 ) compares T.D. I.82 at this point
("quoniam nihil tertium est") and remarks: "No attempt is made to show that eternal life is necessarily
pleasant." This is certainly true of both the De Senectute and the Tusculans, but "quoniam nihil tertium
est" at T.D .I.82 actually means that there is no third thing apart from the body and the soul, not that
there is no third alternative to immortal happiness and extinction.
246 Ibid. 78: "sic persuasi mihi, sic sentio."
247 Ibid. 77.
248 Ibid. 84: "O praeclarum diem, cum in illud divinum animorum concilium coetumque proficiscar
cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros de quibus ante
dixi, verum ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior; cuius a me
corpus est crematum, quod contra decuit ab illo meum, animus vero, non me deserens sed respectans,
in ea profecto loca discessit quo mihi ipse cernebat esse veniendum; quem ego meum casum fortiter
ferre visus sum, non quo aequo animo ferrem, sed me ipse consolabar existimans non longinquum inter
nos digressum et discessum fore."
249 Att. 11.25.3.
250 Cf Pohlenz (p.32), for whom this passage indicates "wie sehr ihn [Cicero] der Glaube an die
Unsterblichkeit, an ein Wiedersehen mit der geliebten Tullia lockt." Powell (1988, p.265) is more
prosaic: "Cicero was no doubt again thinking of his own loss of Tullia."
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E. De Amicitia
At the beginning of the dialogue, the young Scaevola supposes that Laelius had borne
with composure ("moderate") the death of his dear friend Scipio Africanus, but that
he could not have been unmoved by it since that would have been inconsistent with
his humanitas.251 Laelius agrees that indeed he was moved, but he found great
consolation in two considerations: first that no ill ("nihil mali") had befallen Scipio (a
common error that causes great anguish);252 and second that he does not accept that
death involves annihilation: he believes (as Scipio did himself)253 in the immortality
of the soul. But if the truth is otherwise and the soul is mortal, there is no sensation
after death and so "certe nihil mali".254
And then at 45-48 there is a remarkable passage in which the Stoic view that intimate
friendships should be avoided because they deprive the soul of freedom from care
(securitas), is firmly rejected.255 And the suggestion that friendship should be based
on expediency (utilitas)256 rather than affection is scorned.257 This securitas is in fact
to be shunned, even if doing so does entail distress of mind - to that the wise man is
prone.258 Virtue does not presuppose a heart of iron.259
251 De Amicitia 8.
252 Ibid. 10.
253 A reference to the Somnium Scipionis.
254 Ibid. 14.
255 Cf. Colish, p.135: "The conclusion that Laelius arrives at in De Amicitia is that the Stoic
formulation of friendship is acceptable in part, but only if one substitutes a more realistic conception of
human nature and of virtue for the uncompromising rationalism of the Stoa."
256 Ibid. 51.
257 Ibid. 47: "O praeclaram sapientiam!"
258 Ibid. 48: " . . .si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam
humanitatem arbitramur . . ."
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The passage is remarkable of course because it conflicts so obviously with the
description of the wise man in Book III of the Tusculans.260
3. Summing-up
(a) Immortality
The alternatives proposed by Socrates in the Apology (either the soul is immortal or
death involves annihilation) form a kind of leitmotif running throughout Cicero’s
writings. Some of the letters261 seem to foresee annihilation, others (relating to the
fanum) imply immortality; the Consolatio asserts that the soul is divine, but also that
death is to be welcomed not as leading to a better life but as removing us from a
wretched life; Book I of the Tusculans is structured around the two alternatives,
arguing the case first for one and then for the other; the De Senectute and the De
Amicitia both come down in favour of immortality, but both include the absence of
sensation as a fall-back position or consolation prize.262 Of the philosophica only the
Somnium Scipionis asserts one alternative without the other, which of course was
unavoidable: the immortal Scipio Africanus could hardly postulate universal
annihilation on death.
This constant tendency on Cicero’s part to put the case for immortality as duoi/n
259 Ibid. 48.
260 And cf. T.D. V.42: "securitatem autem nunc appello vacuitatem aegritudinis, in qua vita beata
posita est."
261 See below.
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qa,teron has made difference of opinion more or less inevitable on which of the two he
himself actually subscribed to. There are three possibilities: Cicero accepted or
inclined to the case for immortality; he accepted or inclined to the case for
annihilation; or he suspended judgement. In the light of the evidence, is it possible to
say which of these is true?
The first question arising is why Cicero asserts that death is duoi/n qa,teron: for
example, why he structures the first Book of the Tusculans around these two
alternatives, when he also, within the same Book, endorses the view expressed in the
Phaedo. Because of course the Phaedo envisages an afterlife involving bliss and an
afterlife involving punishment or purification, so that together the Phaedo and the
Apology present three alternatives, the good, the bad and the indifferent. That Cicero
ignored and implicitly excluded the bad, and relied on there being only the good and
the indifferent, may indicate a proclivity towards a benign interpretation of death - an
impression which is strengthened by the brushing aside of the interlocutor’s doubts
and fears at the beginning of Book I and the rather too hasty conclusion that the dead
are non miseri.
Indeed the very fact that Book I achieves its explicit aim of removing the fear of death
simply by setting out the objective status of the dead is indicative of this. While the
other four books insist on the necessity (and sufficiency) of virtue in enabling the wise
man to withstand the apparent evils of human existence (the various perturbationes
animi), in Book I virtue is superfluous. In none of the passages referring to the
immortality of the soul is there any real suggestion of an ethical dimension. Plato is
262 Cf. also Pro Sestio XXI.47 and Fam. V.16.4.
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the principal authority, but what he says about the fate of the wicked (or of non-
philosophers) is scarcely ever mentioned, and when it is the worst that can happen is
that their journey to heaven will be retarded. And the absence of an ethical dimension
makes the second alternative impregnable: the dead are either beati or non miseri,
and death is simply explained away on the basis of objectively acquired information.
There is no place for virtue and no need for wisdom. Whereas if Cicero had given
equal weight to the third alternative - death followed by the punishment or
purification of the immortal soul, with the consequence that the only way in which to
be free from the fear of death and therefore capable of living the beata vita is the way
of virtue - Book I would have fitted much more satisfactorily into the scheme of the
whole work. This seems to imply that he really did think that there were only two
alternatives.
And when the relative weight given to each of these alternatives in Book I is
considered, it becomes clear where his own preference lay. As Pohlenz says, Cicero
"zeigt im ersten Teile nicht nur, dass die Seele im Falle ihres Fortlebens glücklich sei,
sondern beweist die Unsterblichkeit selbst und verwirft ausdrücklich die
entgegengesetzte Anschauung (am schärfsten 48.9)."263 The treatment of the
annihilation alternative in the second half of the book is then correspondingly half-
hearted, since it is provided only in case the proof in the first part has failed to
convince. The result is that the force of the first part is weakened by the simple fact
of there being a second part. Pohlenz concludes from this that Cicero must have had a
source264 for the first part by a philosopher, “der von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele
263 Pohlenz, p.28.
264 It will be obvious that no attempt has been made in the above analysis "to stir the turbid waters of
Quellenforschung." (Colish, p.78.) As Boyancé says in relation to the Somnium Scipionis (1936, p.9) it
is important to distinguish two things: "l'originalité du penseur et celle de l'écrivain...Notre première
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überzeugt war und nur diese erweisen wollte,” and that Cicero then provided the
second part.265 But a much more plausible and economical explanation for the
imbalance which Pohlenz has correctly266 diagnosed, is that Cicero himself was
convinced of the immortality of the soul.
That inference can then be tested against the De Senectute and the De Amicitia. In
each of these the acceptance of the immortality alternative is even more clearly
expressed (and in the former Cato is explicitly said to be Cicero’s mouthpiece), while
in each case there is a perfectly good contextual reason for stating the other
alternative. In the De Senectute Cato is refuting the suggestion that the proximity of
death makes old age unhappy, and he does this more thoroughly by covering the
whole range (as he sees it) of possibilities. In the De Amicitia Laelius is explaining
to his young interlocutors where consolation in bereavement is to be found: he
himself believes in the immortality of the soul, but even if they do not accept that,
there is nihil mali in death.
But if the suggestion that Cicero leaned towards a benign interpretation of death has
ripened into a presumption that he leaned towards the immortality of the soul, is such
tâche sera pour montrer la vanité de cette recherche, pour établir que, si aucune idée du Songe ne doit
sa naissance à Cicéron, Cicéron est bien pourtant l'auteur véritable de son oeuvre et non on ne sait quel
fantôme, sous la dictée de qui on voudrait qu'il eût écrit." On the question of sources behind the
Tusculans, see Douglas (1995, p.203, note 11): "J.M.Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977),
despite occasional notes of caution, writes (p.97) 'at this point [Tusculans I:17] an essay on Death, by
whomsoever composed, is inserted in the text' and refers [p.101] to 'the authority behind Tusculans I,'
basing his argument on 'Cicero’s known methods of composition', presumably the mere 'scissors-and-
paste' taken for granted by earlier generations and still treated more seriously than it deserves, if
somewhat sceptically, by Bringmann. . . His survey of conflicting views is apt comment on Dillon’s 'by
whomsoever'. Scholars could so rarely agree on the precise identity of Cicero’s sources because their
question was wrongly formulated." Philippson's article is a good example of the complexity of the
Quellenforschung involved, and of the self-confidence of those conducting it.
265 Pohlenz, p.28.
266 Gigon (p.430) disagrees: "Wir finden hier [the second part of Book I] in grösstem Stile diesselbe
 wie vorhin. Selbst in der Hauptfrage nach Sterblichkeit oder Unsterblichkeit der Seele will sich
Cicero nicht endgültig festlegen. Dogmatische Strenge ist diesen Buche völlig fern."
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a presumption rebutted by the allegedly unequivocal assertions in the correspondence
that death brings annihilation?267 These are the sole instances in Cicero’s writings
where only one of the two alternatives is presented (apart from the Somnium Scipionis
where only one alternative can be presented.) They are of course to be weighed
against the passages in the letters to Atticus relating to the fanum, but do these two
categories simply cancel each other out? Or do the references to annihilation suggest
that the fanum project was an empty gesture? Or does the fanum project truly reflect
Cicero’s thinking on the question of immortality?
André,268 taking his cue from Carcopino’s mockery of that "orgueilleuse idée,"269
stresses the significance of Cicero’s letter to Toranius counselling resignation -
"praesertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum".270 How could these words have
been written at the same time as Cicero was planning his daughter’s apotheosis? Or
putting it the other way round, how are Cicero’s plans for the apotheosis of his
daughter to be taken seriously when he could write these words at the same time?
There are two possible responses. The first is that proximity in date is not the only
consideration in comparing letters: more important is the recipient. It is interesting
that none of the letters which refer to death as annihilation is addressed to Atticus, and
all the letters which refer to the fanum are addressed to Atticus. As Laurand puts it:
“Évidemment, il en [des idées religieuses] parle peu et ses correspondents, joyeux
épicuriens ou politiques désabusés, ne goûteraient guère cette prédication.”271 The
second is that it is not clear that the words "praesertim cum omnium rerum mors sit
extremum" do in fact imply annihilation. They certainly imply the end of anxiety
267 Fam. 5.21.4; 6.4.4; 6.21.1.
268 p.12.
269 Carcopino, p.278.
270 Fam. 6.21.1.
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about the state of the Republic, which is the context in the letter to Toranius, but do
they necessarily conflict with an expectation of the soul’s immortality? As Laurand
says about the remark in Att.12.18 ("Longumque illud tempus, cum non ero, magis me
movet quam hoc exiguum"): "N’oublions pas cependant que les croyants disent encore
aujourd’hui: 'Il n’est plus,' sans pour cela mettre en doute l’immortalité de l’âme."272
The same considerations may apply to the other references to annihilation in the
letters. To put present adversity in perspective by the reminder that death will involve
the absence of all sensation,273 or the end of all pain,274 is not incompatible with a
belief in immortality. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a maxim of the law, not
of logic or psychology. The Socratic alternatives represent a maximum and a
minimum expectation, and if Cicero can make his point in these letters by supposing
the minimum, why mention the maximum?275
The fanum project itself, on the other hand, is not to be so scornfully dismissed as
Carcopino and Shackleton Bailey would have it. Invective apart, Carcopino’s
argument is that Cicero suddenly dropped the whole idea after talking about nothing
else for four months, and that he did so because he realised how costly it would be:
"On est admis à soutenir que Cicéron, s’il a tiré de son orgeuil autant que son chagrin
ses projets de sanctuaire à la divinité de Tullia, les a sacrifiés à une avarice plus
271 Laurand, p.355.
272 Ibid. p.354.
273 Fam. V.21.4: "ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debe<b>amus propterea quod nullum
sensum esset habitura."
274 Fam. VI.4.4: "praesertim cum id impendeat in quo non modo dolor nullus verum finis etiam
doloris futurus sit."
275 But cf. André, p.11: "C'est surtout dans le domaine des convictions transterrestres que la pensée de
l'orateur-philosophe peut paraître flottante...Les lettres Fam.,5,16 et 5,21 sont dominées par le doute et
le dilemme..."
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puissante sur lui que son chagrin et son orgeuil réunis."276 And Shackleton Bailey
also infers from the sudden silence in the correspondence that the project was abruptly
abandoned and that Cicero may have found consolation in the estate at Puteoli left
him by Cluvius. But both these arguments would be met by the hypothesis that the
estate at Puteoli represented not a substitute for the project but its fulfilment: the
financial problem would no longer exist, and further references in the letters would be
superfluous.
Yet even if Cicero did abandon the idea, that might be evidence of impulsiveness,
vacillation, inconstancy - perhaps even of exhibitionism and avarice: it would not be
evidence that he had abandoned belief in the immortality of the soul. A violently
hostile and prejudiced approach sometimes fulfils the function of a devil’s advocate:
not even Carcopino’s character assassination excludes the possibility that Cicero held
such a belief, and the way in which he describes his intentions for Tullia’s apotheosis,
both in the letters to Atticus and in the Consolatio (the quotation in Lactantius), seems
to turn that possibility into a probability.
How strong that belief was - whether Cicero himself considered immortality merely
probable - is impossible to say, although it may be that there are hints or clues to be
found here and there in the Tusculans in the exchanges between M. and A. In the
middle of Book I, when M. turns to deal with the second alternative of annihilation,
A. protests that nothing will induce him to abandon immortality. M. approves, but
adds: "etsi nihil nimis opportet confidere; movemur enim saepe aliquo acute
concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim
276 Carcopino, p.285. And cf. p.284: "Plus que l’urbanisme de César, cette carence, que sans doute
Atticus avait prévue, explique le renouncement final de Cicéron."
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aliqua obscuritas. id igitur si accederit, simus armati."277 And a little further on,
when A. says that he had no objection to another digression on immortality, M.
replies: "Video te alte spectare et velle in caelum migrare. Spero fore ut contingat id
nobis."278
Perhaps these two passages capture Cicero’s attitude: the hope for immortality verges
on conviction, but the fall-back position is a psychological necessity.279 It is as if the
Socratic alternatives have become a Pascalian wager280 - except that for Cicero it is
more of a two-way bet, with the bigger stake on immortality as the winner.
(b) Death
The imbalance between Book I and Books II-V of the Tusculans in respect of their
ethical content has the further implication that Cicero was much less concerned with
his own approaching death than with the death of the other. The way in which the
interlocutor's fear of death is disposed of in Book I - logically, objectively, with no
ethical overtones - suggests an absence of neurosis on the subject in Cicero's make-up.
Indeed the only personal allusions in Book I relate not to any fear of dying on his part
but to a wish that he had died before Tullia281 and to his apprehension about what she
277 I.78.
278 I.82.
279 Cf. Pohlenz, p.32: "Namentlich in den beiden letzen Schrifte [Cato and Laelius] spürt man wie sehr
der Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit, an ein Wiedersehen mit der geliebten Tullia lockt; aber dass er über
die Alternative ‘Entweder Fortleben oder Bewusstlosigkeit’ innerlich doch night hinausgekommen ist,
zeigen seine Briefe deutlich." Kleijwegt (p. 385) is more positive: "Weil nun die Ergebnisse des ersten
Hauptteils die Unsterblichkeit der Seele nicht gewährleisten konnten, wiesehr Cicero das auch
gewünscht hätte, fügte er im zweiten Hauptteil (82-119) noch die nächstbeste Möglichkeit hinzu..."
280 Cf. Leeman, p.327: "Seit Platons Apologie (41A ff.) hat die Philosophie oft eine Art
Rückversicherung in bezug auf die erhoffte Unsterblichkeit versucht."
281 T.D. I.84.
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might have had to endure after death.282 Book III, on the other hand, with its
references to his own reaction to bereavement and its enumeration of the manifold
forms of consolation and their relative merits, indicates that he saw luctus as a much
more dangerous enemy. In other words, in complete contrast to Seneca, who is
obsessed with the question of his own death and relatively indifferent to the death of
others, Cicero seems to have been unmoved by the prospect of his own death283 but
crushed by the death of his daughter.
The impact of Tullia's death as it is documented in the letters to Atticus can be taken
at its face value - there is no need to respond to Carcopino's allegation that it was a
deliberately orchestrated "grande douleur".284 But the indifference to his own death
perhaps requires some explanation, because the above arguments suggest not so much
an unshakeable conviction that the soul is immortal, as a temperamental optimism
content to accept without challenge the precarious logic of the Socratic alternatives.
The question then becomes: what was the basis for that optimism?
There are two revealing passages in the Tusculans which suggest an answer -
revealing in the sense that they are strictly speaking irrelevant to the context in which
they appear, and they involve a paradox which Cicero seems to be both aware of and
slightly embarrassed by. It is likely therefore that they tell us something about his real
thoughts.
282 I.111.
283 Except perhaps when it was imminent: Contrast Asinius Pollio and Livy on Cicero's death. Pollio:
"Atque ego ne miserandi quidem exitus eum fuisse iudicarem, nisi ipse tam miseram mortem putasset."
Livy: "omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum erat tulit praeter mortem..." (Seneca, Suasoriae
VI.24 and VI.22.)
284 Carcopino, p.277.
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The first is at I.90-91, where the argument is that on the hypothesis that death is
followed by lack of sensation, the dead will not feel the need of anything: "cum vero
perspicuum sit nihil posse in eo esse qui ipse non sit, quid potest esse in eo odiosum
qui nec careat nec sentiat?" But then he suddenly says that the wise man will still
consider the interests of posterity. "quare licet etiam mortalem esse animum
iudicantem aeterna moliri, non gloriae cupiditate, quam sensurus non sis, sed virtutis,
quam necessario gloria, etiam si tu id non agas, consequatur." In other words, virtue
although disinterested will win fame, which even in the absence of immortality will
be eternal.285
Similarly at I.109, after the discussion of funeral customs and the conclusion that in
no way do they affect the dead, he suddenly declares: "Sed profecto mors tum
aequissimo animo oppetitur, cum suis se laudibus vita occidens consolari potest...
quamquam enim sensus abierit, tamen suis et propriis bonis laudis et gloriae,
quamvis non sentiant, mortui non carent. etsi enim nihil habet in se gloria cur
expetatur, tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur." And here the paradox is the
more acute in that he uses the verb carere in a different sense from that in the long
argument at I.87-88 that the dead "feel no need of" anything because they have no
sensation: here non carent means "they are not deprived of". And then he goes on to
say ("quoquo modo hoc accipietur") that Lycurgus, Solon, Themistocles and
Epaminondas are not without fame ("non possum autem dicere. . . carere gloria"),
and that anyone resembling them "fidenti animo, si ita res feret, gradietur ad
mortem." So although such people (and in this passage Cicero is explicitly included
among them) are unconscious of having fame and glory, and because they are
285 Cf. Montaigne II.16: 604/705: "cet homme là [Cicero] fut si forcené de cette passion que, s'il eust
osé, il fut, ce crois-je, volontiers tombé en l'excès où tombarent d'autres: que la vertu mesme n'estoit
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unconscious cannot be said to feel the need of fame and glory or anything else,
nevertheless they will not be without fame and glory. Or putting it even more
paradoxically, they will not feel the need of (non carent) fame and glory, not just
because they are unconscious, but because they will actually have (non carent) fame
and glory.
It is tempting to conclude that these two passages in Book I of the Tusculans indicate
why Cicero apparently approached his own death "aequissimo animo", and conversely
that the arguments in Book III advocate an approach to bereavement which is
certainly not what he actually adopted and probably not what he really endorsed.
desirable que pour l'honneur qui se tenoit tousjours à sa suitte."
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IV. Montaigne and Dying
J'aymerois mieux m'entendre bien en moy qu'en Ciceron.1
1. Background
"In the year of Christ 1571, at the age of thirty-eight, on the last day of February,
anniversary of his birth, Michel de Montaigne, long weary of the servitude of the
court and of public employments, while still entire, retired to the bosom of the learned
Virgins, where in calm and freedom from all cares he will spend what little remains of
his life now more than half run out. If the fates permit he will complete this abode,
this sweet ancestral retreat, and he has consecrated it to his freedom, tranquillity, and
leisure."2
With this inscription, in Latin, on the wall of the antechamber to his library,
Montaigne marked his withdrawal from the vita activa of a Bordeaux magistrate, and
embarked on the vita contemplativa of a propertied gentleman with scholarly tastes
and equipment. But with Montaigne (in spite of or perhaps because of his professed
candour and eagerness to open himself up for inspection, body and soul), everything
he writes has to be tested, and in fact very little in that retirement inscription can be
taken on its face value.
1 III.13:1051/1218. References in French are to Montaigne Oeuvres Complètes, Bibliothèque de la
Pléiade, Gallimard 1962. References in English are to Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays, tr.
M.A.Screech, Penguin, 1991. Page numbers for both are given, in that order. The letters A, B and C in
quotations from the Essais indicate passages appearing for the first time in the editions of 1580, 1588
and 1595 respectively.
2 The Latin text (given in Frame, 1965, p.353) is: "An. Christi 1571 aet. 38, pridie cal. Mart., die suo
natali, Mich. Montanus, servitor aulici et munerum publicorum jamdudum pertaesus, dum se integer in
doctarum Virginum recessit sinus, ubi quietus et omnium securus [quant]illum id tandem superabit
decursi multa jam plus parte spatii, si modo fata duint, exigat istas sedes et dulces latebras avitasque
libertati suae tranquillitatique et otio consecravit." The above translation is Frame’s. A translation
into French is given in the Pléiade at p.xvi.
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He had been a member of the Chambre des Enquêtes in the Parlement of Bordeaux
for fourteen years, and had recently put himself forward for promotion to a higher
court. But family connections in the Grand' Chambre disqualified him, and instead of
applying for a royal dispensation he decided to resign. In those circumstances, "long
weary of the servitude of public employments" may have been making a virtue of
necessity. And in fact his highest public office was to come ten years later when he
was elected Mayor of Bordeaux. As far as the "servitude of the court" is concerned,
in the years immediately following his retirement Montaigne was made a chevalier of
the order of St Michel and a gentilhomme de la chambre first of Charles IX and then
of Henri de Navarre, and somewhat later took part in attempts to mediate between the
latter and Henry of Guise. In other words, the vita activa was by no means a thing of
the past.
But the autumnal hues of the retirement inscription are misleading in the other
direction as well. Not only did the vita activa continue, but the vita contemplativa
proved to be anything but a leisurely pottering around the family estate. Whether he
ever intended to "complete his sweet ancestral retreat" (the Château de Montaigne
acquired by his great-grandfather) is improbable: in the event he neither ruined it, as
his father had predicted he would, nor did he do anything to improve it.3
Still more at variance with reality is his anticipation of "tranquillity" and "freedom
from all cares". He was right in assuming that his life was more than half over, but
within a few years of retirement he had ceased even to be "still entire": he had begun
3 III.9:926/1074: "[B] Puis que [C] je ne pretens acquerir que la reputation de n'avoir rien acquis, non
plus que dissipé..."
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to suffer the first excruciating pains from kidney stones, which were to colour the rest
of his days.4 And of course when he composed the inscription, the whole country
had been engulfed in religious civil war for a decade, the Bordeaux region for even
longer, and his sweet ancestral retreat was an obvious and constant target for both
sides. As he wrote later, it was ". . .un merveilleux chef d'oeuvre, et exemplaire,
qu'elle soit encore vierge de sang et de sac, soubs un si long orage, tant de
changemens et agitations voisines."5 To be miraculously unspotted by blood or sack
is not quite the same as living a life of “calm and freedom from all cares.”
Yet the most striking aspect of the retirement inscription as a statement of intent is
that it says nothing about the Essais, indeed nothing about writing at all. It seems
unlikely that he had no literary pursuits in mind. He had already completed a
translation of Raymond Sebond’s Theologia Naturalis, which in spite of his assertion
at one point that it was done in a few days, must have taken several months at least - it
is a work of a thousand pages. And he certainly began the Essais very soon after
retirement: Book I:20, for example, is dated exactly thirteen months later. But in I.8,
De l’Oisiveté, he confirms the haziness implied in the inscription. His intention when
he retired, he says, had been to allow his mind to enjoy itself at leisure: "Mais je
trouve, variam semper dant otia mentem, que au rebours, faisant le cheval eschappé, il
se donne cent fois plus d'affaire à soy mesmes, qu'il n'en prenoit pour autruy; et
m'enfante tant de chimeres et monstres fantasques les uns sur les autres, sans ordre et
sans propos, que pour en contempler à mon aise l'ineptie et l'estrangeté, j'ay
commancé de les mettre en rolle, esperant avec le temps luy en faire honte à luy
4 And which he describes in excruciating detail, e.g. Journal de voyage en Italie, Pléiade p.1311.
5 III.9: 943/1092-3.
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mesmes."6
At first sight, this looks as if writing for him was to be antidote to a disorderly mind -
the chapter begins with the observation that "Si on ne les [sc. les espris] occupe à
certain sujet, qui les bride et contreigne, ils se jettent desreiglez, par-cy par là, dans le
vague champ des imaginations."7 Yet there is seldom any strict logical connection
running throughout Montaigne’s chapters, any linear progression from beginning to
end. (In fact the Platonic image of the bolting horse applies as much to the Essais
themselves as it does to the state of mind which gave rise to them.) And here his
purpose in writing turns out to be not to bridle his thoughts but by recording them to
contemplate at ease their apparently random oddity. Indeed far from making his mind
ashamed of itself, he was to find his justification in charting its twists and turns and in
laying bare its peculiarities and its contradictions.
It took time. The first edition of the Essais, containing Books I and II, was published
in 1580. Its earliest chapters are relatively unoriginal and uninteresting,8 the content
largely military and historical, the style anecdotal, the genre those collections of moral
exempla and sententiae popular in antiquity and in the Renaissance. But here and
there, and increasingly, are to be found more personal, subjective explorations of
more arresting themes - solitude, friendship, suicide, death. And in the middle of
Book II appears the most chimerical and monstrous of all the chapters, the Apologie
6 I.8: 34/31.
7 Ibid. 33/30.
8 As Frame puts it (1955, p.39), they are "meager of personality." But Starobinski suggests (p.21-2)
that this conventional division into early impersonal chapters and the later ones which are characterised
by self-portrait is oversimplified: "Ce qu'on doit pourtant reconnaître, c'est que la 'peinture du moi'
n'est que l'évolution plus tardive d'une pensée d'emblée orientée vers la vie personelle; la question du
moi est posée dès le départ. Montaigne a tenté d'y répondre d'abord par les moyens traditionnels, et
c'est pour les avoir trouvés incapables de satisfaire son attente qu'il a eu recours, par la suite, à une
autre méthode, et qu'il a fait l'essai d'une autre attitude."
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de Raimond Sebond, in its final form one of the most expanded, and even in its
original form taking up about a quarter of the whole 1580 edition. Because the
second edition, published in 1588, contained not only a new Book III with thirteen
chapters, considerably longer on average than those in Books I and II, but also
innumerable additions, by way of interpolation, to the first edition. And the
posthumous 1595 edition continued this process of expansion yet further - expansion,
rather than alteration.9
The result is to make it exceedingly difficult to say what Montaigne’s "stance" was on
any subject whatever.10 Not only is any statement likely to find its contradiction,11 or
at least its paradoxical reformulation,12 within the pages of the same chapter as
originally composed; and not only is there likely to be another chapter elsewhere
presenting a different point of view; but within each of the chapters there are likely to
be interpolations dating either from 1580-1588, or from 1588 until his death in 1592,
which modify the original argument (or even a previous addition), or challenge it, or
offer a different, perhaps mellower perspective. Yet even to use a word like
‘mellower’ is problematic, since it implies a progression, a development in
Montaigne’s thought - something which he himself denies. He defends his practice of
making additions rather than corrections on the grounds that he would lose something
9 II.37: 736-7/858: "[A] Au demeurant, je ne corrige point mes premieres imaginations par les
secondes; [C] ouy à l'aventure quelque mot, mais pour diversifier, non pour oster. [A] Je veux
representer le progrez de mes humeurs, et qu'on voye chaque piece en sa naissance. Je prendrois plaisir
d'avoir commencé plustost et à reconnoistre le trein de mes mutations."
10 Cf. Sayce, p.231: "We should like to pin him down and he is determined not to be pinned down."
T.S. Eliot expressed it with rather more exasperation: trying to criticize Montaigne, he said, was like
flinging hand grenades into a fog. (See Bloom, pp. 150f.) And cf. Friedrich, p.324: "Es ist nicht
leicht, mit seinen Todesdenken ins Reine zu kommen. Denn er war selber nicht im Reinen damit."
11 One of the slogans painted on the ceiling of Montaigne's library was from Sextus Empiricus: pa,nti
lo,gw| lo,goj i;soj avnti,keitai) (Pléiade, p.1423.) Cf. Friedrich, p.11: "Er hat eine verblüffende
Bereitschaft fur die Widersprüchlichkeit seiner selbst und der Dinge, und es ist, als ob er sich erst im
Genuss der Allwidersprüchlichkeit so recht wohl fühlte."
12 As Starobinski puts it (p.81): "Il n'est point de voie, pour lui, qui n'offre une bifurcation; point de
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of himself if he were to change what he had written, and he adds that he does not
believe his later thoughts to be more profound than his earlier: he grows older, but
not wiser.13
On a subject like death, therefore, which is everywhere in the pages of the Essais, it is
a mistake to look for a systematic presentation of his ideas, or for a clear development
from one position to another, or even perhaps for a single coherent approach at any
given stage in his life. And in this of course he may be psychologically more true to
life than the objective scholar who tries to impose some sort of order: death does not
lend itself to objective treatment, and there are few who do not oscillate in their
attitude to it.14
Certainly Montaigne had had some experience of death, over and above the constant
reminders of mortality to which everyone was exposed in 16th century France,
especially during the religious wars. In the few years immediately before his
retirement, he had lost a father, a brother, a daughter, and his closest friend; and he
had almost died himself.
Pierre de Montaigne died in June 1568, at the advanced age of seventy-four and and
after seven years of suffering from the stone15 - the affliction he bequeathed to his
vertu qui ne se renverse en son opposé; point d'exemple qui n'appelle un exemple contradictoire."
13 III.9: 941/1091.
14 Cf. Friedrich, p.324: "Es ist nicht leicht, mit seinem Todesdenken ins Reine zu kommen. Denn er
war selber nicht im Reinen damit. Er probiert aus, lässt keine Deutung endgültig fallen, keine
endgültig zu, verhält sich auch zum Tod in der Weise des essai, des Versuchs, der jeweils aus dem
augenblicklichen Zusammenhang auf die Sache zugeht und mit den unbehobenen Widersprüchen
unausdrücklich eingesteht, dass er mit ihr nicht fertig wird. Das ist Methode, hier wie bei allen
Themen der Essais. Hier, beim Schwierigsten, das der Mensch zu bewältigen hat, kommt sie der Sache
besonders zugute... Dass Montaigne seine Aussagen nicht geschlossen hat, macht ihn reicher als seine
Vorgänger und reicher als seine späteren Gegner im Bezirk des Todesgedankens."
15 II.37:742/863.
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son. Montaigne was not present at his deathbed - he was in Paris arranging the
publication of Raymond Sebond’s Theologia Naturalis, which his father had
"commissioned" from him.
Within a year of his father’s death, his younger brother, Captain Arnaud de Saint-
Martin, died suddenly a few hours after being struck on the ear by a tennis ball: in his
early chapter on death (I.20), Montaigne cites this among the examples of the fragility
of human existence which should offset any expectation that a thirty-nine year-old
will have as long again to live.16
Then in the August before his retirement his daughter Thionette died, aged two
months. She was the eldest of six daughters, only one of whom (Leonor) survived
infancy. A few weeks later, Montaigne dedicated to the bereaved mother his friend
La Boétie’s translation of Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Uxorem - also arising out of the
death of a child - in the course of which he says he leaves to Plutarch the task of
consoling her. His own feelings, or lack of them, may be inferred from some
offhanded remarks in I.14. He says that he has lost two or three infants in his time,
not without regret but without profound grief, and he adds that he has noticed other
occasions when he has met with indifference what other people regard as catastrophes
-"Ex quo intelligitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem."17 It seems
that in relation to bereavement Montaigne was more instinctively Stoic than Cicero
was, unless (as has been argued)18 this frankness is a front and he is hiding his true
feelings beneath a show of cynicism.
16 I.20: 84/94.
17 I.14: 61/64f. The quotation is from Cicero T.D. III.28.
18 By Cole, who reads (p.174) Montaigne's "professions of indifference" as "the defensive denial of
repressed feelings."
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Certainly there is no cynicism and no concealment in relation to his friendship with
Etienne de La Boétie, or to the effect the latter’s death had on him. La Boétie was a
fellow magistrate in the Bordeaux Parlement, three years older than Montaigne. Their
friendship was instantaneous and profound: in the eyes of both, unique. In De
l’Amitié (I.28), Montaigne describes it as so perfect as to have no rival in modern
times: it is the sort of thing that occurs no more than once in three hundred years.19
And La Boétie, in words recorded by Montaigne, was equally uninhibited.20
But in 1563, at the age of thirty-two, La Boétie died, with Montaigne at his bedside.
They had known each other for four years. The loss of his friend had a profound and
permanent effect, and perhaps accounts for Montaigne’s absence of emotion in
relation to subsequent bereavements. Later in the same chapter he compares the rest
of his life since to smoke or dreary darkness. "Depuis le jour que je le perdy . . .je ne
fay que trainer languissant."21 That was written at least ten years after the event, but
the immediate effect "d’une si lourde perte, et si importante"22 is recorded in a letter
from Montaigne to his father, almost certainly written immediately after La Boétie’s
death and published as the conclusion to the latter’s Oeuvres, which Montaigne
brought out in November 1570.
This letter is much more a document of its times than anything in the Essais. Indeed
in some ways it reads like a stereotype of the late medieval deathbed scene, in which
19 I.28: 182/207.
20 See "Fragment d'une lettre que Monsieur le Conseiller de Montaigne escrit à Monseigneur de
Montaigne son père, concernant quelques particularitez qu'il remarqua en la maladie et mort de feu
Monsieur de la Boetie" (Pléiade, pp.1347-60 - hereafter referred to as Lettre) p.1352..
21 I.28: 192/217. And see also the other dedication to La Boétie inscribed in Montaigne's library at the
time of his retirement, of which a translation is given in Pléiade, p.xvi.
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the dying person knows exactly what is going on, accepts it resignedly, and is more
likely to disguise it from his friends and relatives than vice versa; and in which the
room where he is dying is as accessible and as crowded as a society drawing-room.
Or in Philippe Ariès’ formulation: "La simplicité familière est l’un des deux
caractères nécessaires de la mort. L’autre est sa publicité . . .Le mourant doit être au
centre d’une assemblée."23 The interesting thing is that Montaigne seems to have
been inspired by that first characteristic of his friend’s death and repelled by the
second.
Montaigne’s letter describes the rapid progression of La Boétie’s sudden intestinal
illness from its onset till his death ten days later. The account is both graphic and
moving, both mundane and elevated. This, he tells his father, is deliberate: even the
most banal things his friend said during this illness were "un singulier tesmoignage
d’une ame pleine de repos, de tranquilité et d’asseurance;"24 and whatever rose above
the commonplace was “plein de bon exemple.”25 And in fact the style of the letter,
entirely straightforward and unobtrusive, is perfectly suited to its subject matter. In
spite of his emotional involvement, he is able to give a controlled and objective
account of events, of the reactions of the various dramatis personae, of the comings
and goings of wife, uncle, niece, step-daughter, friends, servants, lawyer, priest; and at
the same time this perspective of the detached observer is balanced by a moving
description of his own feelings and of La Boétie’s sensitivity and compassion and
ultimate confidence. And as the only example of Montaigne’s literary style from the
22 Lettre p.1347.
23 Ariès, p 26.
24 Lettre p.1348.
25 Ibid. p.1347. Starobinski remarks (p.77): "Tout au long de son agonie, La Boétie, épié par son ami,
récite admirablement le rôle du sage mourant: il meurt comme un livre." But this may because his
death is recorded by a writer. Cf. Friedrich (p.326), who describes the letter as "ein Kunstwerk, das in
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period before the Essais (apart from his translation of Sebond), it is intriguing just
because the narrative is so straightforward and just because the narrator is so
unobtrusive.
What particularly impresses Montaigne is the way La Boétie forces himself, in spite
of his weakness and his awareness of imminent death, to disguise the truth from his
wife and uncle. Indeed he is so struck by La Boétie’s courage both in facing death
and in concealing it from others, that he tells him that while he is ashamed of his own
comparative lack of courage, he is grateful that he now has such an example to learn
from in facing his own death. La Boétie assures him that this is the whole point of
studying philosophy and that "quand tout est dit, il y a fort long temps que j’y estois
preparé, et que j’en sçavois ma leçon toute par cueur."26
La Boétie then summoned in turn his niece and his step-daughter. To each of them he
gave sound moral advice, adding to his niece that she must not mourn him too greatly,
but rather envy him, and that if God were to give him the choice at that point "ou de
retourner à vivre encores, ou d’achever le voyage que j’ay commencé, je serois bien
empesché au chois."27 During all this time, "sa chambre estoit pleine de gents28 . . .
pleine de cris et de larmes, qui n’interrompoient toutesfois nullement le train de ses
discours."29
The following day, the Monday after he fell ill, La Boétie was much worse, ice cold,
die unverkennbar literarisch abhängige Idealisierung zum stoisch-christlichen, sieghaften Sterben eine
genaue Schilderung der geistigen und körperlichen Phasen des Sterbens einfügt."
26 Ibid. p.1353.
27 Ibid. p.1355.
28 Ibid. p. 1354.
29 Ibid. p.1356.
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in a mortal sweat, almost no pulse. He cried out piteously to Montaigne, "Mon frere,
n’avez vous pas de compassion de tant de tourments que je souffre? Ne voyez vous
pas meshuy que tout le secours que vous me faites ne sert que d’allongement à ma
peine?"30 He heard Mass the next morning, and then spoke movingly to the priest and
to Montaigne, asking them to pray for his soul. More than once he started up with the
words, "Bien, bien, qu’elle vienne quand elle voudra, je l’attends, gaillard et de pié
coy." He then seemed to see extraordinary visions, which he was unable to describe
to Montaigne: only that they were "admirables, infinies, et indicibles."31 A little later
he wanted to speak to his wife, "et luy avoit dit d’un visage le plus gay qu’il le
pouvoit contrefaire, qu’il avoit à luy dire un conte." But he was too weak, and feeling
himself close to death he said, "Je m’en vais." Then seeing his wife’s distress he at
once corrected himself: "Je m’en vais dormir, bon soir ma Femme," and he sent her
away.32 He died early the next morning, as Montaigne poignantly concludes, "apres
avoir vescu 32 ans, 9 mois, et 17 jours."
And finally there was Montaigne’s own brush with death, which he describes in II.6,
De l’Exercitation. The incident occurred probably about a year before he retired. He
was out riding one day at a time when the religious wars were at their height and the
château was "dans le moiau de tout le trouble."33 Because he had not been intending
to go far he was mounted on a small and inferior horse. Suddenly one of his men, on
a much more powerful horse and trying to show off, rode straight into Montaigne’s
path and knocked him flying, so that he lost consciousness and was taken for dead.
But as the men were carrying him home he recovered, and vomited up a bucketful of
30 Ibid. p.1357.
31 Ibid. pp.1358-9.
32 Ibid. p.1359.
33 II.6: 352/418.
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clotted blood. He assumed he had been shot in the head and felt closer to death than
life, yet the feeling was far from disturbing. Indeed the sensation of gliding out of
life, like falling into a gentle sleep, was not only painless, it was pleasant. When they
got him home and to bed, he felt infinitely relaxed and comfortable: "C'eust esté sans
mentir une mort bien heureuse; car la foiblesse de mon discours me gardoit d'en rien
juger, et celle du corps d'en rien sentir. Je me laissoy couler si doucement et d'une
façon si douce et si aisée que je ne sens guiere autre action moins poisante que celle-là
estoit."34 (It would be difficult to imagine a deathbed scene more remote from that of
La Boétie: no heroics, no pathos, no spectators.)
There then is Michel de Montaigne, retired from the world (or at any rate professing
to be) at the age of thirty-eight. The civil war is raging all around, he senses no
particular purpose in life, he has no interest in managing his estates, his feelings for
his wife are less than passionate, and ever since he has lost his greatest friend "je ne
fay que trainer languissant."35
His solution is to retreat to the library in the tower of his château, to live permanently
in his "arriere boutique",36 with no ambition to make his mark again in the world. He
dismisses as "une ridicule contradiction" the ambivalence of Pliny or Cicero who use
retirement ostensibly to devote themselves to literature and intellectual activity but
actually to enhance their reputation - or in the case of Cicero "à s'en acquerir par ses
escris une vie immortelle"37 The only proper way of withdrawing from the world is
34 II.6:357/423.
35 I.28:192/217.
36 I.39:235/270: "Il se faut reserver une arriere boutique toute nostre, toute franche, en laquelle nous
establissons nostre vraye liberté et principale retraicte et solitude."
37 Ibid. 239/274.
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"faire comme les animaux qui effacent la trace à la porte de leur taniere."38
Retirement should not be a question of "reculer pour mieux sauter",39 it should rather
be an opportunity for leisurely introspection: "C'est assez vescu pour autruy, vivons
pour nous au moins ce bout de vie. Ramenons à nous et à nostre aise nos pensées et
nos intentions. Ce n'est pas une legiere partie que de faire seurement sa retraicte; elle
nous empesche assez sans y mesler d'autres entreprinses. . .La plus grande chose du
monde, c'est de sçavoir estre à soy."40
2. First Thoughts
If he had been consistent, therefore, we should never have heard any more of
Montaigne. But in fact, in "une ridicule contradiction", his retirement turned out to be
precisely a matter of "reculer pour mieux sauter". At the outset perhaps he had no
inkling of this. He began to write, partly to keep on the track of the runaway horse,
partly to combat a melancholic humour,41 partly perhaps in a continued reaction to La
Boétie’s death. It has been suggested, for example, that "the Essays themselves are a
compensation for the loss of La Boétie", a substitute for a level of communication
which was no longer available to him.42 But it may have been something deeper and
more universal than that. Because the most pervasive theme in the early chapters is
death, and specifically how to prepare for it in advance. It is as if Montaigne’s real
aim is to be able to apply to himself La Boétie’s dying claim: "Quand tout est dit, il y
a fort long temps que j’y estois preparé, et que j’en sçavois ma leçon toute par
38 Ibid. 242/277.
39 Ibid. 241/277.
40 Ibid. 236/271-2.
41 II.8:364/433.
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cueur."43 Or putting it another way, it is as if he is intent on fulfilling his promise to
his dying friend that the latter’s courage in the face of death will serve as an example
to him "pour jouër ce mesme rolle à mon tour."44
Certainly he seems to be almost obsessed with the subject. He has always, he says,
been fascinated by the way people die - their approach, their last words, the
expression on their faces.45 And many of the allusions to death scattered about in
Books I and II fall into that category. There are innumerable anecdotes and
illustrations from antiquity of suicide, whether as the only honourable or the only
tolerable solution46 - Cato is cited several times as the model of virtue;47 of a
disorderly life redeemed by an orderly death;48 of simple acceptance and resignation
in the face of death;49 of torture or the gallows being greeted with irrepressible
laughter;50 of imperturbability so great as to allow a calm untroubled sleep before
meeting death;51 of martyrdom in the pursuit of eternal life,52 or of glory,53 or
simply because it is the custom;54 of porcine indifference to death.55
But the first extended treatment of the subject - I.20, Que philosopher, c’est
apprendre à mourir - gives a much better indication of the direction of Montaigne’s
thinking on the subject. The chapter is unique in being precisely dated: "[A] Il n'y a
42 Frame, 1965, p.81.
43 Lettre, p.1353.
44 Ibid. Cf. Starobinski, p.82: "Tout se passe comme si la disparition de La Boétie avait soudain
découvert à Montaigne sa propre mort..."
45 I.20:88/100.
46 e.g. II.3; II.13.
47 e.g. II.13: 594/691.
48 I.19: 79/.87.
49 I.14: 51/53.
50 I.14: 51f/54f.
51 I.44: 262/303.
52 I.14: 60/64.
53 I.14: 54/56; cf. II.16.
54 I.14: 51/54.
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justement que quinze jours que j'ay franchi 39 ans."56 It is also one of the best-known
of Montaigne’s chapters, or at least the most often quoted.57
The title is derived from the Tusculan Disputations58 as the first sentence of the
chapter makes clear: "Ciceron dit que Philosopher ce n’est autre chose que s’aprester
à la mort." What Cicero actually said - tota enim philosophorum vita commentatio
mortis est - is itself a résumé in translation of several passages in the Phaedo. Two
things are immediately striking. The first is that although the Essais are peppered
with Latin quotations - 1264 according to one count, and this chapter alone contains
thirty-eight59- the quotation from Cicero is given in French. The second is that the
French is not an exact translation of the Latin. The "apprendre à mourir" of the title is
not quite the same as the "s'aprester à la mort" in the first sentence, and the
"philosopher" in the first sentence is not quite the same as the tota philosophorum vita
in Cicero. In other words, the title of the chapter is at two removes from Cicero, but
by not citing the Latin Montaigne is able to give the impression that he is actually
quoting Cicero.
Now Montaigne’s motives in using so many classical quotations changed over the
years. He confesses that to begin with he was looking to bolster his arguments by
giving them the authority of antiquity,60 but then as his confidence grew he would add
more quotations from authors whom, to his delight, he found to be in agreement with
55 I.14:54/57; II.12:470/546.
56 I.20:82/93.
57 Of the nineteen passages listed in the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (4th edition, Oxford, 1992)
from all 107 chapters of the Essays, four are from I.20.
58 T.D. I.74.
59 And there are many more indirect allusions. Brody (p.114) goes as far as to say: "L'on soupçonne
qu'à l'exception d'une poignée d'interventions personnelles, l'étude approfondie des sources de
Montaigne dans son essai sur la mort ne révèlerait guère une seule phrase originale."
60 E.g. II.12:528/614.
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him. (Indeed only 13 out of the 38 quotations in I.20 were in the original version: 21
were added after 1580, and another 4 after 1588.) Yet he remained self-conscious and
self-deprecating about his dependence on the thoughts of others.61 In Du Pedantisme
(I.25) there is this interpolation from after 1588: "[B] Nous nous laissons si fort aller
sur les bras d'autruy, que nous aneantissons nos forces. Me veus-je armer contre la
crainte de la mort? c'est auz depens de Seneca. Veus-je tirer de la consolation pour
moy, ou pour un autre? je l'emprunte de Cicero. Je l'eusse prise en moy-mesme, si on
m'y eust exercé. Je n'ayme point cette suffisance relative et mendiée."62
At the beginning of I.20, therefore, it may be that Montaigne cites Cicero in French
partly to disguise the fact that he is paraphrasing him (which enables him at the same
time to imply that the title also has Cicero’s authority), and partly because, in the
opposite direction, it gives the impression that he is less dependent on other men’s
arms and is in fact drawing from his own resources.63
And he does immediately proceed to distinguish two possible interpretations of his
paraphrase: "C'est d'autant que l'estude et la contemplation retirent aucunement
nostre ame hors de nous, et l'embesongnent à part du corps, qui est quelque
aprentissage et ressemblance de la mort; ou bien, c'est que toute la sagesse et discours
du monde se resoult en fin à ce point, de nous apprendre à ne craindre point à
61 See, for example, II.10:387/458: "Car je fay dire aux autres ce que je ne puis si bien dire, tantost par
foiblesse de mon langage, tantost par foiblesse de mon sens." And cf. I.25 (135/154).
62 I.25. 137/155.
63 Cf. Friedrich, p.52: "Der Späthumanist Montaigne will kein Nachahmer sein, sondern eine
Individualität, deren geistiges Leben in der Entfaltung des eigenen Wesens besteht." And cf.
III.12:1034/1197, where Montaigne says: "[C] Parmy tant d'emprunts je suis bien aise d'en pouvoir
desrober quelqu'un, les desguisant et difformant à nouveau service. Au hazard que je laisse dire que
c'est par faute d'avoir entendu leur naturel usage, je luy donne quelque particuliere adresse de ma main,
à ce qu'ils en soient d'autant moins purement estrangers." And cf. further the 1588 version here
(deleted, unusually, at a later date): "Comme ceux qui desrobent les chevaux, je leur peins le crin et la
queue, et parfois je les esborgne; si la premier maistre s'en servoit à bestes d'amble, je les mets au trot,
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mourir."64 Now the first of these is clearly Cicero’s own interpretation: it is
essentially the argument in the Phaedo, which Cicero is expounding at this point in
the Tusculans. But it is the second which Montaigne adopts as the basis for the rest of
the chapter. So that by not actually quoting Cicero, or referring to Plato’s original
context, he manages to avoid the charge that he is not in fact elucidating either. The
allusion in the title together with the paraphrase in the first sentence are really a
"louping-on stane" enabling him to ride off on his chosen theme, which by the end of
the third sentence is no longer either "apprendre à mourir", or "s'aprester à la mort",
but "apprendre à ne craindre point à mourir."
In other words, what Montaigne appears to have in mind is not the Platonic65 practice
by anticipation of the state which follows death, but the self-discipline which can
remove the terror from the act of dying (h` mele,th tou/ fusikou/ qana,tou), which
results in fact in "le mepris de la mort". If we did not scorn it, death would be "un
subject continuel de tourment, et qui ne se peut aucunement soulager."66 It is
inevitable; and it lies in wait for us everywhere, in the most unexpected places, as a
series of absurd examples, both contemporary and ancient, demonstrates: one man is
killed by a collision with a pig, another by a tortoise falling on his head, another dies
choking on a grape pip, another (a Pope) between a woman’s thighs.
The response of ordinary people ("du vulgaire") is not to think about death at all. But
that is simply blind and brutish stupidity,67 because in fact it simply makes matters
worse. "[A] Ils vont, ils viennent, ils trottent, ils dansent, de mort nulles nouvelles.
et au bast, s'il servoient à la selle." (1667/1197.)
64 I.20:79-80/89.
65 Cf. Friedrich, p.330: "...der allenthalben völlig unplatonische Montaigne..."
66 I.20. 81/92.
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Tout cela est beau. Mais aussi quand elle arrive, ou à eux, ou à leurs femmes, enfans
et amis, les surprenant en dessoude et à decouvert, quels tourmens, quels cris, quelle
rage, et quel desespoir les acable?"68 Such "nonchalance bestiale" is impossible for
anyone of any intelligence.69
The proper solution therefore is not to ignore death or try to run away from it, but the
opposite - we must inure ourselves to it. "[A] Ostons luy l'estrangeté, pratiquons le,
accoustumons le, n'ayons rien si souvent en la teste que la mort. A tous instans
representons la à nostre imagination et en tous visages. Au broncher d'un cheval, à la
cheute d'une tuille, à la moindre piqueure d'espleingue, remachons soudain: 'Et bien,
quand ce seroit la mort mesme?'"70 The ancient Egyptians had the right idea, bringing
in a mummified corpse in the middle of their banquets, as a memento mori.71
And Montaigne claims that he himself has always behaved like this. For example,
one day when he was out riding only a league from his house, he had hastily noted
down some testamentary instruction, because although he was in perfect health he felt
no certainty of reaching home alive.72 Two memorable images sum up this approach:
"[A] Il faut estre tousjours boté et prest à partir";73 and "[A] Je veux qu'on agisse, [C]
et qu'on allonge les offices de la vie tant qu'on peut, [A] et que la mort me treuve
plantant mes chous, mais nonchalant d’elle, et encore plus de mon jardin imparfait."74
With this attitude to death the philosopher wins freedom. To paraphrase Seneca:
"[A] La premeditation de la mort, est premeditation de la liberté. Qui a apris à
67 Ibid. 82/92.
68 Ibid. 84/95.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. 85/96.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. 86/98.
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mourir, il a desapris à servir. Le sçavoir mourir nous afranchit de toute subjection et
contrainte."75
And that, one might think, is that. But now Montaigne goes off on a new tack.76
Nature herself, he says, helps us out and gives us courage (that is, presumably, if all
this stoic paraenesis has failed to produce the desired effect), because either death is
violent, in which case it is also short and we have no time to be afraid; or else it is
preceded by illness, in which case it is worse in anticipation than in reality - illness
being an example of Caesar’s maxim that things often seem bigger at a distance than
close up, and death, hopefully, being another. When our bodies are decrepit we are
able to face death much more easily than when we are at the peak of health. The
imperceptible onset of age is nature’s way of leading us down the gentle slope to
death.
And the chapter concludes with a five-page soliloquy by Nature (largely borrowed
from Lucretius, combined with paraphrases of Seneca),77 who strengthens the
preceding arguments by pointing out that death is part of the fabric of the universe,
part of life itself, that it is absurd to accept life without accepting death, and that it is
therefore absurd to fear death. Everyone is in the same boat, there is no escape. In
any case, there is nothing to be afraid of, since there is no consciousness after death
and so no unhappiness. "You" will miss nothing connected with this life since "you"
will not exist.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid. 87/99.
75 Ibid. 85/96.
76 "Il y a plus" (Ibid. 88/100.)
77 Cf. Friedrich, p.334: "Das ist nun auch die Stelle, wo der Vorrat antiker Todeskunde am dichtesten
zur Schau kommt, und zwar so, wie er der stoischen und epikureischen Lehre gemeinsam ist."
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But then there is a postscript (already there in the original version) in which
Montaigne draws attention to the fact that death seems to be faced with "beaucoup
plus d’asseurance parmy les gens de village et de basse condition qu’és autres." The
reason, he thinks, is to be found in the trappings which surround the deaths of those of
higher rank: "[A] . . .une toute nouvelle forme de vivre, les cris des meres, des
femmes et des enfans, la visitation de personnes estonnées et transies, l'assistance d'un
nombre de valets pasles et éplorés, une chambre sans jour, des cierges allumez, nostre
chevet assiegé de medecins et de prescheurs; somme, tout horreur et tout effroy
autour de nous. Nous voylà desjà ensevelis et enterrez. Les enfans ont peur de leurs
amis mesmes quand ils les voyent masquez; aussi avons nous. Il faut oster le masque
aussi bien des choses que des personnes; osté qu'il sera, nous ne trouverons au
dessoubs que cette mesme mort, qu'un valet ou simple chambriere passerent
dernierement sans peur. Heureuse la mort qui oste le loisir aux apprests de tel
equipage!"78
Now all this is rather odd. The main argument is reasonably coherent: that the only
way of successfully overcoming the fear of death is by taming death, frequenting it in
the sense of constantly having it before your eyes, so that when it comes you are ready
for it - although it may be remarked that the above synopsis of the argument puts it a
little more coherently than he does himself. It is almost impossible to deal with
Montaigne (short of simply repeating his words) without making the thread of his
argument clearer than it is: something which Montaigne himself would neither deny
nor regret.79 But in I.20 the argument is obscured not only by the style and the
78 I.20:94-5/107-8.
79 III.9: 973-4/1124-6.
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accretions, but by the presence (in the original version) of certain tensions.
The first tension, which has already been pointed out, is with the authority which
launches him on his theme. Montaigne has in fact a very ambivalent attitude to
Cicero. He quotes him more than any other Latin writer, and the Tusculan
Disputations more than any other of his works. Yet he says some choice and nasty
things about him - about his passion for glory,80 about his inconsistency,81 about his
verbosity and rhetoric.82 (Is it possible that Montaigne saw some aspects of himself
in Cicero, and disliked what he saw? They do have several things in common: both
lawyers; both retired from public life - in both cases, as it turns out, temporarily - and
looking for a purpose; both finding that purpose in writing; both sensing that the real
anchor in their lives is a friend par excellence (Atticus / La Boétie); both immersed in
the philosophy of the ancients; and both in the event forging a new philosophical
vernacular. And for all Montaigne’s self-deprecation in relation both to reputation
and to literary style, the Essais themselves are a sufficient proof that he was
indifferent to neither.)
However that may be, he refers to Cicero in this chapter only to take leave of him
immediately, and he does not refer at all to Socrates whom Cicero is quoting. This
may betray another tension. Montaigne comes eventually to regard Socrates as the
greatest figure of antiquity (replacing on the pedestal the younger Cato), but in the
role indicated by the oracle at Delphi: as one who spends his life in the pursuit of
self-knowledge, not as the speculative philosopher of the Phaedo "mythologizing"
about the afterlife. The first interpretation of Cicero’s quotation from Socrates, which
80 II.16: 604/705.
81 II.12: 468/545.
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Montaigne mentions as a possibility at the beginning of the chapter - the
philosopher’s task being to anticipate so far as possible the final separation of soul
and body in death - is not one that interests him, even at this stage.83
In fact, there is no reference in I.20 to an afterlife at all, which in a chapter on learning
how to die by an allegedly staunch Catholic84 might seem somewhat surprising. And
it is not quite an answer to say, as Screech does:85 "'Death' is considered in the sense
of the act of dying, not as the state of the soul in the afterlife. As such it is the
concern of philosophy not of religion." It is not quite an answer because what is
really surprising about I.20 is that it implies so clearly, in the closing soliloquy by
Nature, that there is no such thing as an afterlife - for example, the quotation from
Lucretius: "Licet, quod vis, vivendo vincere secla / Mors aeterna tamen nihilominus
illa manebit."86
And this of course raises the question whether Montaigne was really quite so
committed a Christian as he professed to be.87 There are some indications that he
82 I.40: 243/279.
83 And perhaps he regarded it as meaningless, or more precisely meaningless after death and both
impossible and undesirable in life.
84 I.56: 303/355: "...[C] tenant pour execrable s'il se trouve chose ditte par moy ignorament ou
inadvertament contre les sainctes prescriptions de l'Eglise catholique, apostolique et Romaine, en
laquelle je meurs et en laquelle je suis nay."
85 In his preface to I.19.
86 I.20: 92/105. The quotation is from DRN III.1090-91.
87 Friedrich is in no doubt. He refers unequivocally to the "nicht unfrommen, aber unchristlichen
Montaigne" (p.105). Christianity is something which "er braucht...um es wieder abzustossen." (p.95).
And specifically in the context of death, "Während auf manchen Seiten der Essais stoische und
christliche Nachklänge hörbar sind, kommt es gerade bei den Todesreflexionen eindeutig heraus, was
er nicht is: weder Stoiker noch Christ." (p.357.)
For a balanced account of Montaigne's attitude to Christianity, see Sayce, pp.202-232. Sayce at one
point (p.217) quotes Gibbon (Chapter 2): "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the
Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false;
and by the magistrate as equally useful." There is no doubt that Montaigne was more of a philosopher
and a magistrate than a member of le vulgaire.
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was,88 and there is no doubt that he behaved all his life very much in a spirit of
broadminded tolerance - which was why he found himself a target for both sides in
the religious wars.89 And there are one or two isolated endorsements of the Christian
view of the afterlife, for example, to La Boétie on his deathbed.90 But there are
counter-indications, especially in II.12, the Apologie de Raimond de Sebond.
This extraordinary hybrid,91 174 pages long in the Pléiade edition, purports to defend
Sebond’s Theologia Naturalis against the twin criticisms of trying to support faith by
reason, and of using weak arguments in the process. But in fact Montaigne does more
than any of Sebond’s critics both to challenge the status of human reason and to
undermine Sebond’s own arguments,92 largely on the basis of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
So much so that the chapter should really have been entitled Apology for Pyrrho. And
by implication, while he ostensibly maintains an unquestioning allegiance to
Christianity, his sceptical onslaught inflicts as much damage on it as on anything
else.93
88 E.g. I.56 (see note 83 above). And cf. III.9: 960/1111.
89 See III.12: 1021/1182.
90 Lettre, p.1351.
91 Starobinski (p.101) characterises it as "ce dangereux complément de théologie negative rajouté à la
théologie positive du Liber Creaturarum", though it is questionable whether it should be called
theology in any sense, even negative - cf. Friedrich, p.133: "Die 'Theologie' Montaignes - falls man
von derartigem überhaupt sprechen darf ..."
92 So Friedrich: "[Montaigne] wird, ohne es ausdrücklich zu wollen oder zu sagen, sein Gegner"
(p.131); and "Montaigne macht sich gar nicht die Mühe, darüber nachzudenken, wie sehr die
Hauptstücke seiner 'Apologie' genau dem zuwiderlaufen, was in Sebundus steht und was er einst selbst
übersetzt hat." (p.132). But whether Montaigne was really so unconscious of what was going on must
be debatable. Cf. Sayce, p.223: "We are bound to notice the disproportion between the two parts of
the defence of Sabunde: the first, that reason can aid faith, takes up about one sixteenth of the essay;
the second, that reason is no use anyway, all the rest. The first part is half-hearted..., the second is
conducted with unflagging enthusiasm."
93 II.12: 422/497 "[A] . . .nous ne recevons nostre religion qu'à nostre façon et par nos mains, et non
autrement que comme les autres religions se reçoyvent. Nous nous sommes rencontrez au païs où elle
estoit en usage; ou nous regardons son ancienneté ou l'authorité des hommes qui l'ont maintenue; ou
creignons les menaces qu'ell' attache auz mescreans; ou suyvons ses promesses. . .Une autre religion,
d'autres tesmoings, pareilles promesses et menasses nous pourroyent imprimer par mesme voye une
croyance contraire. [B] Nous sommes Chrestiens à mesme titre que nous sommes ou Perigordins ou
Alemans." Friedrich (p.130) remarks: "...die ganze 'Apologie' belegt, dass Montaigne die Religion,
gleichgültig welche, überhaupt nur in ihrer Verknüpfung mit der Menschlichkeit, als religion mortelle
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There are two alternatives here, if it is accepted that there is tension bordering on
contradiction between what Montaigne states to be his professed religion and the
implications of what he states to be his preferred philosophical position. Either he is
unaware of the tension, or he is dissimulating. In other words, having denied (under
the influence of Pyrrho’s scepticism) that it is possible to arrive at any certainty
through rational enquiry, and accepted that the critical range of Pyrrhonism extends to
matters of religious faith, he is either unable to see the resulting precariousness of his
own religion, or he refuses to acknowledge it.
The first alternative is less likely to be true than the second (though religious faith can
make anyone illogical.) The second would be entirely understandable, either from
the point of view (in such an age) of self-preservation;94 or on the basis of the
Pyrrhonian position itself, since Montaigne sees one who holds it as obliged to
support the status quo.95
et humaine, zu betrachten vermag."
94 Although, as Friedrich points out (p.360), the absence of anti-Christian polemic in Montaigne is
more a matter of irrelevance than reserve: "Sein achristliches Denken gerät auch im Todesproblem in
keine Spannung zu den christlichen Restelementen, die ihm aus historischen Zusammenhängen noch
anhaften. Er braucht sich gar night polemisch dagegen zu äussern. Sein Vermeiden antichristlicher
Polemik ist nicht bloss Furcht vor der Zensur. Er bildet seine eigene Gesinnung einfach aus, unter
Führung der Antike, als gäbe es überhaupt jene ganz anderen Betrachtungen gar nicht."
95 II.12: 486/564. "[C] ny mescreant, [A] ny establissant aucun dogme [B] contre les observances
communes; humble, obeïssant, disciplinable, studieux; ennemi juré d'haeresie, [A] et s'exemptant par
consequant des vaines et irreligieuses opinions introduites par les fauces sectes." And cf. ibid. 492/571:
"[A] Aucunes choses, ils [les anciens] les ont escrites pour le besoin de la société publique, comme
leurs religions; et a esté raisonnable, pour cette considération, que les communes opinions, ils n'ayent
voulu les espelucher au vif, aux fins de n'engendrer du trouble en l'obeissance des loix et coustumes de
leur pays." An interpolation after "leurs religions" in 1588 edition (later deleted) may be particularly
significant (as Montaigne's version of "the noble lie"): "Car il n'est pas défendu de faire notre profit de
la mensonge mesme, s'il est besoing." (1559/571.)
And cf. Friedrich, p.142: "Montaigne ist kirchentreu. Aber er leitet seinen Konservatismus nicht ab
aus Zustimmung zum objektiven Wahrheitsgehalt der katholischen Lehre. Die Kirche erscheint ihm als
etwas von altersher Gegebenes und Ordnung Stiftendes; wer in ihrem Wirkungskreis geboren ist, tut
gut, sich ihr zu beugen." This is an interesting reversal of that prevalent modern approach which
deplores 'institutional religion' while retaining a belief in God. In other words, whereas Montaigne
(according to Friedrich, p.146) anticipated Barrès: "Je suis athée, mais je suis catholique," the modern
approach is: "I don't go to church, but I am a Christian."
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What is at any rate undeniable is that on the subject of the afterlife the Apologie is
even-handedly critical of anthropomorphic credulity. The physical pleasures and
pains which await us according to Plato’s myths ("après la ruine et aneantissement de
nos corps") are in the same category as Mahomet’s paradise of nymphs and wine.
Montaigne says with Socratic irony that "[A] je voy bien que ce sont des moqueurs
qui se plient à nostre bestise pour nous emmieler et attirer par ces opinions et
esperances, convenables à nostre mortel appetit."96 The only logical approach, he
says, must be that "[A] Si les plaisirs que tu nous promets en l'autre vie sont de ceux
que j'ay senti çà bas, cela n'a rien de commun avec l'infinité."97 Or more succinctly:
"[A] S’il y a quelque chose du mien, il n’y a rien de divin."98 For the conditions of
an afterlife to be imagined at all, "il faut les imaginer inimaginables, indicibles, et
incomprehensibles" - an arresting echo of La Boétie’s dying visions: "elles sont
admirables, infinies, et indicibles."99
And the same principle applies, he goes on, to any hope that we could recognise our
parents or children or friends in the next world: such notions are still "terrestres et
finies."100 Moreover, to avoid this trap by asserting that the rewards and punishments
of the afterlife relate only to our spiritual part, is to fall into another: "[A] car nous
sommes bastis de deux pieces principales essentielles, desquelles la separation c'est la
mort et ruyne de nostre estre,"101 so that what may happen to our souls no more
happens to us than the decay of our bodies happens to us. In short: "[A] Et si, pour
96 II.12: 498/578. He adds later that some Christians make the same mistake: "[C] Si, sont aucuns des
nostres tombez en pareille erreur, se promettant après la resurrection une vie terrestre et temporelle,
accompaignée de toutes sortes de plaisirs et commoditez mondaines."
97 Ibid. 498/579.
98 Ibid. 498-9/579.
99 Ibid. 499/579. Cf. Lettre p.1359
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nous en rendre capables, on reforme et rechange nostre estre (comme tu dis, Platon,
par tes purifications), ce doit estre d'un si extreme changement et si universel que, par
la doctrine physique, ce ne sera plus nous."102
It has to be said that in applying this devastating critique to every attempt to envisage
an afterlife, Montaigne seems to have lost sight of the Pyrrhonian precepts he purports
to be following:103 far from suspending judgement, he has become thoroughly
dogmatic. The consistent Pyrrhonist would deny that we can know anything about the
future world, even what it will not be like, even that it will not resemble or perhaps
duplicate the pleasures of this world. It may very well be mistaken to proceed
uncritically on the assumption that there is something in common between this world
and the next and their respective pleasures; but there is just as little ground for
asserting dogmatically that there could be no such similarity or even identity.
Yet that logical loophole would provide cold comfort for anyone seeking support in
the Apologie for belief in an afterlife. Admittedly Montaigne does not, in the
passages quoted above, completely exclude the possibility: it could be argued that he
is simply advocating the via negativa - "wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muss
man schweigen." The trouble is that when he does speak, he is more likely to imply
the impossibility of an afterlife than to express any confidence in its actuality, or even
to assert its theoretical possibility.104 For example, in dismissing Pythagorean
100 II.12: 499/579.
101 Ibid. 500/580-1.
102 Ibid. 499/579.
103 That is, what Friedrich (p.339) calls "[Eine] Skepsis, die nicht nur bezweifelt, was wir für wirklich
halten, sondern auch für möglich halt, was wir bezweifeln."
104 Cf. Friedrich, p.361: "Sodann gibt es keine Unsterblichkeit bei ihm, weder im platonischen noch
im christlichen Sinne...Die erschliessende Skepsis Montaignes schweigt hier: diese Möglichkeit, dass
der Mensch unsterblich sein könnte, hält sich nicht offen, während sie doch sonst so viele
Möglichkeiten, selbst das Wunder, offen lässt."
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metempsychosis he says: "Ce qui a cessé une fois d’estre, n’est plus."105 It has a ring
of finality.106
So far the tensions remarked on in I.20 have been those in relation to Montaigne's
sources - Cicero and Plato - and those in relation to his professed Christianity. But
there are also internal tensions, notably in the extraordinary postscript. Throughout
the chapter there has been a series of epithets disparaging the lower orders, who
typically escape from their fear of death by pretending that there is no such thing: "Le
remede du vulgaire, c’est de n’y penser pas - quelle brutale stupidité - un si grossier
aveuglement - cette nonchalance bestiale." All this in contrast to the stoical fortitude
of the philosopher who has schooled himself to look death in the face and by doing so
has gained freedom - and Montaigne is apparently presenting himself as the type of
such a philosopher: he has done what is necessary, and is passing on the benefit of his
wisdom in this chapter. But then suddenly, after Nature’s five-page soliloquy adding
her weight to the thesis that death is to be accepted without fear (except that it is
actually the weight of other philosophers) - suddenly there comes this postscript.
And suddenly "le vulgaire" are no longer the brute masses, they have become "les
gens de village", and "un valet ou simple chambriere"; and far from being grossly
blind and stupid, it is suddenly they rather than "we" who possess an instinctive
confidence when they come to die; and suddenly Cicero, Socrates, Lucretius have
become irrelevant, and philosophising a waste of time: all "we" need to do is to tear
105 II.12: 500/580.
106 And Starobinski's conclusion (p.50) has the ring of truth, at least as far as Montaigne's belief in a
Christian afterlife is concerned: "S'il n'avait redouté l'oubli comme un total anéantissement, eût-il mis
la main à la plume? En quoi il est peu chrétien. Il éprouve le souci de survivre selon sa vérité
particulière dans la mémoire d'une autre génération: c'est qu'il a perdu l'espoir en l'immortalité
spirituelle et en l'illumination éternelle que l'Église promettait aux élus accueillis dans la patrie céleste."
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off the mask with which we have been foolish enough to cover up the face of death,
and we too will be able to die "sans peur"! And it is not as if all this is a subsequent
addition: it is part of the original version,107 while conversely there are interpolations
from after 1588 which are entirely in line with the ostensible theme of the chapter:
for example, "Or des principaux bienfaicts de la vertu est le mepris de la mort."108
What is the explanation for this double tension - early passages which collide with the
context and anticipate a different kind of approach to death, and later passages which
confirm and strengthen the first approach? The latter may perhaps be accounted for
simply on the ground that this is Montaigne’s method of composition by accretion:
since he is rarely convinced that one way of looking at things is better than another,
and since he is equally unpersuaded that what he thinks now is necessarily superior to
what he used to think, he is just as likely to add a quotation in support of a previously
held opinion, or to refine it or reformulate it more elegantly, as he is to interpolate an
implicit refutation.109
As far as the former is concerned, it is clearly in tune with Montaigne’s temperament
to want to present an unruly hybrid which points beyond itself to future possibilities,
rather than an impeccably logical finished product.110 But the reality is that these
107 As Friedrich puts it (p.86): "Im Todesessay I.20 nimmt, aus Seneca paraphrasiert, die stoische
Lehre von der Seelenstärke gegen Todesfurcht einen gewissen Raum ein. Aber sie ist nur ein Anfang,
der schon in diesem Essay, noch mehr aber in den späteren, zugunsten einer entspannten
Todeswilligkeit preisgegeben wird."
108 I.20: 81/91.
109 Cf. Friedrich, p.324: "Im übrigen kommt es in den Essais nicht zum Durchbruch einer letzen,
einheitlichen, bequem referierbaren Bestimmtheit der Todesdeutung. Die späten handschriftlichen
Zusätze durchkreuzen auch hier wie überall in den Essais früher Gesagtes, oder aber sie passen sich
ihm an und erweitern es sogar, obwohl Montaigne den älteren Gesichtspunkt schon längst verlassen
hatte."
110 And there is also the consideration that level A itself was composed in stages and incorporates
unidentifiable additions and revisions: the evidence for this is in level A itself, in the opening words of
II.37: "[A] Ce fagotage de tant de diverses pieces se faict en cette condition, que je n'y mets la main
que lors qu'une trop lasche oisiveté me presse, et non ailleurs que chez moy. Ainsin il s'est basty à
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future possibilities are already present. What lies behind this new approach in the
postscript is his own experience. Of course the same can be said of the first approach,
in a sense, except that there it is largely second-hand experience. He has collected
anecdotes about facing death - but about how other people have faced death. He has
sat for days beside the deathbed of his friend - but it was La Boétie who was dying.
And that second-hand experience has perhaps been less effective than he pretends:
the chapter reads less like the triumphant account of someone who has conquered his
fear of death than a slightly desperate attempt by someone who is still very much
afraid to persuade himself that he is not.111 For example, that typical deathbed scene
described with such savage irony in the postscript is uncannily reminiscent of the
description of La Boétie’s death in the letter to his father. It is almost as if in spite of
himself - in spite of his devotion to the memory of his friend and in spite of his
promise that La Boétie’s courage in death would serve as an example to himself - it is
almost as if he has a deep revulsion to everything about La Boétie’s death, and a deep
suspicion about the adequacy of the stoicism with which he faced it.112
diverses poses et intervalles, comme les occasions me detiennent ailleurs par fois plusieurs mois. Au
demeurant, je ne corrige point mes premieres imaginations par les secondes; [C] ouy à l'aventure
quelque mot, mais pour diversifier, non pour oster. [A] Je veux representer le progrez de mes humeurs,
et qu'on voye chaque piece en sa naissance." (736-7/858) And this means that it is fallacious to
assume that for example in I.20 awkward transitions or tensions are to be expected only between the
different levels, while A itself represents a seamless whole. In other words, perhaps the last paragraph
of I.20 really is a postscript.
111 Cf. III.12: 1017/1177.
112 Cf. Brody's remarks on the implicit rejection in the epilogue to I.20 of what he calls "le Grand
Cérémonial" conventionally accompanying death. What Brody finds distinctive about I.20 is more
what is not said than what is said, because while what is said is almost entirely a mosaic of quotations
from the classical world, what is not said is anything at all about religion and salvation: I.20 is in fact
the first ars moriendi of modern times which is exclusively humanist in its inspiration. (p.109.) And cf.
Friedrich (p.321) on the Essays as a whole: "Nicht von Anfang an, aber in rasch zunehmended Masse
und schliesslich ganz rein geschieht in den Essais dieses Entdecken des Todes von der eigenen inneren
Erfahrung her. Das macht sie zu einem der grossen Todestexte des nachantiken Abendlandes..."
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3. Second Thoughts
Both revulsion and suspicion may still at this stage be largely latent, but both come to
be articulated. In III.9, De la Vanité, Montaigne defends his passion for travel against
various objections, one of which is that he might die far away from home. If he
attached any importance to that, he says, he would never leave his parish, let alone
France. But the objection is spurious: death is the same everywhere. In fact, there
are more disadvantages than otherwise in dying at home.: "[B] J'ay veu plusieurs
mourans bien piteusement assiegez de tout ce train: cette presse les estouffe. C'est
contre le devoir et est tesmoignage de peu d'affection et de peu de soing de vous
laisser mourir en repos: l'un tourmente vos yeux, l'autre vos oreilles, l'autre la
bouche; il n'y a sens ny membre qu'on ne vous fracasse. Le coeur vous serre de pitié
d'ouyr les plaintes des amis, et de despit à l'avanture d'ouyr d'autres plaintes feintes et
masquées."113 Far better to die on the road, among strangers.
That is the voice of experience, negative at least. It is impossible not to think that La
Boétie was one of the ‘plusieurs mourans bien pitieusement assiegez de tout ce train’:
there are too many echoes here, especially of certain details such as La Boétie calling
out to Montaigne "tout pitieusement: 'Mon frere, n’avez vous pas de compassion de
tant de tourments que je souffre? Ne voyez vous pas meshuy que tout le secours que
vous me faites ne sert que d’allongement à ma peine?'";114 or when, hearing his wife
weeping, "il l’appella, et luy dit ainsi: 'Ma semblance, vous vous tourmentez avant le
113 III.9:956/1107. Friedrich (p.351) thinks that there may be an echo here of the Phaedo: "wo
Sokrates die Frauen wegschickt, um 'in heiligem Schweigen' zu sterben." But of course Socrates does
not send his friends away. In fact it would be difficult to imagine anything less Socratic than the sort of
solipsistic death Montaigne has in mind here.
114 Lettre p.1357.
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temps: voulez-vous pas avoir pitié de moy?'"115
And there are other signs that experience, direct experience, was leading Montaigne to
the conclusion that stoical fortitude in the face of death was not the answer. The
chapter (II.6) describing the accident when he was thrown from his horse and nearly
died, begins by referring to those philosophers who train and form the soul, for
example by renouncing wealth in order to practise poverty. But, he states
immediately and without argument: "[A] Mais à mourir, qui est la plus grande
besoigne que nous ayons à faire, l’exercitation ne nous y peut ayder. On se peut, par
usage et par experience, fortifier contre les douleurs, la honte, l’indigence et tels
autres accidents; mais, quant à la mort, nous ne la pouvons essayer qu’une fois; nous
y sommes tous apprentifs quand nous y venons."116
In other words, the exact opposite of the main argument in I.20.117 And it seems that
he has arrived at this opposite position as a result of reflecting on that accident -
which had happened probably about three years before he wrote II.6. Because we
can, he goes on, have some experience of death: "[A] Il me semble toutefois qu’il y a
quelque façon de nous apprivoiser à elle et de l’essayer aucunement. Nous en pouvons
avoir experience, sinon entiere et parfaicte, au moins telle qu'elle ne soit pas inutile, et
qui nous rende plus fortifiez et asseurez."118 But he no longer means this in the sense
of collecting stories at second hand, or looking at mummified corpses, or frequenting
the idea of death. In fact, what he has in mind is not something we can arrange at all.
115 Ibid p.1359.
116 II.6: 350/416.
117 Friedrich (p.344) prefers to put it like this: "Der Essay II.6 'widerspricht' nicht dem Essay I.20.
Aber er verschiebt jetzt alles so sehr in den Aspekt der inneren Erfahrung, dass etwas von jenem Essay
höchst Verschiedenes herauskommt."
118 II.6: 351/417.
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"[A] Mais ceux qui sont tombez par quelque violent accident en defaillance de coeur
et qui y ont perdu tous sentimens, ceux là, à mon advis, ont esté bien près de voir son
vray et naturel visage; car, quant à l'instant et au point du passage, il n'est pas à
craindre qu'il porte avec soy aucun travail ou desplaisir, d'autant que nous ne pouvons
avoir nul sentiment sans loisir."119 And here he repeats the thought which he had
introduced tangentially in I.20, that many things, such as illness, appear more
frightening in anticipation than in reality. "[A] J'espere qu'il m'en adviendra de
mesme de la mort, et qu'elle ne vaut pas la peine que je prens à tant d'apprests que je
dresse et tant de secours que j'appelle et assemble pour en soustenir l'effort."120
At this point, therefore, he seems to be hovering between second-hand experience,
which is the subject, largely, of I.20, and direct experience which is at the heart of
II.6. Because it is that direct experience of near-death which has encouraged him to
hope that death really is something "plus grande par imagination que par effect."121
Indeed the foretaste of death which has been vouchsafed him is not only less
frightening than he had imagined it would be: it is not even unpleasant.
And he concludes that "à la verité, pour s’aprivoiser à la mort, je trouve qu’il n y a
que de s’en avoisiner."122 Of course this is quite a different kind of "aprivoiser" from
the frequenting and contemplating and practising death recommended in I.20123 -
because the kind in II.6 is not something we can choose to experience at all. The
experience envisaged in I.20 must be appropriated by each person individually: if the
119 Ibid. 351-2/418.
120 Ibid. 352/418.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. 357/424.
123 Cf. I.20: 86/97: "Il est impossible que d'arrivée nous ne sentions des piqueures de telles
imaginations. Mais en les maniant et repassant, au long aller, on les aprivoise sans doubte."
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fear of dying is to be removed you must dwell constantly on the inevitability and the
imminence of death. But this approach doesn’t work, or at least it doesn’t work for
Montaigne who has tried it as much as anyone. On the other hand, the experience of
death described in II.6 can only come to a few, and it cannot be stage-managed, it
happens entirely by chance - which is to say, it happens not artificially but naturally.
The role of Nature in the approach to death was adumbrated in I.20, both in the minor
digression which described her leading us down the gentle slope to old age and so
making death easier to face, and by implication in the postscript referring to the
instinctive assurance of the the "gens de village" when they come to die. But the main
chapter on death from Montaigne’s later years - III.12, De la Phisionomie - develops
the central importance of nature, to the detriment of stoical philosophy and scholarly
erudition.
At one point Montaigne confesses that his chapter titles do not always encapsulate
their subject-matter,124 and on the face of it III.12 is a good example. The sequence of
ideas is: Socrates is the paragon of moral excellence, simplicity and naturalness; but
Socrates was ugly; which is strange, because human beauty and human goodness are
often linked. But the exposition of the first element takes up twenty-two pages in the
Pléiade edition, with no overt mention of physiognomy, to which two pages are then
loosely devoted; while the final four pages relate to two of Montaigne’s own
experiences where he thinks his own frank countenance saved his bacon.
It is the first twenty-two pages which are interesting. Socrates has now supplanted the
124 III.9: 973/1124-5.
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superhuman Cato in Montaigne’s mind as the model of nobility and greatness,
precisely because he is human, down-to-earth, natural. While Cato was far beyond
the reach of any of us, "[B] Socrates faict mouvoir son ame d'un mouvement naturel
et commun. Ainsi dict un paysan, ainsi dict une femme.125 . . .les plus simples y
recognoissent leurs moyens et leur force; il n'est possible d'aller plus arriere et plus
bas. Il a faict grand faveur à l'humaine nature de montrer combien elle peut d'elle
mesme."126 Knowledge, study, book-learning are greatly overrated, more dangerous
than useful. "Il ne nous faut guiere de doctrine pour vivre à nostre aise. Et Socrates
nous aprend qu'elle est en nous, et la manière de l'y trouver et de s'en ayder."127
This applies quintessentially to death. "[B] Recueillez-vous; vous trouverez en vous
les arguments de la nature contre la mort vrais, et les plus propres à vous servir à la
necessité; ce sont ceux qui font mourir un paisan et des peuples entiers aussi
constamment qu'un philosophe."128 And he adds after 1588, in a kind of manifesto of
his later approach compared with the earlier: "[C] Fussé je mort moins allegrement
avant qu'avoir veu les Tusculanes? J'estime que non. Et quand je me trouve au
propre, je sens que ma langue s'est enrichie, mon courage de rien; il est comme
Nature me le forgea, et se targue pour le conflict d'une marche populaire et
commune."129
After further denigration of the useless subtleties of erudition he gives some examples
of the common people’s approach. Knowing nothing of Aristotle or Cato, and aided
only by Nature, they seem to face death far more simply and with far more resolve
125 III.12: 1013/1173.
126 Ibid. 1015/1175.
127 Ibid. 1016/1176.
128 Ibid.
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than those who face it with the aid of philosophy: "Combien en vois-je
ordinairement, qui mescognoissent la pauvreté? combien qui desirent la mort, ou qui
la passent sans alarme et sans affliction? Celuy là qui fouyt mon jardin, il a ce matin
enterré son pere ou son fils."130 And this is especially apparent in times - like those -
of pestilence and social upheaval.131 His conclusion is that "[B] Nous avons
abandonné nature et luy voulons apprendre sa leçon, elle qui nous menoit si
hereusement et si seurement."132
Again he spells out the apparent completeness of his conversion from the argument in
I.20. Because now he thinks that anticipating death in order to prepare ourselves
produces the worst of all worlds: not only do we not succeed in preparing ourselves
for death, but we force ourselves to live through it twice. So that Cicero's maxim is
simply posturing: "[C] Ils s’en venteront tant qu’il leur plaira. Tota philosoforum vita
commentatio mortis est. Mais il m'est advis que c'est bien le bout, non pourtant le but
de la vie; c'est sa fin, son extremité, non pourtant son object. Elle doit estre elle
mesme à soy sa visée, son dessein; son droit estude est se regler, se conduire, se
souffrir. Au nombre de plusieurs autres offices que comprend ce general et principal
chapitre de sçavoir vivre, est cet article de sçavoir mourir; et des plus legers si nostre
crainte ne luy donnoit poids."133 Or putting it still more baldly: "[B] Si vous ne
sçavez pas mourir, ne vous chaille; nature vous en informera sur le champ,
plainement et suffisamment."134 This is what common folk understand naturally and
what enables them to endure all kinds of ills, and if they are to be criticised as crass
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid. 1017/1178.
131 Ibid. 1025/1187.
132 Ibid. 1026/1188.
133 Ibid. 1028/1190-1.
134 Ibid. 1028/1190.
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and obtuse, "[B] Pour Dieu . . .tenons d'ores en avant escolle de bestise. C'est
l'extreme fruict que les sciences nous promettent, auquel cette-cy conduict si
doucement ses disciples. Nous n'aurons pas faute de bons regens, interpretes de la
simplicité naturelle."135
One of those "good professors" is Socrates, and as an example of Socratic teaching
Montaigne now repeats ("de ce qu'il m'en souvient")136 the gist of Plato’s Apology, in
the course of which Socrates says - according to Montaigne - "[B] Je sçay que je n'ay
ny frequenté, ny recogneu la mort . . ."137 Montaigne says he has selected this speech
as an example of Socratic reasoning, because dying is part of nature (so that to fear it
is quite unnatural), and Socrates explains this in the most simple and natural way,
without artifice and without dressing up his thoughts in other people’s words. Which
gives Montaigne the excuse for two pages on borrowing other people’s words, before
he at last gets round explicitly to the subject of physiognomy.
Now on a superficial level this is straightforward enough. Over the years
Montaigne’s thinking on the subject of death and how to approach it has changed.
The doubts which were already present earlier, undermining his presentation of the
view that the only way to deal with death was to anticipate it by frequenting it, have
expanded into the precisely opposite approach, that the only way to deal with death is
to ignore it. "La stupidité du vulgaire", ridiculed in I.20, becomes - in the same words
- the model attitude in III.12.138 Death in I.20 is "le but de nostre carriere"; dying in
III.12 "est bien le bout, non pourtant le but de la vie." Cicero’s phrase "tota
135 Ibid. 1029/1192.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 On Montaigne's evolving attitude to "le vulgaire" see Frame, 1955, pp.3 ff. and 165 ff.
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philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est", which was the battle-cry of I.20, is
dismissed in III.12 as bluster.139
But a closer look may suggest that Montaigne is doubly disingenuous in III.12 and
involves himself in a double contradiction. First, it might have been expected of
someone who prides himself on his frankness and his abhorrence of lying, to come
clean and admit that he has changed his mind and that he regards his previous position
as no longer tenable. (Because it is clear from the above pairs of opposites that this is
not one of those cases where he can preserve an uncommitted detachment,
maintaining that he merely thinks differently now and that there is nothing to choose
139 Cf. Villey (II, pp.394f): "Il est impossible de confesser plus hautement ses erreurs passées. Sur la
question de la préparation à la mort, le douzième essai du troisième livre . . .est en contradiction
formelle avec le vingtième du premier livre, la théorie de 1588 avec celle de 1572." There have,
however, been many attempts to argue away the contradictions between I.20 and III.12 - see Boon,
pp.307f. for the first moves in this direction in the 1950s. Brody's chapter on Montaigne and death is a
good example. The title to I.20 he takes not as a proposition to which Montaigne subscribes but "une
simple hypothèse liminaire, discutable ou même sujette à caution." And "le vulgaire" referred to
disparagingly in the first part of I.20 are not, he says, to be understood as equivalent to "les gens de
village et de basse condition" of the epilogue: "le vulgaire" are envisaged by Montaigne "non pas
globalement ou dans l'abstract à titre de classe sociale, mais comme proie potentielle à l'irrationalité,
comme victime de tendances dénaturantes et déshumanisantes."
But it is not entirely clear why these scholars are so anxious to make Montaigne consistent. Quite apart
from his own explicit admission that he does change his mind, frequently, and that the later thoughts
are not necessarily superior to the earlier, what is more likely than that a man's approach to death
should evolve over a period of twenty years, or even alter radically? In any case, Montaigne seems to
have rejoiced in paradox and playful contradiction: inconsistency is a charge which would not have
troubled him in the least. So that a reading which aims to remove all contradictions and paradox and
force him into the straitjacket of strict logical consistency is likely itself to be missing the point.
Moreover, it has to be said that the difference between the evolutionary and the non-evolutionary
interpretations is sometimes less than clear-cut. Boon, for example, sets out (p.308) to demonstrate
"l'insuffisance des arguments de la thèse évolutive et le sens profond d'unité de ce thème [la mort] dans
les Essais", but what he actually establishes (p.315) is that Montaigne moved from a young man's
approach to death as largely theoretical to something much more personal: "L'on sait que la venue de
la maladie et de la vieillesse change radicalement sa situation. Ce qui avait été matière à réflexion
devient maintenant objet d'expérience." (Ibid.) In other words, from "la mort" to "ma mort". And is
this not evolution? Conversely, while Sayce (pp.134f.) declares (p.134) that "In the Third Book the
evolution, not to say volte-face, is complete," and that "the evolution from one position (importance of
preparation for death) to its opposite (unimportance of preparation for death) is thus established beyond
doubt," nevertheless "at a deeper level" this may be a distinction without much of a difference:
"Whether to be achieved through stern effort or evasive action, the object remains the same: the
treatment of death as no more than an incident which hardly ruffles the surface of a serene life.
Evolution, here as elsewhere, is largely the drawing out of latent potentialities."
183
between the two points of view: this is a practical subject - how to behave in relation
to death - and he does think that his later approach is preferable to the earlier.) But
instead of admitting this, he pours scorn on those who inspired his earlier view, and
whom he had previously quoted with unqualified approval - notably Cicero.
It could conceivably be argued that this is to miss the point, which lies in the ironical
references to his own earlier position, ironical because they deliberately echo the same
vocabulary and phraseology but with quite different implications. Things are,
however, more serious when it comes to citing Socrates in support of the new
position, and putting words in his mouth which not only did he never say but which
are actually the opposite of what he did say. It is ironical enough (ironical in a less
favourable sense) that Montaigne, as part of the process of promoting Socrates’
natural simplicity, simultaneously demotes Cicero by writing off the latter’s "tota
philosophorum vita commentatio mortis est" as mere puff - and omits to mention that
this is actually a paraphrase of Socrates himself. Perhaps his memory let him down at
this point - it was, as he often says, notoriously weak. But then he goes on to give an
extended paraphrase of Plato’s Apology, allegedly from memory: he prefaces it with
the words "de ce qu'il m'en souvient." He could of course have verified his sources -
he even draws attention two pages later to the fact that at the time of writing he is
surrounded by his thousand volumes. Instead, by relying, or pretending to rely, on his
notoriously weak memory, he is able to insert into his representation of Socrates’
speech a sentence which is not in the original, which is the opposite of what is implied
in the quotation two pages earlier from the Phaedo, and which gives Socratic
authority to Montaigne’s new approach: "Je sçay que je n'ay ny frequenté, ny
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recogneu la mort."140
And this leads to the two contradictions in which Montaigne entangles himself in
III.12. The first is a logical contradiction. His argument is that the proper approach to
death is to forget about it and leave it to nature as the common people do, an approach
which Socrates allegedly embodied; and part of his eulogy of Socrates is based on the
natural simplicity of the latter’s style of argument, never relying on other people’s
words.141 But if Montaigne’s new approach is simply what nature teaches and the
common people embody, why not simply say so and leave it at that? If the new
approach is inaccessible to philosophy, why adduce a philosopher in support? If the
common people can die fearlessly without knowing anything of Aristotle and Cato,
they can presumably die fearlessly without knowing anything of Socrates - and so can
we. If Montaigne denies that he would have died any less happily before reading the
Tusculan Disputations, why should he die any less happily before reading Socrates -
especially since the Tusculans are quoting Socrates? If his mind’s "buckler in the
combat with death is to approach it as do the common people",142 why does he need to
buckle on Socrates as well? And if one of the reasons why Socrates is so admirable is
his refusal to be dependent on other people, is it not rather absurd to be dependent on
Socrates?
140 Friedrich, who after drawing attention to everything about Socrates which Montaigne never refers
to - Ideas, immortality, cosmology, definition and objective ethical principles - proceeds (p.72): "Diese
Streichungen sind charakteristisch. Sie liegen genau an der Stelle, wo Montaignes eigenes Denken
Halt macht. Dabei ist nun freilich immer noch genügend sorgfältige Rücksicht auf die Überlieferung
da, so dass man nicht sagen könnte, er habe Sokrates verzeichnet. Er hat nur die Umrisse enger
gezogen." It is not quite clear from this which Socrates Friedrich is denying that Montaigne
misrepresented. But the reality is that Montaigne does refer to the Platonic Socrates' approach to death
(tota philosophorum vita ...) and does incorporate into the Apology what appears to be a fictitious
contradiction of that approach ("I know that I have neither frequented death...") It is difficult not to
conclude that rather than drawing narrower boundaries, Montaigne is redrawing Socrates in his own
image - as Friedrich himself suggests on the previous page: "Ja man hat oft, wenn er ihn [Sokrates]
schildert, den Eindruck, als schildere er sich selbst."
141 Unlike himself, he adds disarmingly: some assert "que j'ay seulement faict icy un amas de fleurs
estrangeres, n'y ayant fourny du mien que le filet à les lier." (III.12: 1033/1196.)
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The second contradiction is factual: the Socrates of Plato (and Montaigne's Socrates
is drawn at least partly from the Socrates of Plato) does not in fact, either in his words
or his actions, adopt what is alleged to be the natural approach to death of the
common people, namely not to reflect on it at all. Limiting the evidence to the
Apologia, a man who spends his time pestering others to place the good of their souls
above wealth and fame, who considers the unexamined life to be not worth living, and
who will always prefer death to doing wrong, is hardly behaving naturally and will
certainly not be taken for one of "le vulgaire".
4. Further Thoughts
There is, however, more to say in relation to Montaigne's representation of Socrates in
III.12. Some commentators want to revise conventional interpretations of Montaigne
and to tell us what he really meant, either by reading between the lines and finding an
involuntary concealment of the truth on psychological grounds, or by reading the
Essais in such a way as to evacuate them of contradiction or inconsistency. Nehamas
has a very different aim, indeed his aim is the opposite: to show that sometimes
Montaigne does not mean what he says - that he can be deliberately obfuscatory or
ironically ambiguous - and to allow him to remain in hiding behind the mask.
"Through his discussion of Socrates' speech and his own borrowings [in III.12],
Montaigne has raised, as explicitly as any author of his degree of indirectness ever
could, the question whether the surface of his texts indicates their real meaning,
142 Ibid. 1016/1176.
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whether their appearance expresses their nature. That is the central question of
physiognomy."143
Nehamas' treatment of De la Phisionomie is in the context of Socrates' role as a model
for the art of living. His thesis is that "the art of living comes in three varieties, three
genres." The Socrates of Plato's early dialogues exemplifies the first: "his ideal may
be universalist, but he has no means by which to prove that is right. He remains
tentative and protreptic." Secondly, Plato - specifically in the Phaedo and the
Republic - constructs an art of living which is in fact claimed to apply to everyone and
which is supported by theoretical argument. But the third genre is "the least
universalist of all. According to it, human life takes many forms and no single mode
of life is best for all. Philosophers like Montaigne . . . articulate a way of living that
only they and perhaps a few others can follow. They do not insist that their life is a
model for the world at large. They do not want to be imitated, at least not directly.
That is, they believe that those who want to imitate them must develop their own art
of living, their own self, perhaps to exhibit it for others but not so that others imitate
them directly. Imitation, in this context, is to become someone on one's own: but the
someone one becomes must be different from one's model."144
And this conceptual framework proposed by Nehemas may suggest an answer to
some of the questions raised in the course of this chapter. After discussing
Montaigne's use in III.12 of the Silenus theme from the Symposium, Nehamas says:
"Socrates is not the only Silenus. Montaigne's essay and Montaigne himself are also
instances of Alcibiades' image. . . Both Socrates and Montaigne need to be interpreted
143 Nehamas, p.118.
144 Ibid. pp.9-10.
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in order to be understood. . . Physiognomy cannot be trusted, especially when one,
like Montaigne, is still in the process of fashioning himself."145 So Montaigne is not
didactic, but neither do the Essais form a finished and easily accessible self-portrait.
And both these approaches miss the point because they both want to use Montaigne as
a model to be imitated.
A second question to which Nehemas suggests an answer is that concerning the role
of nature in I.20 and III.12. Nehemas is unashamedly "evolutionist": "Philosophy
had traditionally been taken as 'a preparation for death' - a tradition Montaigne
himself had accepted in his early essay, 'That to philosophize is to learn to die'. But
now he has a different view."146 Using Socrates as a model, Montaigne arrives at an
approach to death which is natural, informed by nature. But both "Socrates" and
"nature" require to be explicated. Montaigne's Socrates is "the result of stitching
together the testimonies of Plato and Xenophon, Cicero and Plutarch."147 And
Cicero's story about Socrates correcting by training a soul which at first matched his
ugly exterior allows Montaigne "to think of nature not as a lost original state but as a
state achieved through rational self-restraint. . . Despite the apparently central thesis
of the essay, 'Of Physiognomy', one does not start as a natural being; that is
something one becomes. . . Nature, therefore, is not simply the origin where
individuals or society begin. More important, it is the final state in which our various
inclinations work for a common purpose, refusing to trespass on one another's ground,
and enable each individual to accomplish the best - the different best - of which each
145 Nehamas, pp.125-6. And cf. at p.111: "Nothing in [III.12], neither Socrates' nor Montaigne's
various stories, nor even Montaigne's own writing, can be taken at face value." Nehamas quotes from
III.2:782/907-8: "[B] Je ne puis asseurer mon object....Je ne peints pas l'estre. Je peints le passage:
non un passage d'aage en autre, ou, comme dit le peuple, de sept en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de
minute en minute."
146 Nehamas, p.115.
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is capable."148
Thirdly, Nehamas argues that Montaigne's strategy in constructing that composite
image of Socrates is aimed at his presentation of nature. The closing speech from the
Apology which Montaigne alleges he is quoting from memory is, in Nehamas' words,
"a condensation, rearrangement, and eclectic paraphrase;"149 but "despite his various
sources and his own manipulation of them, Montaigne insists that Socrates' speech, as
he has rendered it, is perfectly natural: 'In an unstudied and artless boldness and a
childlike assurance it represents the pure and primary impression and ignorance of
Nature.'"150 And it is specifically from Xenophon, says Nehamas, that Montaigne
derives "a non-esoteric Socrates, a Socrates who is common, straightforward, and
'natural' as can be."151
Fourth, there is the paradox involved in Montaigne's appeal to Socrates in support of
his hostility to the philosophers. The general question, Nehamas says, "is how
Socrates, whose main concern was to care for himself, a man who neither presented
himself as, nor was teacher of anyone, could function as a model for another. The
147 Ibid. p.120.
148 Ibid. pp.123-4.
149 Ibid. p.116. It is curious that both Friedrich and Nehamas labour under the misapprehension that
Montaigne waters down Socrates' speech in the Apology by omitting any reference to an afterlife. So
Friedrich (p.367): "Dabei ist es sehr bezeichnend, dass er den im Platon-Text enthaltenen
Agnostizismus des Sokrates (ob der Tod gänzliche Vernichtung sei oder Übergang in ein Nachleben
der Seele) beteutend steigert. Bei Platon nämlich hört man: es könnte ja immerhin sein, dass die Seele
nicht untergeht. Bei Montaigne hört man das nicht mehr. Er will nicht wissen, was nach dem Tode aus
uns wird." And Nehamas (p.116): "There now follows a remarkable passage, a condensation,
rearrangement, and eclectic paraphrase of Plato's Apology, from which Montaigne has excised
Socrates'...tentative view that the soul may survive the body's death." Whereas in fact Montaigne's
version of the speech reads: "[B] Quant à moy, je ne sçay ny quelle elle est, ny quel il faict en l'autre
monde. A l'avanture est la mort chose indifferente, à l'avanture desirable. [C] (Il est à croire pourtant,
si c'est une transmigration d'une place à autre , qu'il y a de l'amendement d'aller vivre avec tant de
grands personnages trespassez, et d'estre exempt d'avoir plus à faire à juges iniques et corrompus...)"
(III.12: 1030/1192.)
150 Nehamas, p.117.
151 Ibid. p.110.
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question is more pressing when that other, like Montaigne, is also concerned with the
care of his own self."152 The answer is that Montaigne is neither imitating the
example of Socrates nor offering himself as a model to be imitated. Nehamas quotes
Friedrich, who said that "Montaigne's only aim is. . .to grant every person the same
right to the freedom of being himself that the author claims for himself."153 Or putting
it another way, for both Socrates and Montaigne the Delphic injunction to "know
yourself" is crucial: but whenever that injunction is obeyed it is always a different
self which is known. "Socrates taught Montaigne a few general precepts, like 'Live
according to your power' or 'Follow nature', which do not describe their end and offer
no instructions for reaching it. To apply them, one must determine one's particular
powers, which . . . are different in each individual case. Socrates also taught
Montaigne that there is little to learn from him, even though one can learn a lot
through him. And he taught him that to learn through Socrates is not to follow him
and re-create him but, as Montaigne himself does in this Silenic text, to become his
own model of nature."154
Now the trouble with all this is that when you start from the premiss that your subject
is more or less impenetrable, you are likely, if you say anything at all, to err on the
side of intelligibility. Or as Kierkegaard would put it, the temptation is "to paint the
god Mars in the armour which made him invisible." And at times Nehamas is in
danger of falling into this trap. If III.12 is "immensely complex, apparently
disorganised, often contradictory";155 if "nothing in the essay, neither Socrates' nor
Montaigne's various stories, or even Montaigne's own writing, can be taken at face
152 Ibid. pp.119-20.
153 Ibid. p.104.
154 Ibid. p.126.
155 Ibid. p.108.
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value";156 if it is so questionable whether "the surface of his texts indicate their real
meaning";157 if "in Montaigne's world, perhaps everywhere, it is impossible to show
oneself as what one really is"158 - if all this is true, how is Nehamas able to be so lucid
in his analysis of what Montaigne really means, and so self-confident? Or putting it
another way, what are the criteria for deciding whether his analysis is correct?
One answer to the last question would be that the test is whether the interpretation
accounts coherently and exhaustively for everything in the original text. But there are
several problems in that respect with Nehamas' treatment. First, there is his argument
that "Montaigne's insistence that Socrates defeated his original inclination to vice
through reason allows him to think of nature not as a lost original state but as a state
achieved through rational self-restraint."159 Because what Nehamas does not mention
is Montaigne's later addition: "[B] Come Socrates disoit de la sienne qu'elle en
accusoit justement autant en son ame, s'il ne l'eust corrigée par institution. [C] Mais
en le disant je tiens qu'il se mocquoit suivant son usage, et jamais ame si excellente ne
se fit elle mesme."160 Now that addition may itself be an ironic jest,161 but it does on
the face of it undermine the Socratic authority behind Nehamas' interpretation of
Montaigne's understanding of nature, and simply to ignore it undermines the
credibility of that interpretation.
Second, there are other remarks in III.12 which seem to run counter to Nehamas'
claim that in Montaigne's eyes "one does not start as a natural being: that is
156 Ibid. p.111.
157 Ibid. p.118.
158 Ibid. p.122.
159 Ibid. p.123.
160 III.12:1035/1199.
161 Although it echoes a passage in II.11: 402/474: "[A] ...car je ne puis concevoir en ce personnage là
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something one becomes."162 For example: "[B] [Socrates] ne monta rien, mais ravala
plustost et ramena à son point originel et naturel et lui soubmit la vigueur, les aspretez
et les difficultez.;163 or "[C] Fussé je mort moins allegrement avant qu'avoir veu les
Tusculanes? J'estime que non. Et quand je me trouve au propre, je sens que ma
langue s'est enrichie, mon courage de rien; il est comme Nature me le forgea, et se
targue pour le conflict d'une marche populaire et commune."164
Third, there is the question of universality, and Nehamas' central contention that
Montaigne does not intend to universalise, but that in order to fulfil the Socratic
injunction to follow nature "one must determine one's particular powers, which . . .are
different in each individual case."165 Against that there is this apparently unequivocal
sentence: "[B] Et en ont faict les hommes comme les parfumiers de l'huile: ils l'ont
sophistiquée de tant d'argumentations et de discours appellez du dehors, qu'elle en est
devenue variable et particuliere à chacun, et a perdu son propre visage, constant et
universel, et nous faut en chercher tesmoignage des bestes, non subject à faveur,
corruption, ny à diversité d'opinions."166
Of course (as always) each of these quotations can be countered by others from the
same chapter which go in the opposite direction. There is another (C) passage which
repeats the idea of reason straightening out Socrates' vicious tendencies;167 there are
several passages which envisage the possibility of the "desnaturés" somehow (but that
is the problem) reacquiring the lost innocence which simple people still possess
aucun effort de vitieuse concupiscence. Au train de sa vertu, je n'y puis imaginer aucune difficulté et
aucune contrainte..."
162 Nehamas, p.123.
163 III.12: 1014/1174.
164 Ibid. 1016/1176.
165 Nehamas, p. 126.
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naturally;168 and against the universality of nature there is the remark that "[B] Les
hommes sont divers en goust et en force; il les faut mener à leur bien selon eux, et par
routes diverses."169
But that is not the point. Obviously Nehamas can and does cite evidence from the
text of III.12 in support of his various claims. The question is rather whether his
interpretation does justice to the whole of that chapter.170 Or putting it another way:
given the ambiguities of the content, and given that Montaigne's playful allusion right
at the end171 to Plutarch's habit of presenting things "[B] en ces deux sortes . .
diversement et contrairement" is clearly intended to apply to Montaigne himself, by
what authority does Nehamas select one strand, one of the "two opposite and
contrasting manners", and use that as the basis for his interpretation? How can he
clear himself of the suspicion that in procrustean fashion he has simply arranged
Montaigne to fit his preconceived theory?172
5. Conclusions
Nehamas of course is right, that there is something unfinished about Montaigne, that
he was constantly fashioning himself and constantly refashioning his thoughts.
Which means that the title of Screech's translation - "Complete Essays of Michel de
166 III.12: 1026-7/1188.
167 Ibid. 1037/1201: "[C] Cette raison, qui redresse Socrates de son vicieux ply. . ."
168 E.g. 1026/1188.
169 Ibid. 1029/1191.
170 Cf. Sayce, p.1: "...quotations from the Essais taken in isolation can be highly misleading: as with
the Bible, almost anything can be proved. Ideally every quotation should be related to the whole
complex of attitudes, but this is hardly a practical possibility."
171 Ibid. 1041/1206.
172 Cf. Sayce again (ibid.): "It follows too that, faced with such multiplicity, any critic tends to extract
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Montaigne" - is an oxymoron, and that this heading "Conclusions" is itself
misleading: "Latest Thoughts" might be better.173
Not only that, the man was a mass of contradictions, in the way he thought, the way
he wrote, and the way he presented himself. Except that the word "contradiction"
needs to be qualified or elaborated. There are times when two of his statements or
approaches are in formal contradiction to each other - and the reason may be a
progression in his thinking (or at least a change of mind), or a deliberately
uncommitted proffering of alternatives, or an ironic display of the perverse nature of
the human mind.174 At other times what is involved is more paradox than
contradiction, and the cause lies in the nature of his subject-matter or in the limitations
of the human mind.175 And there must also be times, given the limitations of the
particular man Montaigne and the extraordinary scope of the Essais, when he
contradicts himself unintentionally.
What all this amounts to is that it is dangerous to do anything with Montaigne except
read him, since analysis or paraphrase or even quotation will inevitably result in
omission and distortion.176 Rather than attempting to reach some sort of finality,
those elements which will make Montaigne in his own image."
173 Cf. Friedrich's remark (p.8) on the effect Montaigne's style has on his commentators: "Das liegt am
Charakter des dargestellten Autors und seines beweglichen, umherkreisenden Denkstils."
174 Cf. III.2: 782/908.
175 Cf. III.13: 1045/1211-2: "[C] C'est signe de racourciment d'esprit quand il se contente, ou de
lasseté. Nul esprit genereux ne s'arreste en soy: il pretend tousjours et va outre ses forces; il a des
eslans au delà de ses effects; s'il ne s'avance et ne se presse et ne s'accule et ne se choque, il n'est vif
qu'à demy; [B] ses poursuites sont sans terme, et sans forme; son aliment c'est [C] admiration, chasse,
[B] ambiguité. Ce que declaroit assez Apollo, parlant tousjours à nous doublement, obscurement et
obliquement, ne nous repaissant pas, mais nous amusant et embesongnant. C'est un mouvement
irregulier, perpetuel, sans patron, et sans but."
176 Cf. Friedrich, p.33: "Wollte man die Essais resumieren in einer Kernidee (etwa im que sais-je?)
und deren Teilen, so bliebe zuviel unerfasst von dem, was sie in ihrer Breite sind...Ihre
Nachdenklichkeit und Anschaulichkeit, ihr Witz und ihre Laune ertragen nicht eine verkürzte
Wiedergabe, so wenig wie eine Meditation oder eine Erzählung das ertrüge." Accordingly, (p.8):
"...die beste Art, ihm [Montaigne] beizukommen, ohne ihn zu erdrücken, ist das mitgehende
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therefore, this "conclusion" simply asks some questions. There is a sentence in II.6
which has already been referred to: "[A] Ce n'est pas ci ma doctrine, c'est mon
estude; et n'est pas la leçon d'autruy, c'est la mienne."177 The first question then is,
did Montaigne in fact learn anything from his investigations into approaching death?
It seems to be a reasonable inference that he saw his earlier approach as useless and
that he therefore abandoned it. There is no direct evidence that he came to doubt the
validity of his later approach, or that he found it less than effective - no direct
evidence. But it may be remarked, as he himself remarked about Seneca, that the very
fact of writing so much about death "[B] montre aucunement qu'il estoit pressé de son
adversaire."178 After all, it is on the face of it peculiar for someone who wants to
discourage reflection about death to spend so much time reflecting about it. That the
earlier approach in I.20 was not the answer, was already suggested by the
contradictions contained within it. That the later approach in III.12 was not the
answer either is suggested by the contradiction involved in the very act of articulating
it at such length.
But a more substantive answer to the question might be that he seems first to have
thought of death as "la mort",179 and moved from there to seeing it as "ma mort": in
other words, the universal human problem, "solved" by the traditional artes moriendi,
became for him the problem of the death of Michel de Montaigne.180 But the
Beschreiben."
177 II.6: 357/424.
178 III.12: 1017/1177.
179 So Friedrich (p.328) says that in the early chapters "Montaigne spricht noch in einer unpersönlichen
Neutralität. Er ist noch nicht mit sich selber allein. Sein Ich steht stellvertretend für die Gattung
Mensch."
180 See Friedrich, p.352: "Die öfter gebrauchte Formel ma mort..., die die frühere la mort abgelöst
hat, drückt den grossen Schritt aus, den er gemacht hat vom objektiven Todeswissen zur Todesnähe in
der individuellen Innerlichkeit." And cf. p. 325: "Stärker als irgendein antiker Philosoph
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"solution" to that problem he found in the perspective of "sa mort", his or her death,
that is to say the death of other people, the valets and chambermaids, "les gens de
basse condition": the problem of my approaching death is answered by how they
approach death ("cette mesme mort"), or how death approaches them. And that
perspective in turn throws all the emphasis back from death onto life. One could say
that for Montaigne it becomes increasingly a problem of life and death: to see death
as the peasant does, in terms of what is natural, involves living life as the peasant
does, naturally.181
But two further questions immediately arise from that. The first is, how is the
"desnaturé" to learn how to be natural again? How can the philosopher become the
peasant?182 Montaigne forestalls the obvious criticism that his peasants are an
absurdly over-romanticised figment of his imagination with the argument: All right,
even if they are actually crass and obtuse and insensitive, and even if that is the only
reason why they are able to endure suffering with such constancy and steadfastness,
"Pour Dieu, s'il est ainsi, tenons d'ores en avant escolle de bestise."183 But how
precisely do we enrol in that school? If the common people do not think about death,
this is not because they have been told not to think about it, but because they naturally
don’t think about it.184 What happens if we naturally do think about it? Can we
individualisiert er den Tod. Er wird ihm zunehmend wichtig als sein eigenes künftiges Sterben." Cf.
also Leeman, who finds in Montaigne (p.322) "eine Entwicklung von allgemeiner Erörterung über das
Todesproblem zu einer immer direkteren Bezogenheit auf den eigenen Tod."
181 In Starobinski's formulation (p.100): "Tandis que l'imminence de la mort incite le chrétien à
diriger sa pensée vers l'au-delà, Montaigne au contraire reporte son regard sur l'en deçà."
182 If "difficultatem facit doctrina" (III.13: 1044/1210, quoting Quintilian), why should learning be
supposed capable of removing the difficulty?
183 III.12: 1029/1192.
184 Montaigne's own self-analysis ("[C] Je me tiens de la commune sorte, sauf en ce que je m'en tiens"
- II.17: 618/722) encapsulates this problem of learning to be natural, of consciously becoming
unconscious of death. Friedrich (p. 338) says that Montaigne "später dies Denken [an den Tod]
wiederum absichtsvoll in ein Vergessen wandelt," but he does not explain how the trick is done.
Similarly at p.365 Friedrich shows that he recognises the distinction but not the problem: "Die
philosophische Qualität dieses Todesverhältnisses wird dadurch nicht geschmälert, dass Montaigne von
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simply tell ourselves not to? And in what sense is it behaving in accordance with
Nature to tell ourselves to stop doing what comes naturally to us? What it amounts to
is this: in order to learn how to cope with death, we must imitate not Cicero, or Cato,
or Lucretius, or Socrates, or Pyrrho - but Pyrrho’s exemplary pig.185 The trouble is
that human beings cannot imitate pigs: exemplary pigs might fly.
The second consequential question relates to "sa mort" in a more restricted sense, the
sense of the death of another, as opposed to my own death. Or in different terms, the
problem of bereavement. It is remarkable that Montaigne has almost nothing to say
about bereavement. He refers of course to the extraordinary effect which La Boétie's
death had on him, but his relationship with La Boétie was itself so extraordinary that
it could not possibly serve in any sense as an example to others. Nor does Montaigne
see it as such. Everything about it was unique - or at least its like was not to be seen
above once in three hundred years - and so, the implication is, was the effect on him
of its cessation. In any case, even if it could operate as an example, it would simply
teach us to equate bereavement with unrelieved gloom. And apart from that his only
allusions to the death of others are indifferent or even cynical - for example, III.4, De
la Diversion, which recommends diverting the bereaved, not as a lasting cure but as
the best means of escaping unscathed from their presence. Whether or not Cole is
right - that this sort of thing argues the repression of deeper feelings186 - it does seem
to be the case that Montaigne was unconcerned with the problem of making sense of
another's death, and in particular with Ivan Karamazov's question: how to make sense
Unwissenheit, Vergessen, Natur redet. Es handelt sich um ein hochreflektiertes Vergessen, um eine
hochreflektierte Naturhaftigkeit." Here the impossible is disguised as paradox.
185 See I.14: 54/57: "[A] Pyrrho le Philosophe, se trouvant un jour de grande tourmente dans un
batteau, montroit à ceux qu'il voyoit les plus effrayez autour de luy, et les encourageoit par l'exemple
d'un pourceau, qui y estoit, nullement soucieux de cet orage."
186 Cole, p.174. And cf. Friedrich, p.327: "Es scheint, dass er den möglichen Tod seiner Nächsten
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of the cruel and agonizing death of a child.
Of course there are two obvious answers to this question: one that Montaigne
deliberately excludes any consideration of religion, and therefore any consideration of
theodicy; and the other that the Essais are anything but systematic, and therefore
there is no obligation on him when he discusses death to account for all its aspects.
But the fact remains that within an understanding of death which is underpinned by
Nature, such an attitude to bereavement seems oddly unnatural.
And oddly unsatisfying. According to Brody, Que philosopher, c'est apprendre à
mourir is the first example of a profane ars moriendi since classical antiquity:187 and
there is no doubt that it is profane - or even completely pagan, as Pascal called it.188
But is it really an ars moriendi at all? The sentence from II.6 quoted at the beginning
of this Conclusion was expanded after 1588 to read: "[A] Ce n'est pas ci ma doctrine,
c'est mon estude; et n'est pas la leçon d'autruy, c'est la mienne. [C] Et ne me doibt on
sçavoir mauvais gré pourtant, si je la communique. Ce qui me sert, peut aussi par
accident servir à un autre."189 And the function of the ars moriendi was after all to
help. The further question therefore arises: did Montaigne's thoughts on approaching
death ever help anyone else?
He refers frequently to Plato, but he mentions the immortality of the soul only to
stress the impossibility of coherently asserting it. He quotes extensively from Cicero's
Tusculan Disputations, but he ignores the stoic techniques for dealing with
überhaupt von sich wegschieben möchte..."
187 Brody, p.109.
188 Quoted by Brody, p.132.
189 II.6: 357/424.
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bereavement and suggests nothing else instead. In his philosophy of death he is
nearest to Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients, but then his 'philosophy' turns
out to be merely an artificial substitute for an original state of natural innocence, and
how the "desnaturé" is to return to that original state remains a mystery. In other
words, Montaigne's reflections on death hold out no prospect of anything other than
extinction, they offer no consolation or advice in bereavement, and they recommend
an approach to life and death which, unless it is already yours, seems to be
unattainable. Can they be said in that case to amount to an ars moriendi?
The answer perhaps is: yes, but only as part of an art of living in Nehamas' sense -
which involves us seeing Montaigne not as an example to be imitated (he is in any
case inimitable) but as a great original. And that in turn means that he must be left as
he is, with all his contradictions intact. We must take him as we find him, accepting
his self-criticism at its face value, and resisting the temptation to make virtues of his
vices.
His reflections on approaching death are from some points of view - that of the
scholar who wants to systematise them,190 or that of the disciple who wants to adopt
them191 - incoherent and useless. But from another point of view they may be said to
inspire, because contradiction, paradox, vacillation, even incoherence are in this
context the hallmarks of honesty and courage. His reflections show us a human being
engaged in battle. He is a human being like us; he has no better armour than we do
190 Cf. I.38: 231/265: "...voulans de toute cette suite continuer un corps, nous nous trompons."
Starobinski expands this (p.108-9): "Continuer un corps, ce serait faire oeuvre artificielle, vouloir
imposer une figure constante à ce qui est soumis à un 'branle' perpétuel. Forme, constance, stabilité,
fermeté - toutes qualités que nous invoquions pour définir les essences - ne sont que des illusions: seul
les logiciens professionels...pourront y recourir."
191 Cf. the little parable in II.37: 737/858: "[A] Un valet qui me servoit à les escrire soubs moy pensa
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because he refuses to shelter behind the conventional ceremonials and artes moriendi
of his time;192 and the enemy is our enemy. He seems to have somehow extricated
himself from the engagement - by deserting,193 or by collaborating,194 or perhaps
simply by surrendering.195 It is not important which, because we are not expected to
use his tactics in fighting our own battle. It is enough that he fought his, and wrote
about it.
faire un grand butin de m'en desrober plusieurs pieces choisies à sa poste. Cela me console, qu'il n'y
fera pas plus de gain que j'y ay fait de perte."
192 Cf. Friedrich, p.363: "Er nimmt, obwohl aus anderen Gründen, den Tod so ernst wie ein Christ,
aber er versagt sich christliche Tröstung."
193 Cf. III.9: 956/1107): "Je ne suis point arrivé à cette vigeur desdaigneuse qui se fortifie en soy-
mesme, que rien n'ayde, ny ne trouble; je suis d'un point plus bas. Je cherche à coniller et à me
desrober de ce passage, non par crainte, mais par art."
194 Cf. Friedrich, p.348: "Dabei wird das Negative des Todes nicht wegdisputiert: er bleibt der
Zerstörer, der Feind. Aber diesem Feind kann man die Hand geben: ein befreundeter Feind."
195 Cf. II.6: 357/423: "[A] C'eust esté sans mentir une mort bien heureuse; car la foiblesse de mon
discours me gardoit d'en rien juger, et celle du corps d'en rien sentir. Je me laissoy couler si doucement
et d'une façon si douce et si aisée que je ne sens guiere autre action moins poisante que celle-là estoit."
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V. Final Questions
The problems raised by approaching death are constant,1 and they are summed up by
St Augustine in a few deft sentences and in a way which suggests a framework for
comparison: "Vita misera est, mors incerta est; subito obrepat - quomodo hinc
exibimus? et ubi nobis discenda sunt quae hinc negleximus? ac non potius huius
neglegentiae supplicia luenda? quid, si mors ipsa omnem curam cum sensu
amputabit et finiet? ergo et hoc quaerendum." (And he adds: "Sed absit, ut ita sit.")2
In other words, three questions: how shall we die? how shall we live? and what
awaits us?
Now on the first - "quomodo hinc exibimus?" - it might be thought that one test of the
validity of the various approaches should be the way in which those who held them
actually did depart: the proof of the pudding. Or as Montaigne put it: "En tout le
reste il y peut avoir du masque. . .Mais à ce dernier rolle de la mort et de nous, il n'y a
plus que faindre, il faut parler François, il faut montrer ce qu'il y a de bon et de net
dans le fond du pot."3
So what did they reveal at the bottom of the pot, our eloquent philosophers of death?
We have reports only in relation to three, Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne.4 The first
1 Garland (p.ix) quotes Freud: "There is scarcely any other matter...upon which our thoughts and
feelings have changed so little since the very earliest times, and in which discarded forms have been so
completely preserved under a thin disguise, as our relation to death. Two things account for our
conservatism: the strength of our original emotional reaction to death and the insufficiency of our
scientific knowledge to it."
2 Augustine, Confessions VI.11.19.
3 Montaigne, I.19: 78/87.
4 St Jerome's claim that Lucretius became insane after drinking a love-potion, wrote De Rerum Natura
during lucid intervals, and eventually committed suicide, can presumably, or at least plausibly, be
dismissed as Christian polemic. See Smith's full discussion in the introduction to his Loeb translation.
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two died violently, one perhaps abjectly, the other perhaps heroically; the third died
in his bed, perhaps piously. Perhaps: because in each case the reports are subsequent
constructions, open to the distortions of time and Tendenz. And the more in keeping
the death with the life, the more suspect - perhaps - the report. The account, for
example, in Tacitus of those last theatrical hours may give the impression that "mit
seinem Mord hat Seneca sein ganzes Werk neu geschrieben",5 but equally Tacitus
himself could have written it out of Seneca's works, or at least written it up.6 And
there is the further possibility that Tacitus' account is more subtly ironic and describes
a death "as ludicrous as it is symbolic."7 Similarly, Cicero's pathetic end - fleeing,
vacillating, at last offering his throat to the sword8 - inevitably recalls not only the
image of the dying gladiator in the Tusculans9 but the oscillation between
philosophical fortitude and emotional instability which characterised his life. Yet the
source behind Livy and Plutarch? Cicero's own slaves? or members of the execution
squad? or tendentious propaganda? or colores invented for the purposes of
suasoriae?10
5 Schönegg, p.243. Cf. Leeman, p.333: "Er hat Wort gehalten, und seinen Tod zu seinem grössten
Erlebnis und seiner Lebensrechtfertigung gemacht."
6 Cf. the way Seneca himself has written up Cato's death in De Prov. II.9-12. See the discussion in
Edwards (pp. 109-112), and compare the less flattering account in Cassius Dio 62.25.
7 Dyson, p.79. According to Dyson, each of the three stages of Seneca's death is intended by Tacitus
to capture "symbolically a part of his failure or hypocrisy": the botched vein-cutting compared with
Cato, the botched poisoning compared with Socrates, and the final steam bath as a symbol of luxurious
living.
8 Plutarch, Cic. 48-49. See also Livy's account in Seneca, Suasoriae 6.17 But Livy himself is
ambivalent: he appears to distinguish between the ignominious flight from death and the final
moments: "sed in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus, exilio, ruina partium pro
quibus steterat, filiae morte, exitu tam tristi atque acerbo, omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum
erat tulit praeter mortem." (Ibid. 6.22.) On Livy's intentions and the relationship between his account
and that of Asinius Pollio, see Pomeroy.
9 T.D. II.41.
10 Cf. Roller, p.109, note 2: "Modern biographers of Cicero more or less throw up their hands when
discussing his death." And rightly so, according to Roller, who argues that the treatment of Cicero's
death in suasoriae and controversiae - it was, as the elder Seneca reports, a favourite subject for
declamationes even in the triumviral period - may have had a decisive influence on the "historical"
accounts: "the death-of-Cicero tradition as a whole is rooted in and shaped by declamation." (p.123.)
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Then there is Montaigne himself. We know well enough how he would have liked to
die: planting his cabbages,11 or sliding pleasantly away,12 or - in keeping with his life
- "retirée et privée."13 But the only account is by some one who was not an
eyewitness: when the end approached, "he had Mass said in his room, and when the
priest came to the elevation of the Corpus Domini, this poor gentleman rose up as best
he could in his bed, with a desperate effort, hands clasped; and in this last action gave
up his spirit to God. Which was a fine mirror of his inmost soul."14 And perhaps it
was. But the truth is we have no idea what he found at the bottom of the pot.
In other words, there is no guarantee that at the final curtain the mask may not still be
in place,15 or, even if it is removed, that any of the audience will see what lies
behind.16 Certainly Montaigne may be right when he says that how we die is more
revealing than what we say about it in advance,17 but revealing to whom?18 And if
even during the last scene in the play the mask may still be on, and plain French is not
spoken, what chance is there of communicating our real thoughts about death at any
stage before that? That is to say, can we only speak of death as "la mort", while "ma
11 I.20: 87/99.
12 II.6: 357/423.
13 III.9: 956/1107.
14 Frame's translation (1965, p.305) of Estienne Pasquier.
15 Perhaps even more securely - cf. Starobinski p.98: "Qui nous assure qu'une belle mort n'est pas un
chef-d'oeuvre d'artifice?...Au lieu d'un démasquage, c'est le dernier méfait du masque."
16 Unless of course the audience is itself immortal, like the one Seneca imagines admiring the spectacle
of Cato's protracted suicide: "Inde credideram fuisse parum certum et efficax vulnus; non fuit diis
immortalibus satis spectare Catonem semel." (De Prov. II.12.)
17 He is of course not original in this: he goes on immediately to quote Lucretius III.57: "Nam verae
voces tum demum pectore ab imo / Eiciuntur, et eripitur persona, manet re.," And cf. Seneca
Ep.Mor.XXVI.5: "quid profecerim morti crediturus sum. Non timide itaque componor ad illum diem
quo remotis strophis ac fucis de me iudicaturus sum, utrum loquar fortia an sentiam, numquid
simulatio fuerit et mimus quidquid contra fortunam iactavi verborum contumacium."
18 The remark is made in the context of a discussion of Solon's injunction to call no man happy until he
is dead, which Montaigne interprets as referring to the manner in which a man dies. But the private or
ambiguous nature of death - and it is always one or the other - means that on this basis no man can ever
be pronounced happy.
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mort" remains something "solitaire, toute mienne"?19 Is this analogous to the remark
attributed to Bultmann, that when he thought as a theologian he ceased to be a
believer, because inevitably he found himself talking about God rather than to God?
Are we similarly condemned to objectivity in our communications about death, so
that while we may tear away the mask which our terrors and conventions have put
over the face of death,20 we can never succeed in removing the mask we wear
ourselves (or not until it is too late)? And are our thoughts about "la mort" as
inevitably and comically suspect as perhaps theology is?21 Are we, as Wordsworth
put it, in the dubious position of philosophers who peep and botanize upon their
mothers' graves? Or - in relation to our own graves - are we simply evading the issue
by endlessly talking about it, like Otho according to Tacitus: "Plura de extremis loqui
pars ignaviae est"?22
Perhaps a way out of that impasse is suggested by Augustine's second question: "ubi
nobis discenda sunt quae hinc negleximus?" It seems after all to a be common feature
of all six that the fact of death induced them to take life more seriously: an approach
encapsulated in Plato's mele,th qana,tou, but just as evident in Seneca's "Male vivet
quisquis nesciet bene mori,"23 in Lucretius' "at bene non poterat sine puro pectore
19 Montaigne, III.9: 956/1107.
20 Montaigne, II.20: 94/108.
21 The relationship between "ma mort" and "la mort" is closely analogous to that between
Kierkegaard's knight of faith and any philosophical System, or as he expresses it in the preface to the
Concluding Scientific Postscript: "The objective problem consists of an inquiry into the truth of
Christianity. The subjective problem concerns the relationship of the individual to Christianity. To put
it quite simply: How may I, Johannes Climacus, participate in the happiness promised by Christianity?
The problem concerns myself alone." (p.20.) The solution proposed by the System is simply
"incommensurable" with the problem, and to be unconscious of this is irresistibly comic: "When I
place an individual who is passionately and infinitely interested in his eternal happiness, in relation to
this theory [the objective theory represented by the Church or the Bible], so that he proposes to base his
happiness upon it, he becomes a comic figure. He does not become comical because he is infinitely
and passionately interested, this being precisely the good in him; but he becomes comical because the
objectivity of the Church theory is incommensurable with his interest." (Ibid. p.42.)
22 Tacitus, Hist.2.47.
23 Seneca, De Tr. An. XI.4.
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vivi,"24 in Anticleia's avlla. fo,wsde ta,cista lilai,eo\ tau/ta de. pa,nta / i;sq v( i[na kai.
meto,pisqe teh|/ ei;ph|sqa gunaiki, 25 in Cicero's "Cuius igitur potius opibus utamur
quam tuis, quae et vitae tranquillitatem largita nobis es et terrorem mortis
sustulisti?"26 and in Montaigne's "Au nombre de plusieurs autres offices que
comprend ce general et principal chapitre de sçavoir vivre, est cet article de sçavoir
mourir; et des plus legers si nostre crainte ne luy donnoit poids."27
And particularly the last seems to capture something of the essence of the Platonic
practice of death (in spite of Montaigne's apparent side-stepping of the issue in I.20):
how one lives is more important than how one dies. Yet the curious thing is that the
ethical dimension, Augustine's ethical link between the fact of death and the conduct
of life, is only really present in Plato, for whom, in the Gorgias and the Phaedo, what
follows death is the motivating force behind the examined life. The others of course
are all concerned with the good life, or the happy life, and the unmasking of death as
nothing to fear enables them to concentrate on living the good or the happy life, but
the ethical content of that life is not dictated by anything that may happen after death.
For Odysseus the prospect after death is, essentially, unrelieved gloom: the dead,
except for a handful in the Elysian fields, are miseri. For Lucretius the prospect is
extinction: the dead are nec miseri nec beati. For Cicero and Seneca it is one or other
of the Socratic alternatives, bliss or extinction; but if it turns out to be bliss that will
in the last analysis be irrespective of how we have led our lives: the dead are aut
beati aut non miseri. And Montaigne, ironically enough (he might be expected, as a
24 Lucretius, V.18.
25 Od. xi.223f.
26 T.D. V.5.
27 Montaigne, III.12: 1029/1191.
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Catholic, to see the dead as aut beati aut miseri), seems to endorse Lucretius28 and
ridicules Plato's conception of an afterlife involving corporeal pleasures and pains.29
There is no correlation for any of them except Plato between the quality of this life
and the quality of any afterlife:30 the fear of death, including the fear of what may
happen after death, is simply a disturbing distraction which gets in the way of living.
That refusal to approach death as something which makes me accountable for my
actions during this life is both the result of and a stimulus to an objectification of
death. If what is in store for us - whether good, bad, or indifferent - is independent of
what we have been, then we are encouraged to look on death as simply a fact of
nature - "la mort". The only differentiating feature is how I confront the moment of
death, yet that turns out to be irrelevant: a private or ambiguous moment, perhaps
connected with what precedes but certainly unconnected with anything which follows.
And this objectification of death has itself something of the conjuring trick about it:
death is nothing to be afraid of, so we should stop thinking about it (although for
someone like Seneca the only way to stop being afraid of it may be to think about it
constantly). So the paradoxical position is reached where the demand of approaching
death to be taken seriously has been met only by declining to take death seriously: the
sting of "ma mort" is removed by transforming it into "la mort",31 and the sting of "la
mort" is removed by transforming it into a benevolent fact of life. It's not that the
dragon has been tamed with a saucer of milk: the dragon has been shown to be
nothing but a pussy cat.
28 Montaigne, I.20: 93/105.
29 II.12: 498/578.
30 A correlation summed up in Phaedo 107C: eiv me.n ga.r h=n o` qa,natoj tou/ panto.j avpallagh,(
e[rmaion a'n h=n toi/j kakoi/j avpoqanou/si tou/ te sw,matoj a[m v avphlla,cqai kai. th/j au`tw/n kaki,aj meta.
th/j yuch/j)
31 Cf. Montaigne, III.4: 815/943: "Je voyois nonchalamment la mort, quand je la voyois
universellement, comme fin de la vie: je la gourmande en bloc; par le menu, elle me pille."
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And this - most curious of all - seems to be the case even if the scenario envisaged in
Augustine's third question is accepted: "Quid, si mors ipsa omnem curam cum sensu
amputabit et finiet?" Augustine's own reaction to the possibility is appalled rejection:
"sed absit, ut ita sit." But for Lucretius - and for him it is not a possibility but a
certainty - it represents release from the irrational fear of divine punishment. And
both Cicero and Seneca, although they hope for some form of immortality, also
consider the alternative of extinction with equanimity. The whole of the second part
of Book I of the Tusculans is devoted to demonstrating that "ne si interirent quidem
animi, quidquam mali esse in morte,"32 and Seneca repeats many of the arguments.
And of course the stance derives ultimately from the Socrates of the Apology, who
likens oblivion to a pleasant sleep.
The question then arises, why Socrates, Lucretius, Cicero and Seneca find the
prospect so undisturbing? Why do they not recoil in horror like Augustine, or indeed
like the common man whose instinctive objections they are concerned to refute?
There are of course the stock arguments: the symmetry argument, the argument that
what does not exist does not suffer. But there are arguments on the other side, for
example what Augustine goes on to say, that it is inconceivable that divine providence
should allow such a thing - an argument which may readily be secularised into a
protest against the futility of the richness of life vanishing into nothing. It is no doubt
the case that what does not exist does not suffer, but (as the interlocutor in the
Tusculans33implies) can we suffer the idea of not existing? Why is it then that these
philosophers find it so easy to do so? Or is this a case of "ces beaux discours de la
32 T.D. I.81.
33 See T.D. I.14.
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Philosophie [qui] ne sont en nous que par contenance", of not speaking plain
French?34
The point perhaps is that any discourse is forced to objectify or universalise the
problem: the private nature of approaching death - "ma mort" - is by definition
incommunicable. But because it is only "ma mort" which is important, or which
constitutes the problem, philosophical discourse can never help.35 It tries to help by
concentrating primarily on the moment of death, and drawing up rules or principles
which dictate how we should prepare for it or rehearse it. But it can only succeed to
the extent that what has begun as play-acting continues to the end of the performance.
And by treating death as theatre, it inevitably fails to deal with it as reality.
But all this is emotionally unsatisfying. The questions about approaching death are
raised by the individual about the individual: when and how will I die? what will
become of me? how can I grasp or be reconciled to the notion of my own extinction?
Yet because the responses given by these philosophers are generalisations, all framed
in terms of "us" or "mankind", they never answer the questions: they can never take
away either my responsibility for my own approaching death, or my unique
relationship to it and its consequences.
Perhaps that is the reason why Montaigne continues to fascinate: that he is not in the
least objective, and not at all neat and pauschal. On the contrary, he is quickly
34 Montaigne, I.19: 78/87.
35 Cf. Nagel, 1986, p.231: "Of course from the objective standpoint the existence or non-existence of
any particular objective self, including this one, is unimportant. The objective viewpoint may try to
cultivate an indifference to its own annihilation, but there will be something false about it: the
individual attachment to life will force its way back even at this level. Here, for once, the objective self
is not in a position of safety."
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dissatisfied with the Senecan concentration on the act of dying; he is impatient with
the conventional trappings which mask the reality of death; he wants to die far from
home, privately, alone; he approves of the simplicity of the peasant as opposed to "les
beaux discours de la Philosophie."36 Of course reducing everything to the simplicity
of the peasant seems to be itself an objectification - death is simply to be accepted as a
part of nature. But in fact Montaigne can never be a peasant,37 precisely because the
peasant does not ask questions, does not commune with himself and examine his life,
does not write essays about death, does not engage in dialogue with his readers.
Perhaps therefore Montaigne comes closest to bridging the gap between the subjective
and the objective. It can never be bridged completely - my death can never be shared
- but perhaps someone like Montaigne can talk to himself, in my hearing, about his
death in such a way as to suggest how I can talk to myself about my own death.38
And in this he seems to be in the spirit of Plato. There is a passage in the Laches
where Nicias says that no matter what you talk about with Socrates you always find
yourself answering questions about yourself, about how you have led your life and
how you are leading it.39 That kind of self-examination is what Montaigne is
engaged in, that is what the Essais are.40 Indeed as Screech says, "Essais are the work
36 I.19: 78/87.
37 Cf. Glauser, p.19: "Ses oppositions sont des ruses d'écrivain. Quand il prétend vouloir ressembler
aux artisans et aux laboureurs qu'il croit plus heureux que des recteurs d'université, il oublie, pour le
jeu, que ceux qu'il jalouse n'écrivent pas d'Essais et qu'ils sont par là très peu dignes d'envie."
38 Compare the way Augustine envisages his conversation with God (garriebam tibi - IX.1) being
overheard by the Reader of the Confessions, e.g. X.34.1: "Restat voluptas oculorum istorum carnis
meae, de qua loquor confessiones, quas audiant aures templi tui, aures fraternae et piae..."
39 Laches 187E. Cf. M. Frede (pp.216 f.) on why Plato chose the dramatic dialogue rather than the
treatise: "To know, we learn from the early dialogues, is not just a matter of having an argument,
however good it may be, for a thesis. Knowledge also involves that the rest of one's beliefs, and hence,
at least in some cases, one's whole life, be in line with one's argument...In this way knowledge, or at
least a certain kind of knowledge Plato is particularly interested in, is a highly personal kind of
achievement...For, at least on these questions which matter, it is crucial that one arrive at the right view
by one's own thought, rather than on the authority of somebody else, e.g. the questioner."
40 Cf. O'Neill, pp.119f.: "[Montaigne] requires of us that we essay the problem of living in a manner
that is faithful to the diversity of life's moods and historical patterns, trusting to no centre but what we
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of an apprentice: [Montaigne's] wisdom is an 'apprenticed wisdom'. Not by accident,
the last word in Book I is apprentissage."41 And perhaps it is equally significant that
at the beginning of I.20 Montaigne translates Cicero's commentatio mortis as "quelque
aprentissage et ressemblance de la mort." Because although in I.20 he seems to set
aside that interpretation, his relationship with approaching death throughout the
Essais could well be described as mele,th qana,tou)42
In other words, rather than explicating or interpreting "what Plato meant" by the
practice of death, Montaigne practised death himself. Of course to the systematic
critic (and Montaigne suffers from him too)43 this is disappointing and frustrating.
The systematic critic, like Clitophon, wants to be told what to do next, what precisely
is involved in Plato's mele,th qana,tou, what is the "essential thought" contained in
Montaigne's aprentissage. But the interesting thing about the Clitophon is that
Socrates answers not a word.44
Then there is the other question - the question of approaching "sa mort", of
bereavement - which either receives no answer at all, or is again "solved" by way of
truly find in ourselves. Thus any exploration that is guided by Montaigne is simultaneously an essay in
sharing our humanity with one who, like Socrates, was never more himself than in the company of
others, but who shaped his own life by never leaving hold of the question it offered him."
41 Screech, 1983, p.13.
42 Cf. Glauser, p.29: "Le thème [la mort] est si vaste et si obsédant qu'il devient le tissu de sa vie."
43 See e.g. O'Neill's criticism (p.47) of "the moralist reading" of Montaigne, "which consists of
anthologizing or rendering the essential thought of Montaigne in terms of a set of timely moral
maxims... It is assumed without question that there is literally an underlying essence of Montaigne's
thought which can be reached with more economy, or with improved assembly, than Montaigne
himself achieved. It is further assumed on behalf of the reader that the reader is interested only in the
shortest way to the gist of Montaigne's thought."
44 And if the Clitophon is not by Plato, then as Kierkegaard said (Philosophical Fragments, p.15) we
can cite it as an independent witness to the Socratic method. Of course the Clitophon may not be quite
as straightforward as this. But neither may it be quite as complex as, for example, Slings makes out -
Clitophon is "the real Socrates" (p.53), while the Socrates of the reported speeches represents the
protreptic Socratic literature which is the target of the author's criticism; Socrates' silence at the end
then simply means that "he has been beaten at his own game." (p.18.)
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generalizations:45 by restating the problem in generalized terms it is shown not to
exist.46 If you have lost your child, the philosopher will console you by telling you
that you are not alone, by pointing to all the countless others who have lost a child.
So, by sleight of hand, it is no longer your child you have lost, it is only a child. It is
no longer a case of "She, she is dead, she's dead; and when thou knowest this / Thou
know'st how dry a cinder this world is." Miraculously, "she" has become just one
among millions, and the world goes on as before.
Of course it is unreasonable to criticize the ancient consolatores for failing in
something which they did not attempt. As Kassel says,47 the remark of Aristippus:
h[kw par v u`ma/j ouvc w`j sullupou,menoj( avll v i[na pau,sw u`ma/j lupoume,nouj, might
serve as a motto for all of them. In Cicero's terms, the object was to enable the
sufferer to endure life both as homo and as vir: as a member of the human race and
therefore subject to vicissitude, but also as a man and therefore with fortitude.48 On
the other hand, it is not unreasonable to criticize the consolatores for attempting
45 Cf. Nagel, 1986, pp.223f.: "The desire to go on living...is essentially first-personal...and therefore it
collides with objective indifference about the survival of anyone in particular. Your relation to your
own death is unique, and here if anywhere the subjective standpoint holds a dominant position. By the
same token, the internal standpoint will be vicariously dominant in your attitude toward the deaths of
those to whom you are so close that you see the world through their eyes."
Again Kierkegaard's "incommensurability" is apposite. And just how incommensurable the objective
consolatio is with the individual's sorrow is captured in the famous exchange in King John 3.4.90-98:
Pandulph. You hold too heinous a respect of grief.
Constance. He talks to me that never had a son.
King Philip. You are as fond of grief as of your child.
Constance. Grief fills the room up of my absent child:
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me,
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words,
Remembers me of all his gracious parts,
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form;
Then have I reason to be fond of grief!
46 Cf. Nagel (1979, pp.196-213, a chapter entitled "Subjective and Objective") on the difficulties
incurred by thoroughgoing objectivism: "The problems...arise because certain subjectively apparent
facts about the self seem to vanish as one ascends to a more objective standpoint." (p.210.) "We can
pursue a unified if very etiolated conception of reality by detaching progressively from our own point
of view. We just have to keep in mind what we are leaving behind, and not be fooled into thinking that
we have made it disappear." (p.213.)
47 Kassel, p.52.
48 Fam. 5.17.3.
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something which was impossible, and failing to see it. But Euphrates saw it clearly
enough when his wife died: w= filosofi,a( turannika, sou ta. evpita,gmata\ le,geij
"fi,lei", ka'n avpoba,lh| tij le,geij "mh. lupou/".49 (And this epigram seems to capture
the shortcomings not only of the consolatio but of the ancient ethical outlook
generally, as simultaneously too objective and too egocentric: the end is the good or
happy life, but the good or happiness of other people are a means to that end. Ideally
the two may be compatible, but where in practice they are not - for example, when the
other person is removed from the scene - the priority is self-therapy. Grief is simply
an obstacle to the preservation of equilibrium.)
Philosophy, in the shape of the consolationes, did make allowance for the possibility
that there might be some delay in obeying its tyrannical commands; but in the
meantime the important thing was to keep up appearances: the show must go on.
(The contradiction that philosophers who make a point of not caring a straw for public
opinion should attach so much importance to the public face of bereavement does not
seem to have struck any of them.) But fortunately (since it reassures us that we are
dealing with flesh and blood after all) we have access to what Cicero and Montaigne
really felt: in the breakdown of the one - to the embarrassment of his friends - and in
the permanent inconsolability of the other. Because perhaps it is this which is most
unsatisfying about the consolatores: not just that some of their solutions to the
problem of death are too neat, too pauschal, but that they purport to solve the problem
at all.
49 See Kassel, p.58.
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Yet there is one question which none of these philosophers of death even raise, far
less answer: the Karamazov question. "If all must suffer to pay for the eternal
harmony, what have children to do with it? . . . And so I renounce the higher harmony
altogether. It's not worth the tears of that one tortured child . . ."50
The question is: how is it possible to propose an approach to death, and particularly
to the death of the other, which takes no account at all of the sufferings of the
innocent? Cicero, Seneca and Montaigne all reveal an almost obsessive interest in the
bereaved father: the Tusculans, the Epistulae Morales and the Essais are crammed
with anecdotes about facing the death of children with stoical fortitude: but
invariably it is the father's point of view which is presented.51 There is nothing in
Montaigne to distinguish the predicament (his own) of the middle-aged or elderly
gentleman learning to face death, from the predicament of the dying child whose life
has barely begun. And there is nothing in Cicero to suggest that the fears and
disappointed dreams of the dying child might pose a more significant challenge than
those of its father.
Montaigne cites the case of Hilary of Poitiers, who was so concerned about the
spiritual welfare of his much-wooed daughter that he prayed constantly for her early
death; and when this took place he and his wife were overjoyed - so much so that his
wife asked him to pray for her own premature death, in which he was also
successful.52 Montaigne apparently sees this as an example of Christian Stoicism.
Others might see it as barbaric, and as representing the exactly opposite point of view
50 Dostoevsky, pp.250f.
51 Most startlingly perhaps in De Prov. III.2, where Seneca suggests that "liberos coniugem ecferre" is
good for the soul.
52 Montaigne, I.33: 216/246.
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from that of Ivan Karamazov, because of course in Hilary's eyes the last person to be
consulted is the child herself.
For both Cicero and Montaigne (and for Seneca), the "patient" as it were is the writer
himself.53 If it is my death which is the issue, the question is how do I face it, how do
I remove its sting, how do I persuade myself that it is not something to be feared? If it
is someone else's death, the question is how do I learn to accept it, so that it no longer
really affects me; or better, how do I train myself in advance so that it will not really
affect me at all? And both Cicero and Montaigne pretend that their recipe has
universal application: this is how death should be approached, they say, by everyone.
But how is it possible to be so naive? Just shift the centre of gravity slightly, so that it
is no longer my death we are talking about, or the death of some one else as it affects
me, and ask how any of these theoretical approaches can be of any possible help or
relevance to, for example, a nineteen-year-old girl who is given a year to live.
Montaigne apparently would say, in his first phase: "You should have been
anticipating this and learning how to face it when it came so that it would hold no
terrors for you;" and in his later phase he would say: "Don't think about it, it'll only
make matters worse." Cicero would say: "Either the soul is immortal, in which case
you should think yourself lucky; or it is not, in which case you've nothing to worry
about because you won't exist and you won't be aware of anything." (And Hilary of
Poitiers would say: "Give thanks to God that my prayers have been answered.")
53 Cf. Long's remark (pp.33-34) on Stoicism (but he intends it for Hellenistic ethics generally): "the
theory seems to treat the material well-being of other people as something that is not essential to their
good, and therefore not something we should make it our business to promote for its own sake or be
distressed about when it is absent."
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The question is not so much whether any of these extraordinary statements would do
any good to the unfortunate girl, but whether anyone (other than Hilary) would be so
callous or crass as to make them in the first place. Would Cicero have spoken in
those terms to Tullia on her deathbed? Would Montaigne have spoken in those terms
to La Boétie on his? The probability is that neither of them would have found
anything at all to say (except perhaps the sort of conventional noises about a happy
afterlife with which Montaigne did in fact haltingly try to reassure La Boétie).
Because Karamazov's question is not just that of theodicy: it is motivated by pity. Or
perhaps that way of putting it is still too self-centred. Karamazov's question is a
question on behalf of the child, not on his own behalf. It expresses the cry of pain,
and of disappointed hopes, and of fear in the face of the unknown, which the child
utters and to which there appears to be no answer. And any approach to death which
does not even attempt to deal with that cry of pain and fear and disappointment is
simply divorced from reality.
But curiously enough something of that reality is to be found in the fantastic world of
the Odyssey. It is to be found generalised in the category of parqenikai, t v avtalai.
neopenqe,a qumo.n e;cousai among the shades,54 and individualised in the poignant fate
of Elpenor. Elpenor is dismissed in the commentaries as a burlesque figure whose
preposterous claim to a hero's funeral rites is humoured by an embarrassed Odysseus.
But that is to measure him against the standards of heroic death in the Iliad.55 In the
Odyssey there are no heroic deaths.56 The suitors' deaths are abject, the maids'
54 Od. xi.39.
55 See e.g. Heubeck, 1989, p.81: "Elpenor requests an honourable burial. The heroic language, which
intentionally recalls the Iliad, highlights the incongruity of Elpenor's claim to status: his birth, station
in life, achievements, as well as the manner of his death, are profoundly unheroic."
56 Indeed even the hero of the Odyssey is less than, or more than, the heroes of the Iliad. Cf. Clarke,
2004, p.89: "Where the Iliad problematises heroic excellence and explores its underlying bitterness,
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pathetic, those of Odysseus' comrades - whether devoured by the Cyclops or the
Scylla, or speared like fish by the Laestrygonians - accompanied by shrieks and
outstretched imploring hands. No one goes gently into the darkness - the only gentle
death is the one prophesied by Tiresias for Odysseus himself - and no one goes
heroically. Even Achilles, who in the Iliad unhesitatingly chooses to die rather than
live in dishonour, in the Odyssey yearns for life at any price.
It is that yearning for life at any price which Elpenor embodies. The manner of his
dying is farcical, but the fact of his death is tragic: on the threshold of life, his
experience limited to the comradeship of rowing, which he asks to be memorialised in
the oar planted on his grave. Indeed there is something sublime about the pathos of
Elpenor's death, just because it is so unheroic,57 and just because there is no
consolatio. The idea that death is the negation of life - in the sense of a dim
awareness of its absence - entails an extraordinary enhancement of the importance of
being alive. A studied indifference to death, or a victory over death, or an eager
anticipation of death are all inconceivable. And so is any kind of consolatio.
Odysseus' terse agreement to Elpenor's request has nothing to do with reflecting its
the Odyssey moves below and beyond the glamour of heroism to a more fundamental level of the
human condition, where the hero succeeds only by accepting the inevitability of his lowliness."
Cf. also Rohdich: "Der ideologische Abstand der Odyssee von der Vergangenheit, der die
überkommenen Begriffe von Heroik und Ruhm revidiert und ihren erhabenen Anspruch nach dem
Mass eines neuen Weltverständnisses korrigiert, findet in der Elpenor-Gestalt seinen beredtesten
Zeugen. (p.111)...In ihm ehren Odysseus und die Dichtung, deren Eponym er ist, das Unglück der
verlorenen Heimat. Das traditionelle Heldengrab wird in einer zugleich niedrigeren und höheren Weise
zum Zeichen: nicht mehr Künder einer der menschlichen Kondition abgetrotzten Göttergleichheit, die
wertvoller wäre als das Leben, sondern Trost über einen Verlust, der banal und doch der grösste ist."
(pp.113f.)
57 Cf. Rohdich, p. 114: "Unglücklich gewesen zu sein...erscheint als Elpenors einzige Qualität...Der
sublimierte Hunger nach Grandeur, Göttergleichheit und Unvergänglichkeit im Ruhm wird transparent
auf ein elementareres Bedürfnis, das sich traditioneller Sicht als eine Degeneration zur Trivialität
darbietet, nach der Intention der Odyssee aber umgekehrt den Geist des heroischen Zeitalters wie eine
ungeheure Denaturierung erscheinen lässt, wie eine grossartig-schreckliche Deviation der
menschlichen Geschichte, einen kalten Rausch, aus dem es gleichsam zur Besinnung zu kommen gilt."
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inappropriateness:58 it is simply that there is nothing more to say, no comfort to be
given.
58 E.g. Heubeck, 1989, p.82: "Odysseus promises to fulfil, and by the brevity of his reply distances
himself from, Elpenor's request."
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